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Abstract/Résumé 
Abstract. This dissertation explores the factors shaping American foreign policy toward 
secessionist crises since the end of the Cold War. The main research puzzle is the 
following: Why is it that, facing the resurgence of secessionist movements in the last 15 
years, the United States reacted to it by supporting the territorial integrity of central states 
in sorne cases (Serbia, Somalia, Moldova), while recognizing the independence of 
secessionist states in other cases (Croatia, Eritrea, East Timor)? How can this apparent 
inconsistency be explained? This dissertation argues that regional stability is the main 
U.S. interest when responding to secessionism. It asserts that, when facing a secessionist 
crisis, the American government will choose the option (i.e. supporting state integrity or 
secessionism) that provides the greatest expected gain of regional stability depending on 
the evolution of the crisis. This explains why the American government's response to 
secessionism fluctuates from one case to another. 
The performed qualitative analysis, which includes cases taken from two regional 
settings, the Balkans and the Horn of Africa, confirms the effect of the regional stability 
factor on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. It shows that the fluctuation of the U.S. 
response is not caused by political inconsistency but by a coherent set of regional stability 
interests. The research also proceeds to the measurement of two competing arguments-
namely ethnie polities and business interests. Case studies show that these domestie 
arguments fail to account for the research puzzle under investigation and that the regional 
stability argument consistently offers better explanations and predictions. Thus, this 
dissertation challenges liberal claims that domestic politics define foreign policy. 
Résumé. Cette thèse se penche sur les facteurs qui définissent la politique étrangère 
américaine à l'égard des conflits sécessionnistes depuis la fin de la guerre froide. La 
principale question de recherche est la suivante: Pourquoi est-ce qu'à la suite de la 
résurgence des mouvements sécessionnistes au cours des 15 dernières années, les États-
Unis ont réagi à ce phénomène en soutenant l'intégrité territoriale des États dans certains 
cas (la Serbie, la Somalie, la Moldavie), tout en appuyant et en reconnaissant 
l'indépendance d'États sécessionnistes dans d'autres cas (la Croatie, l'Érythrée, le Timor 
Oriental)? Comment pouvons-nous expliquer cette apparente incohérence? Cette thèse 
soutient que la stabilité régionale constitue le principal intérêt des États-Unis face à ce 
type de conflits. Lorsque le gouvernement américain fait face à une crise sécessionniste à 
l'étranger, il choisit l'option (appuyer l'État central ou le mouvement sécessionniste) qui 
offre le gain de stabilité régionale le plus probable. Cela explique pourquoi la réaction des 
États-Unis face aux conflits sécessionnistes varie d'un cas à l'autre. 
Une analyse qualitative incluant des cas d'étude provenant de deux ensembles 
régionaux, les Balkans et la Corne de l'Afrique, confirme l'impact du facteur « stabilité 
régionale » sur la formulation de la politique étrangère des États-Unis. Cette analyse 
démontre que la variation de la réaction américaine face aux conflits sécessionnistes n'est 
pas causée par une incohérence politique mais par des intérêts de stabilité régionale 
clairement définis. Cette thèse évalue également l'impact de la politique éthnique et des 
intérêts commerciaux. Elle démontre que ces facteurs domestiques expliquent mal la 
problématique de recherche et que la thèse de la stabilité régionale, qui se concentre sur 
des facteurs internationaux, offre constamment une meilleure explication et de meilleures 
prédictions. Ainsi, la présente recherche met au défi les thèses dites libérales qui 
soutiennent que la politique interne aux États-Unis définit la politique étrangère. 
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The Research Puzzle 
1. 
Introduction: The Research Puzzle 
Introduction 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, secessionist conflicts emerged 
as an important security concern for the United States. In the last 15 years, 
secessionism has been the driving force behind several conflicts that endangered 
regional orders. During the Cold War, secessionist aspirations were often 
repressed by authoritarian regimes. The end of the communist bloc, however, 
awakened latent ethnic conflicts and resulted in an upsurge of secessionist 
movements. l The disintegration of Yugoslavia, the separation of Czechoslovakia 
and the partition of Ethiopia were all caused by secessionist movements. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1999 war in Kosovo were also related to 
secessionist struggles. These examples show that, since the early 1990s, 
secessionism has caused significant international disruption. While sorne 
secessionist crises threatened the stability of the Balkans (Croatia, Slovenia), of 
Eastern Europe (Moldova) and of the Caucasus (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), others 
disrupted the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Somaliland), and South East Asia 
(Bougainvillea, East Timor). 
As the most powerful state in the current international system, the United 
States has been quite concerned with secessionist ambitions and is cautious to not 
encourage independentist movements abroad. As Secretary of State Warren 
1 David Cannent and Patrick James, "Ethnie Confliet at the International Level", in David Carment 
and Patrick James, (eds.), Wars in the Midst ofPeaee: The International Polities of Ethnie Conjliet, 
Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1997, p. 1. 
, 
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Christopher once mentioned, the world is made of thousands of ethnic minorities 
and less than two hundred sovereign states. Allowing the right of external self-
determination to ethnic minorities would lead to permanent turmoil in the 
international system.2 Joseph Nye, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the 
Clinton administration, makes a similar argument when he asserts that the political 
precedent that the U.S. "would create by endorsing a general right of self-
determination could have disastrous consequences". Nye argues that the United 
States should, therefore, be extremely cautious about "demands for secession by 
groups in lndonesia, Central Asia, or in many African countries" because they can 
create enormous violence.3 
A close look at the literature on American foreign policy shows, however, 
that scholars have neglected the study of secessionist self-determination and 
treated it as an epiphenomenon of broader international events (i.e. intrastate wars, 
states collapse, ethnic conflicts). Several questions regarding the U.S. foreign 
policy toward secessionist conflicts remain, therefore, unanswered and more 
research must be conducted on the United States' role, interests and behavior 
toward ethno-nationalist struggles in the world. 
In this dissertation, 1 attempt to remedy the lack of research in this 
important domain by trying to understand what determines the American reaction 
toward secessionist conflicts. More specifically, this research focuses on the 
2 Warren M. Christopher, Hearings: Nomination of Warren M Christopher to be Seeretary of 
State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C.: Govemment Printing Office, 1993, 
p. 72. Also cited in David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars: Ameriean Power and Ethnie Conjliets, 
New York: Hill and Wang Editions, 1997, p. 27. 
3 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of Ameriean Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 152. 
2 
The Research Puzzle 
variation of the American response to secessionist self-determination. Past events 
have demonstrated that, facing the resurgence of secessionist conflicts in the post-
Cold War era, the United States has reacted in a contradictory manner by backing 
the host states struggling with secessionist movements in sorne cases, while 
supporting the independence of secessionist groups in others.4 Why is this so? 
Why, for instance, did the U.S. recognize Slovenia, Eritrea, and East Timor, but 
remain categorically opposed to the independence of Abkhazia, Kosovo, or 
Somaliland? How can we explain this policy variation? Can this apparent 
inconsistency of the U.S. response be explained by the legitimacy of each case of 
secession, by the regional environment in which secessionist movements emerge, 
or by the lobbying of U.S. ethnic groups mobilized for the independence of their 
ethnic kin abroad or against the breakup of their homeland? These are the main 
questions addressed in this dissertation and they raise an important theoretical 
puzzle in the field of U.S. foreign policy. In tackling this research problem, this 
dissertation also assesses whether the American government has developed a clear 
and standardized policy or a coherent strategy to face the resurgence of 
secessionism since the end of the Cold War. 
Thus, this research does not focus on the normative dimension of the 
formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward secessionist self-determination 
movements, but rather on empirical evidences, on the underlying motives of 
Washington' s response.5 
4 1 interchangeably use "central state" and "ho st state", They both refer to a sovereign state that is 
struggling against a secessionist movement. 
5 For a normative account of how the United States should respond to ethnic secessionist 
movements see: Patricia Carley, Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the 
3 
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Regional Stability Matters 
This dissertation argues that existing foreign policy and international 
relations arguments cannot account for the research question under investigation. 
It maintains that current systemic and domestic propositions are based on 
assumptions that fail to capture the logic and preferences behind the American 
behavior toward secessionist struggles. 
Therefore, this research proposes a two-step explanation stressing the 
importance ofregional stability as the United States' paramount interest to explain 
the variation in the American foreign policy toward secessionism. It argues that 
the U.S. is a stability-seeking power and it explains why the American govemment 
has a bias in favor of state unity. Put simply, the first step of the regional stability 
argument maintains that the U.S. supports central states facing secessionist crises 
as long as they can guarantee regional stability. The second step of the model 
asserts, however, that if a central state is unable or unwilling to keep regional order 
when struggling with its own secessionist movement(s), the United States will 
consent to recognizing the secessionist state if, and only if, secessionists can 
demonstrate their ability to keep stability. In such a case, the U.S. policy shift is 
justified by the fact that recognition would validate an expected gain of regional 
stability. The model argues, therefore, that this explains why the United States 
departed on multiple occasions from its traditional policy of supporting territorial 
Right to Secession, Report from a Roundtable held in Conjunction with the U.S. Department of 
State's Policy Planning Staff, Washington D.C.: United States Institute ofPeace, February 1995. 
http://www . tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/9 5usip. pdf (accessed September 2006). 
See also Patricia Carley, u.s. Responses to Self-Determination Movements: Strategies for 
Nonviolent Outcomes and Alternatives to Secession, Report from a Roundtable held in Conjunction 
with the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace, July 1997. http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks16.pdf (accessed 
September 2006). 
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integrity since the early 1990s. This two-step model is presented at length in 
Chapter 3. 
Why this Research? 
Why is it important to understand the variation of the U.S. reaction to 
secessionism since the end of the Cold War? l consider that the resolution of this 
theoretical problem is pressing for several reasons. First, the United States' record 
of support for secessionism has strongly increased since the early 1990s, and this 
marked a significant departure from its traditional anti-secessionist policy. We 
must understand why. 
Second, separatist movements constitute, at the dawn of the 21 st century, an 
enduring challenge for the lone American superpower as weIl as for the 
international community.6 Take for instance the cases of Aceh, Chechnya, 
Dniester, Turkish Kurdistan and Quebec. By understanding how the United States 
reacts to secessionism, we will be better equipped to explain its policy and to 
predict its response toward future secessionist attempts. 
Third, the U.S. can have a direct impact on the success or failure of 
secessionist attempts through its power of recognition.7 lndeed, not all acts of 
6 David Callahan, "The Enduring Challenge: Self Determination and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st 
Century", New York: Carnegie Corporation, 2002. ht1p://www.carnegie.org/pdflethnicconflict.pdf 
(accessed July 2006). 
7 Achieving international recognition is one of the most important aspects of secessIon. Diplomatic 
recognition is critical to secessionist groups since it often draws the line between successful and 
failed cases of secession. See Donald Horowitz, Ethnie Groups in Confliet, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2nd Edition, 2000, p. 230. 
According to Alexis Heraclides, international recognition is crucial for secessionists because 
"ultimately, it is numerous recognitions that will transform a secessionist entity (a unilaterally-
declared state contravening the strict self-determination principle) into a state". Alexis Heraclides, 
5 
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recognition carry the same political weight. An act of recognition granted by the 
United States or by a major power has a greater impact on the process of secession 
than recognition granted by a weaker state. The reason for this is simple: powerful 
states have the political leverage to make secession a fait accompli. Their 
intervention in favor of secessionists can significantly increase the credibility of 
secession, regardless of the qualitative value and merits of the case. This explains, 
for instance, why Biafra failed to secede from Nigeria in the late 1960s or Kosovo 
from Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990s. While both of these secessionist 
states were recognized by some foreign states, they failed to obtain recognition 
from great powers.8 In fact, without U.S. and/or great power recognition, 
secessionist states cannot normally function in the interstate system and their 
independence has almost no value on the international scene. These states can 
hardly participate in international organizations, such as the United Nations, or 
request economic support from the International Monetary Fond (IMF) and the 
World Bank (e.g. the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus since 1983, 
Somaliland since 1991, Macedonia from 1991 to 1994). 
Finally, data shows that since 1945, the United States has intervened in 
intrastate conflicts more often than any other major power.9 Patrick Regan points 
out that among the 76 cases of intervention in intrastate conflicts carried out by 
The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Polities, New Jersey: Frank Cass, 1991, 
p.49. 
8 Biafra was recognized by Gabon, Hiliti, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia. See Stephen M. 
Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnie Polities, Foreign Policy & International Conflict. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 74-85. Kosovo was recognized by Albania. 
9 Patrick M. Regan, "Conditions ofSuccessful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts", 
Journal ofConf/iet Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1996, pp. 336-359. 
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major powers between 1945 and 1994, the United States accounted for 46 percent 
of these interventions. lO Regan's analysis is a clear indication that the U.S. is the 
most important intervener in internaI conflicts and that it has arguably the most 
impact. Thus, for reasons mentioned above, 1 assert that it is crucial for scholars 
and policymakers to understand the motives behind the American response to 
secessionist crises. 
Clarifications and Research Method 
Over the years, there has been great confusion over the meaning of words 
used to describe the process leading states to achieve independence and 
sovereignty. Sorne authors have interchangeably used the words secession, 
separation and partition, while others have given particular meaning to each of 
these concepts. For clarity purposes, this dissertation uses the word secession, 
which is defined here as: "the formaI withdrawal from a central political authority 
by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign 
status".l1 Moreover, the focus of this dissertation is on secessionist movements 
that have officially declared secession from their central state. It would be 
pointless to study whether or not the V.S. recognized secessionist states that never 
declared independence. 
The concept of regional stability, which is at the center of the proposed 
model, should also be clearly explained. 1 define regional stability as a state of 
10 For the same period of time, the Soviet Union (Russia after 1991) only accounted for 21 % of 
these interventions, France for 13%, Britain for 12%, and China for 8%. Ibid., p. 345. 
11 John R. Wood, "Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework", Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1981, p. 110. 
7 
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peace existing between sovereign states in a region. This implies the maintenance 
and respect of international borders (including no refugees flowing across 
international borders), and the nonintervention in states' internal affairs. 1 maintain 
that, taken together, these elements constitute the main interest of the United States 
toward secessionist conflicts as explained in Chapter 3. 
This dissertation focuses on six cases of U.S. response to secessionist 
crises: Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Slovenia, Eritrea, and Somaliland. This 
selection allows for a variation in the dependent variable by focusing on cases of 
U.S. recognition as weIl as on cases of nonrecognition. This limits the problem of 
selection bias and strengthens the external validity of the research. Moreover, this 
study deals with cases taken from two different regional environments, the 
Balkans and the Hom of Africa. This allows us not only to measure variations 
between cases coming from the same regional setting, but also to appraise cross-
regional variations. Through these six cases, this dissertation will therefore 
measure: 1) the micro-variations of the U.S. response toward each case across time 
(i.e. the evo1ution, if any, of the U.S. policy vis-à-vis each case); 2) the variations 
between cases within the same regional environment; and, 3) the macro-variations 
of the American response to secessionism by comparing the two regional 
environments. 
To evaluate the robustness of the regional stability argument presented in 
Chapter 3, this research combines the method of structured-focused comparison to 
process-tracing. This methodological combination allows us to systematically 
focus on facts that are relevant for the measurement of this model as weIl as to 
8 
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make the appropriate connections between the regional stability argument and 
observable outcomes. Chapter 3 will develop further on the methods used. 
This dissertation also looks at two competing domestic arguments and 
compares them to the extemal argument ofregional stability. As Chapter 2 shows, 
the two domestic propositions studied, ethnic politics and business interests, need 
further empirical testing. This dissertation provides additional empirical 
measurement by applying them to the six selected empirical cases. This will allow 
us to assess whether the proposed extemal argument offers better explanations and 
predictions than the two domestic propositions. Hopefully, this comparison will 
contribute to the debate conceming the main sources ofU.S. foreign policy. 
Finally, it is important to note that this dissertation does not pretend that 
secessionism is as important to the United States as terrorism or the proliferation 
of nucIear weapons for instance. In fact, the priority that the U.S. gives to these 
crises fluctuates depending on their intensity, on their potential consequences, and 
on the regions in which they occur. Even if secessionist conflicts abroad do not 
damage American lives and territory, they can disrupt regional stabilities and 
potentially the integrity of sorne U.S. allies. In this respect, secessionism is an 
important security concem for the United States. 
Date Collection 
This research gathers information from vanous sources. Through the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), l requested and obtained the decIassification 
of cables and analyses produced by the State Departement and by several U.S. 
embassies on my cases. These released documents were highly relevant for 
9 
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process-tracing as they allowed the recreation of parts of the debates and 
discussions within the ageney. Moreover, 1 eondueted several interviews in 
Washington D.C. with high-ranking government officiaIs from the administration 
of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, as weIl as with former and current officiaIs 
from the National Security Council and the State Department who worked on a 
day-to-day basis on these secessionist crises. 1 also relied on memoirs written by 
former U.S. officiaIs who were involved in the formulation of the U.S. response to 
the selected cases. FinaIly, this dissertation extensively uses monographs and 
journal articles that deal with aspects of my research topic. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 introduces the different theories of international relations and 
foreign policy that deal with foreign intervention in secessionist conflicts. It shows 
that none of the existing models, whether domestic or international, provide 
satisfactory explanation for the research puzzle under investigation. This chapter 
concludes by calling for a new theory. Chapter 3 proposes a new model of U.S. 
foreign poliey regarding secessionist conflicts and develops an accurate and 
parsimonious explanation of the question under investigation. The chapter 
delineates the regional stability model by presenting its assumptions and logic as 
weIl as by establishing a clear connection between U.S. security interests and the 
concept of regionaI stability. This chapter aIso explains in detail the methodology 
used and justifies the ease selection. Chapters 4 through 8 are empiricaI. They 
examine how the United States reacted to cases of secession and measure the 
regional stability model as weIl as competing domestic arguments. Chapter 4 
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focuses on the secessionist crises in Croatia and Slovenia that occurred in 1991-92. 
It explains why the U.S. initially opposed the secession of these Yugoslav 
republics, and the reasons why Washington operated a policy shift in favor oftheir 
recognition nine months later. Chapter 5 deals with the complex case of 
Macedonia which unfolded from 1991 to 2004. It reviews how the crisis started 
and why it took thirteen years for the United States to complete the process of 
Macedonia's diplomatic recognition. This chapter represents an interesting case of 
delayed U.S. recognition. Chapter 6 completes the study of the Balkan region by 
analyzing the case of Kosovo in the 1990s (but leaves aside the CUITent political 
issues), which is a case of U.S. nonrecognition. It focuses on the unfolding of the 
crises that were related to the issue of Kosovo' s independence throughout the 
1990s including the one that led to the NATO war. As weIl, it analyzes the factors 
leading the White House to deny Kosovo's recognition in 1999. Chapters 7 and 8 
'Concentrate on the variation in the U.S. position towards two cases of secession in 
the Horn of Africa. The Eritrean secessionist struggle is analyzed in Chapter 7. 
This chapter highlights the reasons that led the United States to grant Eritrea' s 
recognition after having supported Ethiopia, the central state, for years. The last 
empirical case presented in Chapter 8 is the one of Somaliland. This study shows 
why the U.S. government refused to support and to recognize the de facto state of 
Somaliland even though Somalilanders fulfilled most of the U.S. prerequisites for 
recognition. FinaIly, Chapter 9 reviews the performance of the proposed 
theoretical model. It draws general conclusions on the American stance toward 
secessionist conflicts, and highlights the theoretical contributions of the model. 
11 
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The next chapter will put into perspective the current research puzzle and 
will set out the theoretical arena in which the regional stability model introduced 
in Chapter 3 will fit. 
12 
1 
Introduction 
State Intervention and Secessionist Conflicts 
2. 
Theories of State Intervention 
in Secessionist Conjlicts 
In recent years, the resurgence of ethnic tensions and the dissolution of 
multinational states (Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia) have produced 
international changes that generated a great deal of interest among the academic 
community. However, the interconnection between ethnic strife and international 
relations lacked a theoretical framework. 1 This lacuna pressed analysts to search 
for a better understanding of this neglected dimension of international relations by 
blurring the academic boundaries between the study of international relations and 
the study of comparative politics. 
Harbom and Wallensteen have recently shown that around one-fifth of an 
the internaI armed conflicts since 1945 have involved foreign states? This 
probably explains why several scholars have attempted to identify the factors that 
explain third state intervention in ethnic and secessionist conflicts. In the literature, 
these factors can be divided into two categories: external and domestic.3 The 
1 David Cannent, "The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and 
Theory", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1993, pp. l37-150. Little and Rosenau have 
made similar remarks about the interrelationship between civil war and international politics. See 
Richard Little, Intervention: ExternalInvolvement in Civil Wars, London: Martin Robertson, 1975. 
James Rosenau, (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1964. 
2 Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-
2004", Journal ofPeace Research, Vol. 42, No. 5,2005, p. 627. 
3 1 choose not to use the classic affective/instrumental dichotomy to identify the different factors 
causing a third state to get involved in a secessionist or ethnic conflict. Indeed, this division is often 
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former category assumes that the international environment is the central 
determinant explaining third state intervention. As for the latter, it asserts that a 
third state's internaI politics best explain motives of intervention, and that 
domestic groups within the state have the greatest impact on foreign policy 
decision-making. 
ln this chapter, 1 first review the arguments formulated by neo-realists and 
neo-liberals, which argue that third state intervention is based on systemic 
determinants and then 1 examine domestic propositions. Second, 1 propose to 
evaluate whether these arguments are helpful in explaining the American behavior 
toward secessionist aspirations. Third, 1 briefly review the rather scarce literature 
on V.S. foreign policy toward ethnic conflicts. And fourth, 1 appraise the 
contribution of each approach to the resolution of my theoretical problem. 1 
demonstrate that each of these competing explanations empirically and 
deductively fail to exp Iain the puzzle under investigation and that a new model of 
confusing since factors that may appear affective, like ethnicity, language, or regime type, can in 
fact be purely instrumental (i.e. they may be tools for power, ambition or economic gains for 
example). Stephen Saideman, for instance, focuses on ethnic ties but in a very instrumental or 
utilitarian fashion. He argues that politicians often refer to ethnic politics when making foreign 
policy decisions to bolster ethnic domestic support and thus to increase their chances of staying in 
power. See Stephen M. Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnie Polilies, Foreign Policy & 
International Confliet. New York: Columbia University Press, 200l. 
1 also agree with Alexis Herac1ides when he maintains that instrumental motives cannot be entirely 
separated from affective elements while affective factors "cannot stand on its own". See Alexis 
Herac1ides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Polilies, London: Frank Cass, 
1991, p. 53. 
Here are sorne studies that have used the affective-instrumental distinction: Astri Suhrke and Lela 
Garner Noble, (eds.), Ethnie Confliet and International Relations, New York: Praeger, 1977. 
Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement", International 
Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3,1990, pp. 341-378. David Carment, "The Ethnic Dimension in World 
Politics: Theory, Policy and Early Warning", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1994, pp. 
551-582. Rajat Ganguly, "The Consequences of Partisan Intervention in Secessionist Wars: 
Lessons from South Asia", Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1997, pp. 5-26. 
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foreign policy is needed to account for the U.S. policy variation towards 
secessionist efforts. 
Security and Power 
Neo-realists argue that security and power are states' central determinant of 
interstate interaction,4 and that states follow the same rationale when deciding 
whether to intervene in internaI conflicts. 5 In recent years, debates among realists 
have brought out two competing versions of realism known as defensive and 
offensive realism.6 The defensive version maintains, among other things, that 
international anarchy makes states anxious about their security and leads them to 
balance power and threat in order to weaken hegemonic states.7 Stephen Walt, 
who espouses such a defensive view of international relations, argues that: "when 
there is an imbalance of threat (i.e., when one state or coalition appears especially 
dangerous), states will form alliances or increase their internaI efforts in order to 
reduce their vulnerability".8 Offensive realists believe, on the contrary, that 
4 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Polities, New York: MeGraw-Hill, 1979. Hans J. 
Morgenthau, PoUties Among Nations, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. 
5 See Henry Bienen, "Ethnie Nationalisms and Implications for U.S. Foreign Poliey", in Charles A. 
Kupehan, (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, Ithaea: Comell University Press, 
1995, pp. 158-179. Hedley Bull, "Introduction", in Hedley Bull, (ed.), Intervention in world 
polities, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984, pp. 1-6. Hans Morgenthau, "To intervene or not to intervene", 
Foreign AfJairs, Vol. 45, 1967, pp. 425-436. 
6 Stephen M. Walt, "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition", PoUtieal Science: The State 
of the Discipline, New York: Norton, 2002, pp. 197-230. Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic 
Politics", International Seeurity, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1992, pp. 177-198. 
7 Stephen Van Evera, Causes ofWar: Power and the Roots ofConf/iets, Ithaea: Comell University 
Press, 1999. Jaek Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestie Polities and International Ambition, Ithaca: 
Comell University Press, 1991. 
8 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1987, p. 263. 
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security can only be partially assured because states cannot directly measure the 
intentions of others. As a result, states would rather aggressively compete to 
maximize their power in order to protect themselves.9 John Mearsheimer is 
certainly one of the strongest proponents ofthis version ofrealism. In The Tragedy 
of Great Power Polities, he asserts: "states recognize that the more powerful they 
are relative to their rivaIs, the better their chances of survival".10 In other words, 
the maximization of power is a necessary condition for state survival. 
Defensive and offensive realists, however, have not expanded their 
theoretical contributions to include the international relations connected to 
secessionism. They have never proceeded to the scientific measurement of their 
propositions by demonstrating empirically that security and power are critical 
motives explaining third state foreign policy regarding secessionist conflicts. 
Stephen Saideman is one of the few scholars who has extended the defensive 
realist rationale to secession. By applying Stephen Walt's balance of threat 
argument to secessionist conflicts, he evaluates whether security considerations 
drive states to support secessionist movements abroad to diminish threatening 
states. His objective is to measure whether or not secessionist groups within strong 
states receive more support than those in weaker states. Il As he points out: "since 
balancing is 'the most central pattern' in international relations for realists, we 
ought to expect that states will tend to support the weaker states and assist 
9 Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims", Security 
Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1997, pp. 1-49. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise ofInternational 
Institutions", International Seeurity, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994-95, pp. 5-49. 
10 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power PoUties, New York: Norton, 2001, p. 3. 
11 Stephen M. Saideman, op. cit., 2001. 
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separatist movements in the stronger, more threatening states"Y By analyzing 
three secessionist crises (the Congo, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia) from which he 
compiled a total of 43 cases ofthird state intervention, Saideman demonstrates that 
this argument is weakly supported by empirical evidence. His study shows that the 
balance of threat argument was only right in predicting 15 of the 43 cases of 
interventions. This indicates that the balance of threat logic is not the driving force 
behind state intervention in secessionist conflicts. Moreover, this argument is 
unable to predict the behavior of states that are neither entirely threatened by 
central states nor by secessionist movements. As a result, this argument often leads 
to unpredictable observations since it "does not have a method of weighing the 
various components of threat". 13 
Alexis Heraclides also shows that security concems fail to explain third 
party intervention. His analysis suggests that, during the Cold War, superpowers 
did not balance their power by supporting opposing sides in secessionist conflicts 
in order to increase their security.14 On the contrary, the United States and the 
Soviet Union tried to avoid antagonistic policies on these issues. Furthermore, 1 
maintain that in addition to being empirically weak, the balance of threat is not a 
credible argument to explain the behavior of the United States towards secessionist 
movements. Did the United States recognize Chechnya, Tibet and Taiwan in order 
12 Ibid., p. 9. 
13 Ibid., p. 61. Thus, among Saideman's 43 cases ofthird state intervention to which the balance of 
threat argument was applied, 19 cases were classified as indeterrninate observations. Ibid., pp. 62, 
95, and 145. 
14 Heraclides focuses his analysis on the following secessionist movements: Katanga, Biafra, the 
Southem Sudan, Bangladesh, Iraqi Kurdistan, Eritrea, and the Moro region of the Philippines. See 
Alexis Heraclides, op. cit., p. 375. 
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to sap the strength of Russia or China? The answer is no. Although the U.S. raised 
the issue of human rights abuses in Chechnya throughout the 1990s, it maintained 
that the Chechen secessionist issue was a Russian internai matter. Moreover, the 
United States refused to adopt a double-foreign policy toward China in order to 
deal separately with Taiwan, and it did not question China's sovereignty over 
Tibet. In fact, we can assume that U.S. support to major powers' secessionist 
movements would be likely to pro duce retaliation against the U.S. instead of 
producing greater security. For aIl of the above reasons, 1 regard the security 
assumption as a weak proposition that is not supported by empiricai evidence. 
Offensive realism leads to a different argument. By focusing on power 
maximization rather than on security, it assumes that strong states like the United 
States are tempted to support secessionist groups in weaker states to increase their 
relative power in geo-strategic areas. This argument maintains that weak states 
cannot effectively retaliate against strong interveners, and therefore that the cost of 
supporting secessionists is inconsequential to dominant powers. 15 This argument is 
consistent with Mearsheimer's assertion that "great powers are rarely content with 
the CUITent distribution of power" and that "they face a constant incentive to 
change it in their favor. [".] if they think it can be done at a reasonable priee". 16 
Saideman once again demonstrates that secessionist groups evolving in weak 
states are not more likely to obtain greater foreign support from strong states than 
15 David B. Carment, Patrick James and Dane Row1ands, "Ethnie Conflict and Third Party 
Intervention: Riskiness, Rationality and Commitment", in G. Schneider and Patricia A. Weitsman, 
(eds.), Eriforcing Cooperation: Risky States and Intergovernmental Management of Conflict, 
London: Macmillan, 1997, pp. 104-131. Hed1y Bull, op. cit. 
16 John J. Mearsheimer, op. cit., 2001, p. 2. 
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from other states. l7 In other words, facts demonstrate that third states' relative 
power do not impact the level of support granted to their secessionist movements. 
As for the specific case of the United States, one could make the argument 
that U.S. support for secessionist groups in weaker states cannot be done at a 
"reasonable price" because such a de ci sion would be likely to produce instability 
resulting from ethnic tensions, civil war, and secessionist diffusion. The U.S. has 
been opposed to secessionist efforts in both strong and weaker states mainly for 
stability considerations. The maximization of power argument, therefore, is not 
convincing enough to be retained as a credible hypothesis to explain the U.S. 
behavior toward secessionism. 
In sum, there is insufficient evidence to support the defensive and offensive 
realist arguments. And when applied to the U.S. case, l assert that the logic of 
balance of threat and power maximization would lead to effects counter-
productive to the United States' interest. Therefore, l reject these propositions. 
Regime and Norms 
Neo-liberal institutionalists assume that international regimes inhibit states 
from unilateral intervention in intrastate conflicts. 18 They predict that states 
intervene in intrastate conflicts once the international community agrees to do so 
17 Stephen M. Saideman, "Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support 
for Ethnic Groups", Journal ofPeace Research, Vol. 39, No. 1,2002, pp. 27-50. 
18 Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Robert O. 
Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Robert O. Keohane, 
"Reciprocity in International Relations", International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1986, pp. 1-
27. Arthur Stein, "Cooperation and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World", International 
Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2,1982, pp. 115-140. 
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along a defined set of rules in order to enforce peace and security in the targeted 
state. 19 This argument asserts that states do not intervene unilaterally in internaI 
conflicts out of self-interest. Rather, third states choose to cooperate with the 
consent of international institutions, and then intervene if a multilateral agreement 
is reached. Because international norms do not legitimize unilateral actions 
(understood as defection from cooperation), a multilateral agreement is the sine 
qua non for intervention. 
Severa! American foreign interventions conducted since the end of the 
Cold War have demonstrated, however, that norms do not have a strong impact on 
Washington's foreign policy. Indeed, the U.S. dominant power departed on several 
occasions from the noninterventionist norm. Its intervention in Haiti in 1994 was 
carried out mainly for security and stability reasons. The U.S. war on Iraq 
launched in 2003, and to a lesser extent the war against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in 1999, conducted without the approval of the United Nations, also 
demonstrate that multilateral agreements are not a necessary condition for U.S. 
interventions in the internaI affairs of other states. 
The Anti-Secessionist Regime 
Towards the specific issue of secession, liberal institutionalists argue that 
because the stability of the international system is the basis for cooperation among 
states and economic prosperity, states obey an anti-secessionist regime that 
emanated from U.N. declarations and treaties on self-determination in order to 
19 David B. Carment, Patrick James and Dane Rowlands, op. cit. 
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preserve the territorial status quo. Mark Zacher indicates that this reglme IS 
founded on the princip le of territorial integrity which was strongly supported by 
the United Nations, the Arab League and the Organization of American States in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, and later by the Organization of African 
Unity?O 
The normative regime against secession's main objective is to limit the 
circumstances under which nations have the right to independence. It was created 
around three types of norms that are not mutually exclusive but which must be 
understood as an international code of conduct. First, only peoples under colonial 
mIe have the right to declare their independence by claiming self-determination. 
Second, states must conform to the norm of diplomatie recognition: Only self-
determined entities (i.e. evolving under colonial mIes) can be recognized as 
sovereign states. Finally, the non-intervention norm forbids states from intervening 
in others' internaI affairs?l A third state recognizing a secessionist movement that 
did not qualify as a self-determined unit, would be intruding in the internaI affairs 
of another state. Liberal institutionalists argue that states conform to these norms 
of behavior because they strengthen the structure of the international system by 
promoting stability, which guarantees mutual gains among sovereign states. 
20 The CSCE Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and the Charter of Paris in 1990 reiterated these norms. 
Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force", 
International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2,2001, pp. 221-222. 
21 See Alexis Heraclides, op. cit., 1991. See also Richard Little, op. cif., p. 15-32. 
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Thus, this international regime constitutes a strong force against 
secession.22 However, 1 as sert that liberal institutionalists have exaggerated the 
impact ofthis regime on states' foreign policy. Several states have indeed departed 
from this regime by supporting secessionist movements. Belgian support to 
Katanga and French support to Biafra in the 1960s, or Russian military and 
economic support to Trans-Dniester in the early 1990s are good examples that do 
not conform to the anti-secessionist regime. Sorne states have even extended 
unilateral recognition to secessionist states, which constitutes a violation of the 
regime. The Indian unilateral recognition of Bangladesh in 1971, or more recently, 
the German unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia are interesting cases of 
defection from regime cooperation?3 
It is true that during the Cold War the United States' attitude towards 
secessionist efforts conformed to the normative regime against secession. The U.S. 
repeatedly condemned secessionism as highly disruptive and was strongly 
committed to states' territorial integrity.24 Facts indicate, however, that the end of 
the bipolar era strongly reduced the impact of anti-secessionist norms on U.S. 
behavior towards secession, since Washington departed on several occasions from 
22 Heraclides points out that the post-1945 international regime against secession "appears more 
restrictive than in the aftermath of the First World War, and in practice more hostile than even 
under the Concert of Europe ... ". Alexis Heraclides, op. cit., 1991, p. 32. 
23 See Beverly Crawford, "Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's 
Unilateral Recognition ofCroatia", World Polities, Vol. 48, July 1996, pp. 482-521. 
24 Evidence shows that during the Cold War the United States was systematically opposed to 
secession (e.g. Biafra, Katanga, Southern Sudan, etc.) and strongly supported host states. The 
American recognition of Bangladesh in 1972 was the only exception. In this case, the O.S. 
extended diplomatie recognition to Bangladesh because India and the Soviet Union rendered its 
secession inevitable. See Dan Haendel, The Process of Priority Formulation: US. Foreign Policy 
in the lndo Pakistani War of 1971, Boulder: Westview Press, 1977. 
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that regime. V.S. recognition of Croatia and Eritrea are examples showing the 
failure of the liberal institutionalist argument. Thus, the anti-secessionist regime 
proposition cannot explain the inconsistency in the U.S. response to secessionist 
efforts. It is, therefore, unconvincing as an explanation for my inquiry. 
Civilizational Tics 
In his famous 1993 article published in Foreign Affairs, Samuel 
Huntington argues that cultural ties between political entities-which he caUs 
civilizations-will replace ideological confrontations and power politics 
considerations as the main source of domestic and international conflicts in the 
post-Cold War era.25 He asserts that from now on, wars will mainly occur across 
cultural fault lines dividing world civilizations. According to Huntington, 
"[g]roups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with 
people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other 
members of their own civilization,,?6 In other words, political entities sharing the 
same religious roots and a similar politico-economic evolution support and defend 
one another. To demonstrate the accuracy of his argument, Huntington gives 
several examples where cultural differences are a great incentive to interstate and 
intrastate conflicts. He maintains, for instance, that third states' response to 
secessionist quarrels is shaped by cultural ties. A foreign state would, therefore, 
25 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", Foreign AjJairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, 
pp. 22-49. Huntington's theoretical model is based on the definition of eight civilizations: Western, 
Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African. See 
also Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 
26 Samuel P. Huntington, op. cil., 1993, p. 35. 
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support the side in a secessionist conflict with which it shares civilizational kin. He 
argues that Germany, the European Community and the United States supported 
and recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia in 
1992 because these two Yugoslav Roman Catholic republics were part of the 
Western civilization while the other republics were either part of the Slavic-
Orthodox or the Islamic cultural alliance. 
Although interesting and imaginative, the cultural ties argument is flawed, 
at least when applied to the American behavior toward secessionism. Facts show 
that the U.S. often supports political entities that are not part of the "Western 
civilization" as defined by Huntington. For instance, the United States supported 
Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence in the early stage of the Yugoslav conflict 
even though Bosnia amalgamated Muslim, Slavic-Orthodox and Western cultures. 
The U.S. also led a NATO intervention against Slavic-Orthodox Serbia to defend 
and support the political autonomy of Muslim Kosovo. How would the proponents 
of the cultural tie argument explain these decisions? First, neither of these two 
political entities were from Western civilization; and second, Christian Serbia had 
closer ties to Western civilization than did Muslim Albanians from Kosovo. So, 
why is it that the U.S. did not support Serbia's struggle against separatists of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army? Finally, how can Huntington explain that Washington 
was the first state to recognize the independence of Eritrea, which is 
predominantly Muslim, from Christian Ethiopia? Again, if the civilizational 
argument were to be right, the U.S. would have stood by its "coreligionists" and 
supported Ethiopia's territorial integrity. 
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These are a few examples showing that the United States does not obey the 
cultural alliance logic when responding to secessionist crises. Therefore, the 
motivations lying behind the U.S. decision to support one party in a separatist 
conflict has to be found elsewhere. 
Are Integrated Models the Solution? 
Lately, scholars have attempted to bring together competing explanations 
to better account for third state intervention. Sorne have argued, for instance, that 
no single paradigm can explain third party intervention because the world is not 
"black-and-white".27 The solution, they as sert, is to combine neorealist and 
neoliberal assumptions into integrated models of foreign policy by balancing 
theories about security and power with those on cooperation and interdependence 
between states. 
Carment, James and Rowlands, for instance, develop such an equilibrium 
model to explain third party intervention in ethnic conflicts.28 Their model 
evaluates, among other things, the extent to which a third state is willing to give up 
cooperation with a host state, such as economic collaboration, in order to support 
its ethnic minority. This allows them to integrate liberal assumptions into their 
model by measuring whether domestic politics and public opinion impact a third 
state's foreign policy toward ethnic and secessionist conflicts. The model also 
focuses on the extent to which the realist notion of material interests may lead a 
27 Patrick M. Regan, "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Intervention in InternaI Conflicts", Journal of 
PoUlies, Vol. 60, No. 3,1998, p. 764. 
28 David B. Carment, Patrick James and Dane Rowlands, op. cit. 
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third state to minimize its SUpport to ethnie kin abroad in order to maintain strong 
cooperation with the host state. 
This proposition is praiseworthy and imaginative, but the problem with this 
equilibrium model is that it generates a complex theory that does not explain weIl 
the research puzzle. By trying to provide an exhaustive aecount of the whole story 
behind third party intervention, 1 maintain that their bipolar model ends up 
explaining little and creates more confusion. 
Other scholars have focused their attention on domestic politics to explain 
third states' foreign policy toward ethnic and seeessionist eonfliets. They assume 
that decision-makers are rational actors who try to stay in power by maintaining 
domestic support and by taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of their 
state when making foreign policy decisions toward secessionist movements. Based 
on these premises, scholars developed three main arguments which examine the 
topic through the lens of ethnic politics, vulnerability, and business interests. 
Domestie Ethnie Polities 
Ethnie politics has been increasingly regarded as a central motive for third 
state intervention in ethnic conflicts.29 Saideman argues, for instance, that states 
support the side of an ethnic conflict that shares ethnic ties with leaders' 
constituents. He asserts that: "ethnic politics serves as a critical dynamic 
29 Karen K. Petersen, "A Research Note: Reexamining Transnational Ethnie Alliances and Foreign 
Policy Behavior", International Interactions, Vol. 30, 2004, pp. 25-42. Stephen Saideman, op. cif., 
1997, 2001. David R. Davis and William H. Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnie 
Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior", International Studies Quarter/y, Vol. 41, 1997, pp. 171-
184. David Carment and Patrick James, "Two-Level Games and Third-Party Intervention: 
Evidence from Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans and South Asia", Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1996, pp. 521-554. 
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compelling some politicians to SUpport secession elsewhere while eonstraining 
others".30 His work c1early demonstrates that there is a strong relationship between 
ethnic ties and third state foreign policy toward secessionist crises.31 However, 
despite the persuasiveness ofSaideman's argument, it falls short in predicting U.S. 
foreign policy. As Saideman himself notes, the United States deviates from the 
ethnie ties explanation and, therefore, does not conform to the argument. 32 He 
explains the anomaly ofthis situation by arguing that low U.S. ethnie competition 
could account for the wrong prediction. We could also argue that the U.S. 
multicultural composition transfonns ethnie groups into antagonist forces that 
cancel out each others' efforts to influence American decision-makers. One could 
also assert that U.S. leaders do not pay much attention to ethnic consideration 
when it concems a small portion of the U.S. electorate at the time. 
Policy analysts have also focused their attention on ethnie poli tics to argue 
that U.S.-based diasporas strongly affect American foreign policy toward their 
homelands. They maintain that U.S. ethnic groups are now a major detenninant of 
American foreign policy.33 Henry Nau, for instance, asserts that the U.S. is 
30 Stephen Saideman, op. cit., 1997, pp. 725-726. 
31 Saideman studies three cases: the Congo, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia. His work shows that where 
leaders' constituents share ethnie ties with secessionists, they support secession in 21 cases out of 
22; however, when leaders' constituents have ethnie ties with the host state, third state leaders' 
support the central government in 15 out of 17 cases. 
32 Stephen Saideman, op. cif., 2001, pp. 208-209. 
33 Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism & the Balkan Wars, Ithaca: Comell 
University Press, 2003. Thomas Ambrosio, "Ethnie Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy", in 
Thomas Ambrosio, (ed.), Ethnie Identity Groups and us. Foreign Policy, Westport (CT): Praeger, 
2002, pp. 1-19. Yossi Shain and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Peace as a Three-Level Game: The Role 
of Diasporas in Conflit Resolution", in Thomas Ambrosio, (ed.), Ethnie Identity Groups and US. 
Foreign Policy, Westport (CT): Praeger, 2002, pp. 169-197. Alexander Deconde, Ethnicity, Race, 
and Ameriean foreign Policy: A History, Boston: Northeastem University Press, 1992. 
27 
State Intervention and Secessionist Conjlicts 
gradually "losing its ethnic core" from British ongm, resulting in the 
transformation of "its foreign policy into a patchwork of ethnic [ ... ] 
particularisms".34 Sorne have even questioned whether U.S. foreign policy still 
promotes national interest or if it has been undermined by diaspora's interests.35 
This is not a new issue. Glazer and Moynihan, for example, argued in the 1970s 
that ethnic influence was "the single most important determinant of American 
foreign policy".36 More recently, Shain asserted, among other things, that sorne 
ethnic groups have been able to pressure U.S. leaders to adopt supportive policies 
towards national self-determination movements. T 0 illustrate his argument, Shain 
gave the example of the Croat-Americans who led an active campaign for the 
American recognition ofCroatia in 1991-92.37 
This whole argument about ethnic diasporas was studied in several policy 
oriented works. However, it has not been systematically evaluated by social 
scientific inquiries. In sorne cases, analysts seem to raise ex amples that well 
support their assumptions but never perform scientific work to test their argument. 
Moreover, few ethnic groups are well organized in the United States, with the 
34 Henry R. Nau, At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign PoUcy, Ithaca: Comell 
University Press, 2002, pp. 82-84. Nau points out that: "Jewish and Slavic Americans have 
supported past interventions on behalf of Israel or countries in eastem Europe." And that "pressure 
may grow from black, Hispanie, and Asian minorities to intervene in Africa, the Caribbean, Central 
America, or the Pacific". Ibid., p. 84. 
35 Yossi Shain, "Multicultural Foreign Policy", Foreign PoUcy, No. 100, 1995, pp. 69-87. 
36 Nathan Glazer and Patrick Moynihan, (eds.), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1975, pp. 23-24. 
37 Y ossi Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999. 
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exception of Greek, Jewish, and Irish descent as well as Cuban-Americans.38 Most 
of the groups are small associations that are not powerful enough to impact U.S. 
foreign policy. Most of them have little money, little political influence, and little 
or simply no access to the governrnent. 1 am not arguing here that ethnic lobbies 
are not important political actors in the United States. 1 maintain, however, that 
their impact on the formulation of American policy toward secessionist 
movements must be weighed to other factors. Since no scientitic work has been 
conducted in the United States to verify this assertion, my research proposes to 
systematically measure the accuracy of this argument. 
Vulnerability 
Neoliberals argue that a state's own vulnerability to internaI ethnic turmoil 
inhibits it from supporting foreign secessionist movements. This proposition, 
known as the vulnerability argument, was tirst applied to the African regional 
context. 39 According to this c1aim, vulnerability explains why states embrace 
international norms of cooperation such as the principle of non-intervention in the 
internaI affairs of other states. Neoliberals assert that the common vulnerability of 
African states is a strong incentive for cooperation because defection in this case 
would be likely to result in a dangerous domino effect leading to the intinite 
38 Thomas Ambrosio, op. eit. 
39 Jeffrey Herbst, "Creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa", International 
Organization, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1989, pp. 673-692. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why 
Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood", World Polities, Vol. 
35, No. 1, 1982, pp. 1-24. 
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redrawing of African borders. In a well documented study on the international 
dimension of secession in Africa, Zdenek Cervenka summarizes this argument: 
Since many are vulnerable to external incitement for secession it 
was obvious to most of the O.A.D. Members that a reciprocal 
respect for boundaries, and abstention from demands for their 
immediate revision, would be to their general advantage. In order 
to survive, weak African governments had to be assured of the 
recognition and respect for their sovereignty by neighboring 
states, as well as any other states in a position to undermine their 
authority and contro1.40 
Neoliberals therefore argue that African states persist over time despite the 
strength of secessionist movements because leaders have no choice but to accept 
rules and norms of cooperation. 
Although straightforward and parsimonious, this argument was recently 
proven false. Heraclides has demonstrated that multiethnic states (especially those 
vulnerable to separatism) are not less likely to support secessionists than 
homogenous states.41 Saideman also shows that the vulnerability proposition is not 
supported by empirical facts. His study indicates that vulnerable third states 
(including African states) are not deterred from supporting secessionist groups 
elsewhere.42 He concludes that international norms of cooperation among 
vulnerable states do not account for foreign policy decision-making. 
40 Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African Unity and its Charter, New York: Praeger, 1969, 
pp. 232-233. 
41 Alexis Heraclides, op. cit, 1990. 
42 Saideman analyzes 30 cases of highly vulnerable third states, which intervened in three 
secessionist crises: the Congo, Nigeria, and the Yugoslav conflict. His work demonstrates that 
among the 30 highly vulnerable states, at Ieast 16 of them supported secessionist movements. 
Stephen Saideman, op. cit., 2001, pp. 65, 98, and 147. 
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This argument is different from the 'norms matter' type of proposition 
exposed previously since it presumes that domestic vulnerability to secession 
rather than an international regime is the central motive that inhibits states from 
intervening in intrastate conflicts. So, the vulnerability proposition is a domestic 
argument while the regime argument is systemic. However, although the 
vulnerability model is first concerned with states' security and stability while the 
regime argument focuses on mIes and norms, the expectation of both propositions 
is basically the same as they both assert that states follow international norms of 
non-intervention. It is also interesting to note that by refuting the vulnerability 
argument, analysts have also demonstrated that norms of cooperation do not really 
inhibit states from supporting secessionist efforts.43 
Furthermore, l assert that the vulnerability argument is not appropriate to 
understand the United States foreign policy behavior. The multicultural 
composition of the U.S. society and its emphasis on civic and constitutional 
nationalism makes it resistant to secessionist claims. Moreover, the indivisibility 
of the U.S. republic, which resulted from the 19th century Civil War, is a 
constitutional principle that has been an integral part of the American political 
culture for almost 150 years. Obviously, that does not mean that the United States 
is totally invulnerable to secessionist aspirations. Texas and Hawaii, for example, 
have a long history of separatist claims.44 Latin Americans are also increasingly 
powerful in the South-West States and may eventually develop separatist 
43 Stephen M. Saideman, op. cit., 1997,2001. Alexis Heraclides, op. cit., 1990. 
44 See, for instance, the work by Norman Meller and Anne Feder Lee on Hawaii's separatist claim. 
Norman Meller and Anne Feder Lee, "Hawaiian Sovereignty", Publius, Vol. 27, 1997, pp. 167-
185. 
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ambitions. But overall, we can argue that the Vnited States has a low level of 
vulnerability to secessionism compared to other Western States such as Canada, 
the Vnited Kingdom, or France, which are facing strong secessionist movements 
respectively in Quebec, Scotland and Corsica. Thus, in addition to being 
empirically refuted by scholars, the vulnerability argument seems very unlikely to 
explain the V.S. attitude toward secessionist movements. 
Business Interests 
According to David Gibbs, American private business interests strongly 
affect V.S policy towards secessionist conflicts.45 Gibbs argues that politicians 
make policies that are in the interest of corporations with which they share strong 
ties. As he mentions: "politicians and business people act rationally to further their 
respective self-interests, and such rational behavior influences the conduct of 
foreign policy".46 Gibbs's "Business Conflict Model" assumes that V.S. economic 
groups are divided according to different interests, and compete to maximize these 
interests. As a result, the V.S. govemment is frequently tom between conflicting 
V.S. foreign economic interests when making policies. Gibbs argues, however, 
that at the end of the day, the private economic connections of V.S. decision-
makers are strongly reflected in the American foreign policy towards secessionist 
movements. Gibbs tests his argument using the 1960 Congo crisis. He shows that 
sorne V.S. economic groups favored the secession of Katanga from the Congo 
45 David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and US. 
Policy in the Congo Crisis, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
46 Ibid., p. 33. 
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because they were expecting to replace Belgian industries in the seceding 
province, while other business groups opposed secession because they were tied to 
Belgium and, therefore, their interests lay in a united Congo. Gibbs's analysis also 
demonstrates that V.S. foreign policy towards the Congo fluctuated from the 
Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration because each government was tied to 
different business interests. 
The business interest argument is interesting; however, Gibbs's analysis 
only focuses on the Congo case, which greatly limits the validity and robustness of 
his mode1.47 Despite this empirical weakness, he argues that the argument can aIso 
apply to other situations with even more relevance because V.S. businesses had 
low interests in the Congo compared to other regions. 1 disagree with this daim 
and 1 counter argue that secessionist attempts often arise in developing countries 
(e.g. Eritrea, East Timor, Somaliland) where the V.S. has Httle economic interests, 
contrary to the case of the Congo, which had enormous reserves of diamonds, gold 
and silver.48 Therefore, 1 doubt that the business interests argument effectively 
accounts for V.S. foreign policy variation in other cases. Considering that 
secessionist efforts often create disruptive effects, it is far from obvious that V.S. 
business groups could benefit from secession. Think about Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
East Timor, and Eritrea, for example, where ethnic tensions led to political and 
economic chaos. Rather, one could argue that V.S. business groups always favor 
stability and secure investments to any secessionist changes, whatever their 
47 Gibbs is aware ofthis problem and raises it on page 202. 
48 Ibid., p. 84. 
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interests in the host state. Furthermore, Alexis Heraclides refutes the neo-
colonialist argument according to which industrialized states benefit from 
secessionist conflicts by treating secessionist leaders as political puppets to 
maximize their material interests.49 His research, based on seven postwar 
secessionist movements, demonstrates, on the contrary, that Western developed 
states are in fact less likely than developing countries to support secessionist 
efforts. Back in 1960, the Congo was a freshly born state with a strong level of 
economic dependency on Belgium. It was also marked by a strong degree of 
polarization between foreign economic interests. Consequently, 1 believe that the 
case of the Congo was the exception rather than the ruie. 
Although 1 doubt that Gibbs's business interest argument accounts for V.S. 
policy variation, 1 believe that this proposition needs more investigation before 
being dismissed. After aIl, it is a common assumption to assume that V.S. 
economic interest is the driving force behind its foreign policy, and that the 
American response to secessionist crises varies on the basis of its economic 
preferences. Since this is a common belief, 1 propose to challenge this argument by 
testing it using other empirical cases. 
The following table gives an overview of the different arguments on third 
states' intervention in secessionist conflicts that have been presented above. 
49 Alexis Heraclides, op. cit., 1990. 
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TABLE 2.1: Competing Arguments 
./ 
Type Ar2ument 
External: Security 
States support secessionist movements abroad to weaken threatening powers. 
Thus, secessionist groups within threatening states receive more support than 
those in weaker states. 
Power 
Strong states support secessionist groups in weaker states to increase their 
relative power. 
Norms 
States obey anti-secessionist norrns because they strengthen the structure ofthe 
international system by promoting stability. This favors mutual gains among 
sovereign states. 
Civilizational Tie 
A third state supports the side in a secessionist conflict with whieh it shares a 
civilization bond. 
Domestic: Ethnie Ties 
U.S.-based diasporas affect the conduct of American foreign policy 
toward secessionism in their homelands. 
Vulnerability 
State's own vulnerability to internaI ethnie turrnoil inhibits it from supporting 
foreign secessionist movements abroad. 
Business Interests 
The private economic connections of U.S. decision-makers are strongly 
reflected in the American foreign policy towards secessionist movements. 
* Arguments in bold need further testing and will be systematically measured in this dissertation. 
U.S. Response to Ethnie Confliets 
Surprisingly enough, the literature on V.S. foreign poliey toward ethnie 
eonfliets, and more specifieally toward seeessionist movements, is rather searee 
despite the great number of intrastate eonfliets that the Vnited States has had to 
deal with sinee the end of the Cold War. Several books and articles have been 
published on how the V.S. and the international eommunity responded to specifie 
crises like the ones of Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda, but little work has foeused on 
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the factors explaining the foreign policy of the United States toward ethnic and 
secessionist conflicts. Evelyn Farkas and David Callahan are among the rare 
analysts to have dedicated books to the subject. However, even if their works 
represent a significant contribution to this sub-field of research, they do not 
specifically focus their attention on the puzzle under investigation, that is, why the 
United States sometimes supports and recognizes secessionist states while other 
times it does not? 
In Fractured States and us. Foreign Policy, Farkas proceeds to a 
comparative examination of three instances of intra-state conflicts in the 1990s 
(i.e. Iraq in 1991, Ethiopia and Bosnia) in an attempt to explain U.S. policy 
regarding partition.50 Although interesting and comprehensive, her work is not 
theoretically driven and her approach does not allow the development of a 
consistent theoretical model that explains and predicts the behavior of the United 
States toward secessionist crises. As she acknowledges in the introduction of her 
book: "There is still no definitive account for why the [U.S.] decisions fell as they 
did. The following pages offer a tentative look at sorne of the key factors that 
influenced policymakers ... ".51 Farkas does identify sorne ofthese factors but does 
not insert them into a coherent theory offoreign policy. 
In Unwinnable Wars, Callahan adopts a different approach. 52 His policy 
oriented research aims at formulating policy prescriptions on how the United 
50 Evelyn Farkas, Fraetured States and us. Foreign PoNcy: Iraq, Ethiopia, and Bosnia in the 
1990s, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003. 
51 Ibid., p. 4. 
52 David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars: Ameriean Power and Ethnie Confliet, New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1997. 
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States should respond to broadly defined ethnie eonfliets. Based on the analysis of 
suceessful and failed cases of U.S. prevention and intervention in ethnie eonflicts, 
Callahan's formulates normative proposaIs to avoid future ethnie eonflicts and 
suggests circumstanees under whieh the United States should intervene when they 
do occur. His rieh empirieal analysis of several ethnie crises eontributes to the 
debate regarding U.S. policy toward seeessionist self-determination. However, 
Callahan does not attempt to explain variation in the U.S. decision to intervene. 
AIso, like Farkas, Callahan does not develop any theoretieal model that could be 
systematieally applied to empirieal cases to explain this puzzle. 
The same criticism can be addressed to Henry Bienen who also foeused his 
attention on U.S. foreign poliey toward ethnic eonfliets.53 Even though Bienen 
raises several interesting questions regarding why and when the United States 
should intervene, his analysis is purely normative and it is motivated by the will of 
formulating responses to ethnic nationalism that best suits American eapacity and 
interests rather than by the aim of understanding a defined research puzzle. 
Thus, recent studies that focused on the connection between American 
foreign policy and ethnic/secessionist conflicts have failed to produce theoretical 
models to make sense of U.S. policy toward secessionist conflicts. What's more, 
these studies have neglected the issue of secessionism per se, and none of them 
addressed our research puzzle. 
53 Henry Bienen, op. cit., pp. 158-179. 
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Discussion 
This chapter reveals that there is a rich body of literature examining third 
states' motives for intervention. This review examined the various arguments 
generated on this topic and showed that my research question fits into broader 
questions of interest to international relations specialists. This chapter also 
provides important insights into why states might decide to support secessionists 
and under what circumstances they may be inhibited from doing so. However, l 
maintain that most of the arguments presented are not convincing enough to 
explain V.S. behavior vis-à-vis secessionist conflicts. Scholars who developed 
systemic models are mainly interested in generating large-scale theories of third 
party intervention rather than foreign policy arguments adapted to particular states. 
As for the domestic models reviewed above, they do focus on V.S. foreign policy, 
but their predictive and explanatory strength is exaggerated by their proponents. 
Fina1ly, scholars who focus on V.S. foreign policy toward ethnic conflicts remain 
too general in their scope of analysis and do not perform systematic measurement 
of the assertions and arguments that they put forward. AIso, most of them remain 
in the policy realm and seem better at raising issues than at risking potential 
answers. 
Moreover, this review shows that most of the work deals with third state 
support to ethnic and secessionist groups rather than with third state recognition of 
secession. There is a difference, for example, between a third party's ideological 
encouragement to a secessionist movement and the extension of politico-
diplomatic recognition to a secessionist state. In fact, a third state that supports a 
secessionist group does not necessarily want to grant it formaI recognition and 
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may simply use the issue as a political tool to achieve other goals. International 
support for secessionist groups has been relatively frequent and expressed in 
different ways. For instance, for the years 1990 to 1992, Phase III of the Minorities 
at Risk Project (MAR) indicates that 35 foreign states have expressly supported 18 
separatist movements, in ways ranging from simple ideological encouragement to 
full-scale military intervention. 54 Diplomatie recognition of statehood has been, 
however, quite rare since 1945. This is because the formaI recognition of secession 
is the ultimate level of third state intervention in an intrastate conflict. It is a very 
serious and consequential action, due to the fact that it often leads to the 
dissolution of states and to the creation of others. As a result, because of this 
substantive difference between simple support and formaI recognition of 
secession, it would be wrong to conc1ude that factors explaining third state 
intervention in ethnie conflicts are logically the same as those explaining 
diplomatie recognition of secessionist states. The literature on third party 
intervention in ethnie conflicts, therefore, has limitations in explaining 
international recognition. 
ln sum, 1 argue that a new theoretical model focusing on American foreign 
policy toward secessionism in the post-Cold War era is needed for the following 
reasons: 
A. Domestic arguments conceming D.S. foreign policy toward secession are 
overstated-namely business interests and ethnie politics. 
54 See Louis Bélanger, Erick Duchesne, and Jonathan Paquin, "Foreign Interventions and 
Secessionist Movements: The Democratie Factor", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, 
No. 2, June 2005, pp. 443-444. 
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B. CUITent systemic models (neorealist and neoliberal) ofthird states' 
intervention are empirically refuted and deductively fail to account for the 
U.S. response to secessionist efforts. 
C. Analyses ofU.S. foreign policy toward ethnic conflicts are too broad and 
suffer from a lack of methodological rigor. 
D. Scholars have focused their attention on third states' support to secessionist 
groups rather than on third states' recognition of secession, which is 
substantively different. 
E. Scholars have neglected the study of major powers' foreign policy towards 
secessionism, which is a crucial aspect of the international dimension of 
seceSSlOn. 
F. The superpower status of the United States makes it a very important third 
state towards secessionist conflicts. 
G. Secessionist movements remain an enduring challenge to the international 
stability at the dawn ofthe 21st century. As a result, a coherent model of 
American foreign policy toward secessionism is needed. 
The next chapter is intended to fill the gap in the literature on us. foreign 
policy towards secessionist movements by generating a new model based on 
regional stability interests. This model will later be tested on case studies and be 
compared to the competing arguments of ethnic politics and business interests. 
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1 3. 
American Foreign Policy and Secessionism: 
A Theory of Regional Stability 
Introduction 
This chapter develops an argument to explain the U.S. foreign policy 
variation towards secessionist efforts in the post-cold war. It asserts that the 
maintenance-or restoration-of regional stability is the U.S. 's paramount interest 
when dealing with foreign secessionist quarrels and that this motive accounts for 
the decision to support or not support secessionist states. l 
This assertion of course raises several questions: Why should the United 
States care about foreign secessionist quarrels in the tirst place? Are these conflicts 
a threat to American national security and vital interests? And if the United States 
is really concemed with the issue of secessionism, why should it care more about 
regional stability than about other factors such as domestic ethrlÏc politics or 
business interests when facing it? Before presenting the argument in detail, 1 
propose to establish the connection between U.S. security and its interest in 
stability to elucidate these questions. 
Stability and Secessionist Movements 
This chapter argues that the United States adopts a defensive realist 
position when dealing with secessionist conflicts abroad. More specitically, it 
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asserts that the U.S. is a defensively positional state, a tenu that was initially 
coined by Joseph Grieco. According to 'defensive positionalism', states seek to 
maintain their relative position and are "sensitive to any erosion of their relative 
capabilities" since the preservation of their power guarantees their security in a 
self-help international system.2 This defensive realist view of international 
relations was inspired by Kenneth Waltz's assertion that states' first concern "is 
not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system".3 This chapter, 
therefore, argues that the U.S. acts along the lines of defensive positionalism as 
Grieco and Waltz would predict. 
The U.S.' maintenance of its powerful position in the system is the goal 
and the driving force of its foreign policy. To succeed in this endeavor, the United 
States must prevent power los ses that could originate from instability in the 
international system. In other words, 1 assert that stability is what defines U.S. 
security. 
The US. Anti-Secessionist Bias 
ln the post-cold war era, intrastate conflicts emerged as the main cause of 
war and as the most disruptive factor to the stability of the international system. 
Among the different sources of intrastate quarrels, secessionist movements stood 
1 As explained in Chapter l, regional stability is defined as: a state of peace between sovereign 
states, the maintenance and respect of international borders (including no refugees flowing across 
international borders), and the nonintervention in states' internaI affairs. 
2 Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal 
institutionalism", International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1988, p. 498. 
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International PoUties, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 126. Also 
quoted in Joseph M. Grieco, op. cil., p. 498. 
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out as one of the most disturbing causes of regional instability. Secessionism 
creates geopolitical turbulence and represents a threat to international borders. 
Secessionist movements are generally unstable. They can provoke civil wars (e.g. 
in Ethiopia, Indonesia, Moldova) and initiate state disintegration (Czechoslovakia, 
VSSR, Yugoslavia). For these reasons, Alexis Heraclides argues that secession is 
"the most unmanageable of the great security challenges of the post-Cold War 
era".4 Secessionist demands can also lead to conflict escalation by generating 
foreign states' incentives to intervene in these conflicts. As seen in the previous 
chapter, around 20 percent of aU the intrastate conflicts fought since 1945 have 
involved foreign powers.5 Germany' s recognition of Croatia, Albania' s support of 
Kosovo, and India' s intervention in favor of the Tamils in Sri Lanka are a few 
examples showing the propensity of secessionist crises to be internationalized.6 
Conflicts resulting from secessionism can, therefore, harm the functioning 
of the international system by creating instability within and among states.7 Since 
stability is what defines V.S. security and dominance, secessionism is seen as a 
threat to Washington's security interests. For this reason, the V.S. does not address 
4 Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Conflagration: What is to be Done?", Seeurity Dialogue, Vol. 
25,~0.3, 1994,p.283. 
5 Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-
2004", Journal of Peaee Researeh, Vol. 42, ~o. 5, 2005, p. 627. 
6 Stephen Saideman indicates that secessionist quarrels "have perhaps been the most controversial 
and internationalized form of ethnie conflicts". See Stephen M. Saideman, "Is Pandora's Box Half 
Empty or Half Full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of 
Disintegration", in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, (eds.), The International Spread of 
Ethnie Corifliets, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 127. 
7 Instability results from the increasing disjunction between the way a given regionaI order was 
configured and the current state of affairs generated by a secessionist conflict. 
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secessionist issues from an objective and neutral point of view, but from a 
pessimistic perspective.8 It has always been very re1uctant to support secessionist 
movements, even those that suffered from injustice and repression, because it fears 
that such an action might encourage other separatist movements to seek 
independence, which would endanger the management of world peace.9 Regional 
stability has, therefore, precedence over the princip le of national self-
determination. As Henry Bienen correctly points out, V.S. decision-makers are 
more concemed "with stability of the state system [ ... ], more concemed about not 
opening the Pandora's box of ethnically based demands for new nation-states, than 
they have been concemed to support self-determination everywhere as a 
principle".lO It is, therefore, not surprising that the V.S. preference is for the 
maintenance of large multinational countries that can accommodate nationalities 
and minorities rather than for small destabilizing secessionist states. 
Scholars have recently found that there are approximately 5000 ethno-
linguistic groups in the world and that about 300 of them are politically mobilized 
8 Sorne also argue that the historie al background of the United States (i.e. the American civil war) 
reinforces the U.S. anti-secessionist bias. The former U.S. ambassador to Canada, James 
Blanchard, mentions in his memoir: "the vast majority of Americans, inside and outside the 
government, have absolutely no sympathy or patience for the notion of secession. That's rooted, 
reasonably or not, in our own Civil War ... ". See James J. Blanchard, Behind the Embassy Door, 
Toronto: Sleeping Bear Press, 1998, p. 67. 
9 See Morton H. Halperin, David J. Scheffer, and Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination in the New 
World Order, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992. 
10 Henry Bienen, "Ethnie Nationalisms and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy", in Charles A. 
Kupchan, (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1995, p. 160. 
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to defend their interests. Il This indicates that secessionism is and will remain a 
great source of international disruption, even if only a small portion of these 
groups seek independence. Supporting secessionist groups could also generate 
more U.S. involvement in the conflict, including possible military intervention and 
economic assistance. Finally, the recognition of a secessionist state may compel 
Washington to redefine its foreign policy toward states of the region affected by 
secession. 
The Research Problem 
If the United States is a stability-seeking power, or a defensive positionalist 
state, that has an anti-secessionist bias, then how can we explain its support for the 
recognition of several secessionist states in the post-Cold War era, such as Eritrea 
and Slovenia? What accounts for the V.S. departure from its a priori support for 
stable international borders? How can we explain that the American govemment 
agreed to such territorial modifications? This is counter-intuitive and quite 
puzzling. 
The regional stability argument proposes an answer to these questions. By 
focusing on the importance of regional stability, this model is an extension of 
'defensive positionalism' applied to a specifie domain of research. Before 
presenting the argument in detail, it is important first to delineate assumptions on 
which the mode! is built. 
11 Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute ofPeaee, 1993. For a list of diseriminated ethnie groups see Minorities 
at Risk Projeet. www.eidem.umd.edu/inser/mar (aeeessed June 2006). 
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Theoretical Assumptions 
The regional stability argument asserts that rational choices determine D.S. 
foreign policy on secessionism. 'The mode! first assumes that American foreign 
policy is the result of rational decisions made by the presidency, that is an 
institution composed of several agents and advisors (e.g. Secretary of State, 
National Security Advisor, CIA director, Secretary of Defense) who do not 
necessarily have the same interests and who may disagree over policies and 
actions to undertake. 12 The argument also acknowledges that the American 
government is, in the words of Richard Neustadt, one of "separated institutions 
sharing powers".13 As a result of the mechanism of checks-and-balances, which is 
at the center of the D.S. political system, the President often has to cope with the 
legislative branch of government in matters of foreign policy.14 However, the 
power to recognize foreign governments and states is an exclusive prerogative of 
the President and the Congress cannot legally oppose such a presidential 
decision. 15 The presidency has, therefore, a great level of autonomy in that matter. 
12 Graham Allison presents sorne variants on the rational policy model. See Graham T. Allison, 
"Conceptual Models of the Cuban Missile Crisis", Ameriean Politieal Science Review, Vol. 63, 
No. 3,1969, pp. 689-718. 
13 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Polities of Leadership with Reflexions on Johnson 
and Nixon, New York: Wiley, 1976. 
14 For instance, the Senate has the constitutional right to advise the President during treaty 
negotiations and the ratification oftreaties requires the agreement oftwo thirds of the Senators. The 
President must also act jointly with Congress for the nomination of Ambassadors since the Senate 
must give its consent to presidential nominees. 
15 Following the recognition of the Soviet Union by President Roosevelt in 1933, the Supreme 
Court of the United States stated that the recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with the U.S.S.R. were clearly the decision of the President. See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and 
the US Constitution, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Previously, the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations ruled in 1897, in connection with the Cuban struggle for independence, that 
"the executive branch is the sole mouthpiece of the nation in communication with foreign 
sovereignties ... [and] therefore, a Congressional recognition ofbelligerency or independence would 
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The second assumption is that the presidency seeks to further its 
subjectively defined goals which are here identified in terms of regional stability. 
This argument assumes that the presidency selects, on the basis of cost-benefit 
analysis, the course of action that will bring the greatest expected stability out of 
each secessionist crisis. The United States foreign policy is, therefore, motivated 
by instrumental rationality leading to informed decisions. 16 This assumption does 
not pretend, however, that the presidency is omniscient or that it has aIl the 
relevant information to make enlightened choices. It only assumes that it is 
purposive, rational, and pragmatic. 
Third, on the basis of the two previous assumptions, the model assumes 
that the U.S. presidency possesses a fixed set of preferences towards secessionist 
crises (ranked in order ofpriority) and that these preferences determine U.S. policy 
choices depending on the evolution of each secessionist crisis (these preferences 
are presented on page 69).17 
be a nullity". See Clarence A. Berdahl, "The Power of Recognition", in Green Haywood 
Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, Chap. I-V, Government Printing Office, 
Washington, pp. 519-539. See also David Gray Adler, "The President's Recognition Power: 
Ministerial or Discretionary?", Presidential Studies Quarter/y, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1995, pp. 267-286. 
For more on the presidential power to recognize new governments see Gregory Weeks, "Almost 
Jeffersonian: U.S. Recognition Policy toward Latin America", Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
31, No. 3, 2001, pp. 490-504. 
16 1 borrow James Morrow's definition of rationality: "choosing the best means to gain a 
predetermined set of ends. It is an evaluation of the consistency of choices and not of the thought 
process, of implementation of fixed goals and not of the morality of those goals". See James D. 
Morrow, Game Theory for PoUtical SCientists, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 17. 
Barry Hindess gives a similar defmition of rationality. He emphasizes the predetermination of 
actors' goals and the consistency in the selection of means to achieve them. Hindess writes: 
"rationality is a property of actors who have given well-ordered ends. Actors are rational insofar as 
they choose between them in a consistent fashion, and they select the most appropriate of available 
means for the pursuit of their ends". See Barry Hindess, Po/itical Choice and Social Structure, 
England: E. Elgar Publisher, 1989, p. 52. 
17 Jeffry Frieden indicates that "in any given setting, an actor prefers sorne outcomes to others and 
pursues a strategy to achieve its most preferred possible outcorne". See Jeffry A. Frieden, "Actors 
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The Regional Stability Argument: A Two-Step Approach 
Defining regional stability as a U.S. interest allows us to rigorously analyze 
foreign policy. It serves as an explanatory link between the political disruption 
caused by a secessionist conflict in a regional environment and U.S. foreign policy 
decisions. To put it simply, the regional stability interest provides reason for U.S. 
rational actions toward secessionist crises. 
The model argues that it is in the best interest of the United States that 
secessionist daims be managed and contained within existing state borders. 
Territorial sovereignty, however, is not always a guarantee of stability and can 
actually become, under certain conditions, a serious cause of regional disruption. 
For example, astate that would persecute its secessionist minority in the name of 
territorial integrity may end up creating regional instability as well as international 
tensions with other states. The Serbian military repression against secessionist 
Albanians in Kosovo in 1998-99 produced such an outcome and led NATO forces 
to intervene against the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY). Prior to the NATO 
intervention, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 
more than 90,000 Kosovar Albanians had fled to Albania and Macedonia ln 
reaction to Serbian violence, which produced a strong regional disturbance. 18 
l therefore argue that providing support to host states that are disruptive is 
not always in the U.S.'s best strategic interest and such a policy can end up 
and Preferences in International Relations", in David A. Lake and Robert Powell (eds.), Strategie 
Choiee and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 41. 
18 UNHCR also indicates that about 410,000 ethnic Albanians were internally displaced following 
Serb military operations. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(lCISS), The Responsibility to Proteet: Researeh, Bibliography, Background, Ottawa: The 
International Development Research Centre, 2001, p. 113. 
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encouragmg regional disorder. The regional stability argument, therefore, 
maintains that, under certain specifie circumstances and in order to maximize 
stability, the United States will choose to end support to a central state and to assist 
instead one or several of its secessionist entities. The model proceeds in the 
following two steps. 
First Step: the US. Supports State Integrity 
Scenario 1: The model argues that the United States will support state 
unit y as long as the central governments of this state maintain external stability by 
containing-either peacefully or by force-a secessionist crisis within its borders. 
Canada is a prime example of astate that peacefully managed a secessionist 
movement and preserved external stability. The referendum on Quebec secession 
held by the Quebec government in 1995 was a democratic exercise which had the 
approval of the Canadian state. The debate over the issue of Quebec' s 
independence was peaceful and democratic, and it was limited to Quebec and 
Canada. No international dispute resulted from this event. During the referendum 
campaign, the Clinton administration supported Canadian national unit y but stated, 
at the same time, that the issue was a Canadian internal affair. 19 
19 The traditional U.S. policy toward the Quebec secessionist issue can be summarized as follows: 
1) the U.S. preference is for a united Canada, and 2) the U.S. does not want to interfere in Canadian 
internaI affairs. When President Clinton visited Ottawa in February 1995, five months after the 
election of the secessionist Parti Québécois in Quebec, it is in these terms that he stated the U.S. 
position regarding the issue: "In a world darkened by ethnic conflicts that literally tear nations 
apart, Canada has stood for all of us as a model of how people of different cultures can live and 
work together in peace, prosperity, and respect." He added: "The United States, as many of my 
predecessors have said, has enjoyed its excellent relationship with a strong and united Canada, but 
we recognize, [ ... ] that your political future is, of course, entirely for you to decide." See James J. 
Blanchard, op. cit., p. 211. 
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Scenario 2: The stability argument predicts that the U.S. will adopt a 
similar policy in favor of state integrity in cases where a central government 
maintains external stability but relies on military repression to prevent territorial 
breakup. The lndonesian war against secessionists in Aceh-the far West province 
of lndonesia-is a good example that illustrates this scenario. Following the 
lndonesian military crackdown in the secessionist province, the United States 
reaffirmed its support to lndonesia's territorial integrity and encouraged Jakarta to 
improve its political relationship with Aceheses so that unit y could be maintained. 
The U.S. support was reiterated despite Jakarta's military operations in Aceh, 
which caused more than 15,000 deaths and 6,000 displaced persons from 1977 to 
1999 and about 2000 deaths in recent years?O Moreover, the U.S. support was 
reaffirmed even if the lndonesian government constantly rejected Aceh's proposaI 
to hold a democratic referendum on the political future of the province. 
The stability argument asserts that, facing such cases of military 
intervention against secessionists, the U.S. will support host states but will be 
worried about potential regional disorder. lndeed, although there may be no 
immediate external instability resulting from domestic warfare against 
secessionists, the long-term consequences of such actions are hard to predict and 
may lead to external turmoiI. 
As the two cases mentioned above show, secessionists can be treated very 
differently by their central governments. Quebecers were allowed to express 
20 See Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000, p. 359. See also Gautam Kumar Jha, "Indonesia and the 
'Free Aceh Movement''', Institute o/Peace & Conflict Studies, Article no. 1054, June 17,2003. 
http://www.ipcs.orginewKashmirLeveI2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1063&subCatID=null&m 
od=null (accessed June 2006). 
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themselves in a referendum on secession, while Aceheses were brutally repressed. 
However, what is important to mention here is that both Canada and Indonesia 
managed to contain secessionism within their borders and were successful at 
maintaining external stability in their regional environment (North America and 
South East Asia respectively). This explains, according to my model, why the 
United States issued similar responses to both cases. 
Scenario 3: In the case where a central state is unable to guarantee external 
stability but is open to negotiation with secessionists and/or to third party 
mediation, the model predicts that the United States will remain commirted to state 
integrity. The U.S. will estimate that supporting the central government remains 
the best way to restore order. The expected stability benefits that would eventually 
procure the unit y of the host state exceed the cost of the external disorder currently 
produced by the secessionist conflict. Therefore, as long as the central state 
demonstrates its openness and/or capacity to sertIe its internaI secessionist crisis, 
the U.S. will categorically oppose secessionist efforts and support state unity. 
This would explain why the American government remained committed to 
Moldova's unit y during its war against Trans-Dniester's secessionists. Following 
Trans-Dniester's declaration of independence in 1991, the Moldovan govemment 
was unable to contain the conflict within its borders and the crisis created 
important regional disorder. Russian forces quickly intervened in Trans-Dniester 
to protect Russian populations, and Romanian citizens crossed the border to 
51 
us. Foreign PoUcy, Secessionism, and Regional Stability 
express their solidarity for Moldovan authorities.21 Within a few months, several 
thousands of Russian-speaking Transdnistrians fled to Ukraine because of the war 
and by the summer of 1992, there were more than 100,000 refugees?2 At the same 
time, however, the government of Moldova demonstrated its desire to settle the 
issue by initiating negotiations with secessionists and by accepting foreign 
mediation.23 The government of Moldova agreed to provide economic and cultural 
autonomy to Trans-Dniester and a political agreement sponsored by Russia, 
Ukraine, and the OC SE was reached by the two parties in 1997.24 Throughout the 
conflict, the United States supported Moldova's government. Although 
Washington was not directly involved in peace negotiations, it was represented 
within the OcSE.25 The attitude shown by the Moldovan state during the 
secessionist conflict had a decisive impact on the evolution of the U.S. policy. The 
government of Moldova's will to resolve the crisis led the Americans as weIl as 
regional powers to uphold their support in favor of its integrity and to oppose the 
21 Russia armed and trained Trans-Dniester's paramilitary forces in early 1992 and sorne Russian 
leaders described the new Trans-Dnister republic as "Russian soil". Later that year, the Russian 
Fourteenth Army became directly involved in the secessionist crisis by being engaged in a full-
scale battle against Moldovan arm forces. See Vladimir Socor, "Moldova's 'Dnister' Ulcer", 
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 1, January IS\ 1993, pp. 13-14. 
22 Airat R. Aklaev, "Dynamics of the Moldova-Trans-Dniester ethnie conflict (late 1980s to early 
1990s)", in Kumar Rupesinghe and Valery A. Tishkov, (eds.), Ethnicity and Power in the 
Contemporary World, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1996. 
23 Ibid., p. 16. In 1992, several international delegations visited Moldova in an attempt to resolve 
the crisis. For example, the Council of Europe, the Office of the U.N. Seeretary-General, and 
oseE representatives aIl visited Moldova. 
24 Vladimir Kolossov and John O'Loughlin, "Pseudo-States as Harbingers of a New Geopolities: 
The Example of the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republie (TMR)", in David Newman, (ed.), 
Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999. 
25 Ibid. In a meeting with Moldova's President Mireea Ion Snegur held in 1992, US. President 
George Bush and Seeretary of State James Baker assessed that Moldova's treatment of its Russian 
ethnie minority was fair and nondiscriminatory. 
52 
u.s. Foreign Poliey, Seeessionism, and Regional Stability 
self-proclaimed Transdniestran Moldovan Republic?6 Had Moldova acted in bad 
faith by being opposed to political negotiations and mediation, the model predicts 
that the V.S. would have reconsidered its diplomatic options and may have 
supported Trans-Dniester' s independence. 
So far, the logic of the stability argument leads us to predict that the V.S. 
will support host states either because they contain their secessionist factions 
within their borders or because the maintenance of host state's integrity provides 
opportunities for the restoration of stability. 1 maintain, however, that this 
consistency in the V.S. response to secessionist crises will not hold in cases where 
the central state is neither open to negotiations and/or foreign mediation, nor able 
to contain its secessionist crisis within its borders. 
Scenario 4: If the host state fails both at the domestic and at the external 
levels, the theory predicts that the V.S. calculation of costs and benefits will 
radically change and that the presidency will be pressed to modify its position. The 
Vnited States will conclude that the host state no longer has the capacity to resolve 
the crisis and that it is a central obstacle to the restoration of regional stability. The 
model then argues that American decision-makers will consider the support and 
the recognition of secessionist states as a political tool to bring back stability and 
peace in the disputed region. 
1 argue in Chapter 4 that at sorne point in time, Yugoslavia fell into that 
category of states. The Yugoslav federal govemment was paralyzed in the early 
26 Since its unilateral declaration ofindependence in 1991, Trans-Dniester has not been recognized 
by the international community. See Robert M., Cutler, "Moldova/Transdnistria", Foreign Policy 
in Focus, Self-Determination Conflict Profile, 2001. 
http://www.selfdetermine.orglconflicts/moldova.html (accessed July 2006). 
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1990s as a result of Serbian and Croatian opposition over state reforms. This led 
Slovenia and Croatia to secede from the federation in 1991. This event had several 
major consequences: it resulted in a war between Croatia and Serbia that quickly 
spread to Bosnia; it precipitated Yugoslavia's disintegration; and produced a large 
amount of refugees that tled to neighboring states. As a result of the disturbance, 
Yugoslavia could no longer either initiate domestic negotiations between its 
republics or contain the conflict within its borders. When it became clear that the 
federation could no longer hold and that the recognition of secessionist republics 
was the only way to slowly restore stability in the Balkans, the United States 
shifted its policy and acknowledged independence in 1992, even though it had 
been one of the strongest supporters ofYugoslavia's territorial integrity until then. 
Yugoslavia serves, therefore, as an unfortunate example of what happens when 
external stability and internaI negotiations fail. 
Measuring the First Step of the Argument 
The variables 'external stability' and 'internaI negotiation' are at the center 
of the U.S. de ci sion to support or not support central states and these variables, as 
we have seen, constitute the tirst step of the theory. It is important to mention that 
the central state must simultaneously fail internally and externally for such a 
policy change to occur on the part of the United States. The external stability 
variable is intimately linked to the Westphalian conception of sovereignty, which 
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is based on states' territoriality and on the principle of the non-violation of states' 
sovereignty.27 A derogation from this principle will pro duce interstate instability. 
But how do we know whether a central government fails to maintain 
external stability? What accounts for its variation? 1 trace here two main indicators 
that allow us to measure fluctuation in stability. The presence or absence of cross-
national refugees is the first indicator. Intrastate conflicts resulting from 
secessionist attempts can produce international refuge es, which constitutes a 
violation of sovereign states' borders. Cross-national refugees are likely to disrupt 
the internal order of neighboring states, to unbalance their ethnic composition, to 
inflict higher economic costs on them, and even to foment ethnic conflicts. Host 
states that fail to contain their populations within their borders while struggling 
against secessionists will, therefore, cause regional instability. In a recent study, 
Salehyan and Gleditsch show that cross-national refugees are a major cause of the 
diffusion of intrastate conflicts and of regional instability.28 Moreover, Myron 
Weiner indicates that a "host country' s decision to grant refugee status [ ... ] often 
creates an adversary relationship with the country that produces the refugees". 
Weiner notes that democratic regimes often face this problem because they "allow 
their refugees to speak out against the regime oftheir country of origin".29 
27 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999. 
28 Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War", 
International Organization, Vol. 60, 2006, pp. 335-366. 
29 Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration", International Security, 
Vol. 17, No. 3, 1992-93, p. 107. Weiner's article focuses on how refugee flows create domestic and 
regional conflicts. He also identifies when cross-national refugees are perceived as threats. 
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The second indicator has to do with whether or not opponents violate the 
territorial integrity of contiguous states during the secessionist dispute. The 
intrusion, for instance, of secessionist fighters or of the central governrnent's 
military into neighboring states as part of a political or military tactic may create 
great regional disturbance and increase the chances of interstate dispute. Alexis 
Heraclides demonstrates that contiguous states are naturally inclined to intervene 
in secessionist conflicts at their doorstep.30 It is, therefore, reasonable to assume 
that the territorial violation of a contiguous state by either the host state or the 
secessionists risks accelerating the intervention of the contiguous state in the 
conflict.31 
Indicators of the failure of internaI negotiation are very straightforward. 
They are essentially the main factors preventing a political resolution of a given 
secessionist crisis. The host state will fail at the internaI level if it is categorically 
opposed to political negotiations with secessionists; if it rejects third states or 
international organizations' mediation (e.g. UN, OCSE, AU, etc.); if it uses 
military repression against secessionists; or finally, if the central governrnent is 
paralyzed or collapses, therefore making any resolution of the conflict impossible. 
30 Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement", International 
Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1990, pp. 341-378. Siverson and Starr argue that most of the states 
can only use their military capability for short distances. Therefore neighboring conflicts represent 
a real opportunity for states to intervene. See Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, The 
Diffusion ofWar, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991. 
31 For instance, the large amount of East Pakistanis who flew to India as a result of the West 
Pakistani repression against the Bengali secessionist movement in the early 1970s accelerated 
India's involvement in the secessionist crisis and led to an Indo-Pakistani war in 1971. 
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TABLE 3.1: 
First Step of the D.S. Stability Calculation 
External Stability 
Indicators ofa Central State's External Instability: 
The secessionist crisis produces cross-national refugee flows 
Antagonists violate the sovereignty of contiguous states 
InternaI Negotiations 
Indicators of Central State's Failure to Negotiate: 
The central government refuses to negotiate with secessionists and rejects third party 
rnediation 
Central authorities exercise rnilitary repression against secessionists 
The central govemment is paralyzed or collapses 
The model assumes that the host state do es not necessarily have to exhibit aIl these 
types of instability to be considered a disturbing agent by the United States. 
Rather, the theory argues that the U.S. may undertake a significant political shift in 
favor of the secessionists if at least one external and one internaI indicator 
simultaneously show a breakdown in stability. Thus, a central state can lamentably 
fail at the external level by causing strong regional disorder and still be backed by 
the U.S. if it shows internaI efforts to settle the issue. Conversely, the U.S. 
presidency will support a central state that contains secessionism even if it is 
achieved through political and military repression. 
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Second Step: the US. Supports Secession as a Last Resort 
In the event that the central state fails at both levels, the argument predicts 
that the United States will raise the possibility of supporting secessionists. The 
model asserts, however, that before seriously considering politico-diplomatic 
recognition of secessionist states, the U.S. will want the assurance that secessionist 
leaders are able to maintain external and internaI stability. American decision-
makers will not be interested in recognizing a new state that is likely to replicate 
the instability of the predecessor state. Moreover, a secessionist movement that 
would act in bad faith in the first phase of the negotiation process with the central 
govemment, in order to force a political deadlock or purely to provoke the collapse 
of the host state, will be unlikely to qualify for recognition as the United States 
will perceive that movement as a disruptive force on regionai stability. 
Scenario 5: If the secessionist group succeeds in showing internaI and 
external stability, the United States will grant recognition, which is expected to 
pro duce a net gain of regional stability.32 1 argue in Chapter 7 that the United 
States committed itselfto recognize Eritrea's independence because the Ethiopian 
govemment had become unable to assure regional stability, while the Eritrean 
authorities fulfilled domestic and external criteria of stability. 
Scenario 6: If the secessionist state is unable to achieve stability, however, 
the U.S. recognition will be denied and the status quo will be maintained. 1 argue 
32 This gain, however, is an expectation rather than a certainty, since the U.S., like any other state, 
operates in a state of uncertainty and usually possesses incomplete information for making foreign 
policy decisions. 
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that this is what happened to Kosovo, which failed to obtain international 
recognition in the 1990s because of a lack of internaI and external stability.33 
Measuring the Second Step of the Argument 
As in the first part of the argument, the second step is composed of two 
variables: external stability and internaI stability. To meet the external 
requirements of stability, the model argues that the secessionist group must first 
accept their former internaI boundaries as their new international borders. 
Territorial revisionism through irredentism, for instance, would not be tolerated. 
Mark Zacher shows that since 1945 aIl the new states that were created through 
state breakups have kept (whether or not they wanted to) their former internal 
borders as legal international ones. Zacher points out: "states generally desire 
predictability regarding the international territorial order. They do not like 
secessions, but if they are going to occur, they do not want the successor states 
fighting over what their boundaries should be".34 The United States is definitely 
not an exception here. The mode! also asserts that secessionist states must avoid 
33 However, the political status of Kosovo, established by the Rambouillet agreement and by the 
2001 Constitutional Framework, is an interesting international development that arose out of the 
failure of both the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Kosovo to guarantee regional 
stability. Instead ofmaintaining the status quo, the U.N. created a new model ofnon-Westphalian 
state sovereignty-Kosovo remains officially part of FRY, but is administered by the U.N. and 
Belgrade has no effective power within it. This new kind of "flexible" sovereignty conferred to 
Kosovo may actually be seen as part of a new generation of responses from the U.S. and the 
international community to situations where a secessionist state cannot remain part of a host state 
nor become fully independent because of instability. See John Doyle, "International Mediation in 
Ethnic Conflict and Practical Models ofNon-Westphalian Sovereignty: From Kosovo to Northern 
Ireland", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association in 
Montreal, March 2004. 
http://64.112.226.77/one/isaiisa04/index.php?click key= 1 &PHPSESSID=a98365db7a459f4d446ea 
5644da87151 (accessed July 2006). 
34 Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of 
Force", International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2001, pp. 234-235. 
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intervention in the internaI affairs of other sovereign states. Secessionist 
governments pursuing political revenge or an aggressive foreign policy toward 
neighboring states will clearly fail the test of external stability. As explained in 
Chapter 5, Greece argued that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had 
irredentist ambitions because it referred to itself as "Macedonia" which was 
already the name of a Greek province. This partly explains why the United States 
suspended its decision to recognize Macedonia's independence. Secessionist 
leaders who produce cross-national refugees by their policies and actions will also 
fall short. Moreover, the secessionist state must be at peace with its neighbors 
when asking for recognition. 1 as sert that the United States will be reluctant to 
recognize secessionist entities that might engage in an inter-state war. Finally, a 
secessionist group must have a defined territory within the host state (i.e. region, 
canton, province, republic, state) to qualify for recognition. Secessionists who 
cannot juxtapose their c1aim to self-determination to a defined territory will fail to 
be recognized since international recognition implies that the recognized unit 
exercises sovereignty over a defined piece of land. A secessionist state that would 
not have legally defined internaI boundaries within a host state would be likely to 
be the victim or the instigator of territorial revisionism and might experience 
political crises with foreign contiguous states and/or with its predecessor state over 
territory. 
As for the internaI dimension of stability, it partly refers to Krasner's 
domestic definition of sovereignty, which he explains as "the organization of 
public authority within a state and the level of effective control exercised by those 
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holding authority". 35 largue that the effective control of the territory by 
secessionists is a prerequisite for stability. Secessionist leaders who fail to achieve 
such control might face intrastate conflicts and recurrent instability. 
Moreover, secessionist authorities must provide guarantees that their state's 
internaI boundaries will be maintained following independence. Any change of 
intrastate boundaries undertaken by secessionist leaders will necessitate public 
consent. This indicator was inspired by the principle of the unchangeability of 
borders contained in the Helsinki Accords that was signed by the members of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which inc1uded the 
United States?6 Another important aspect of internaI stability is legitimacy. The 
regional stability argument assumes that the internaI stability of a secessionist state 
is not limited to the political control exercised by its leaders, but it also includes 
the political legitimacy of the new state. Secession, as well as the authority of 
secessionist leaders, has to be legitimized by public consent, otherwise instability 
will be likely to remain or to reemerge in the future. Thus, a popular consultation 
on the issue of independence has to be held by secessionist authorities-assisted 
by international actors if necessary-to measure the extent to which the population 
living in the secessionist territory agrees to se cede and to renounce being part of 
the host state. 
The respect and the protection of minorities and human rights will also be 
taken into account by the United States as an important aspect of internaI 
35 Stephen D. Krasner, op. cit., p. 9. 
36 The Helsinki Act established princip les guiding relations between states such as territorial 
integrity, inviolability of frontiers, respect for minority rights and peaceful settlement of disputes. 
See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki: CSCE, 1975. 
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Iegitimacy. A military junta that wouid unilaterally proc1aim independence without 
taking into account the will of the people and human rights would definitely fail 
the test of internaI Iegitimacy. In a similar vein, David Callahan argues: 
"democratically inclined secessionists present a better case for independence than 
do nationalists who seek statehood for chauvinistic reasons and offer no guarantee 
of democracy. There is little appeal in backing the creation of new states that are 
likely to be authoritarian.,,37 Here is a summary of the indicators of secessionist 
states' stability: 
TABLE 3.2: 
Second Step of the V.S. Stability Calculation 
External Stability 
Indicators of external stability of the secessionist state: 
Secessionists respect international borders (including no cross-national refugees) 
Secessionists demonstrate that no interstate war is likely to occur following independence 
(absence ofirredentism, revenge, and aggression) 
The secessionist group must have a defined territory within the central state (region, 
canton, province, republic, state, etc.) 
Internai Stability 
Indicators of internaI stability of the secessionist state: 
Secessionist authorities achieve effective control ofthe territory 
Leaders respect internaI boundaries, or modify them with public consent 
Secessionists agree to hold a democratic referendum on independence 
The new state respects human and minority rights 
http://www.osce.orglabout/13131.html (accessed June 2006). 
37 David Callahan, op. cit., p. 33. 
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Unlike the first part of the argument, in which the host state could fail at 
one level and still be supported by the United States, the second step of the model 
represents a much harder test for those who want to leave a host state. 
Secessionists must not only succeed at maintaining external and internal order, but 
they must also obtain domestic legitimacy in order to be recognized by the U.S. 
This difficult test is justified by the fact that secession has more international 
implications than the maintenance of the territorial status quo. Indeed, secessionist 
states break with the international principle of states' integrity and may occasion 
unexpected consequences such as the spillover effect. The international 
recognition of secession is, therefore, a risky exercise. As Robert Young points 
out, "even peaceful secessions are times of much disruption and uncertainty. They 
mark profound changes in the relations between peoples and between states".38 
Therefore, before providing support and recognition to secessionists, the model 
argues that the U.S. will make sure that the seceding state meets stability criteria 
defined in terrns of state authority, territorial control, and popular consent. 
The model also predicts that the U.S. will delay or withhold recognition if a 
secessionist group partially meets the criteria of external and internal stability. 
Diplomatie recognition will then be withheld until secessionists demonstrate 
sufficient eapability to maintain order. 
Moreover, it is important to note that not aH empirical eases will 
chronologically foHow the two steps of the argument. Sorne secessionist cases can 
38 Robert A. Young, "How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?", Canadian Journal of Po/itical 
Science, Vol. 27, 1994, p. 782. 
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clearly demonstrate, right from the beginning of the crisis, that they are able to 
maintain stability but will not be recognized by the United States because their 
host state will be able to properly manage the conflict. 
Furthermore, if a host state that initially failed to maintain external stability 
and to negotiate with secessionists improves its ability to handle the secessionist 
crisis, then the United States could move back to the first leve1 of the argument 
and focus its diplomatie efforts on supporting the integrity of the state. This is an 
important theoretical precision that makes the stability mode1 more of an axis of 
foreign policy options rather than a one-way linear pro cess. The United States will 
not hesitate to move back and forth from one step of the argument to the other step 
in order to maximize what it perceives as an improvement in regional order. 
The mode1 aIso argues that the United States will not recognize the 
independence of great powers' secessionist movements (e.g. Chechnya, Corsica, 
Northern Ire1and, Tibet) because it would be extreme1y harmful to its stability and 
security interests. Even if the U.S. is the dominant power, its support for 
secessionist movements evolving within other great powers could lead the 
American govemment to face economic reprisaIs, military escalation and maybe 
nuclear threat from these states. In the previous chapter, 1 criticized the balance of 
threat argument for similar reasons. 1 argued that it is very unlike1y that the 
Americans would support the independence of Taiwan or Chechnya, for instance, 
to weaken China and Russia even if they become at sorne point highly disruptive 
states and fail to contain their secessionist movements. 
Moreover, these great powers (China, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom) are an permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Supporting 
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their secessionist groups could significantly harm the conduct of international 
diplomacy and the management of the international political system. It would be, 
therefore, irrational to argue that the United States would support great powers' 
secessionist movements to maximize its stability benefits since it is evident that 
such an action would jeopardize its security. The expected reaction of the United 
States toward secessionist conflicts occurring within great powers is, therefore, 
consistent with the regional stability argument. largue that, unless a great power 
disintegrates, as in the case of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States will not 
move to the second step of the stability model regardless of how great powers deal 
with their secessionist movements. 
Intervening Variable: Do Regional and Great Powers Matter? 
The international dimension of secessionist conflicts is of course more 
complex than simple interstate dyadic relations. The decision making process 
leading the U.S. to support or not support secessionist efforts is not only affected 
by its relationship with the host state and with the secessionist movement but is 
also influenced by the position of regional and great powers on the issue. Indeed, 
as one unit of the international system (be it the most powerful unit), the United 
States must interact with the other states of the system and sorne of them can 
potentially play an important role in the secessionist conflict. Thus, the model 
argues that Washington's response to secessionist movements is multidimensional 
and that the actions of other powers can affect the application of U.S. foreign 
policy toward secessionist crises. As a result, the recognitionlnonrecognition of 
secessionist states by regional or great powers will be treated as an intervening 
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variable. This variable will allow for the measurement of the real impact of 
regional stability on the United States' reaction to secessionist attempts by 
showing the extent to which other powers can compel the U.S. to recognize 
secessionist states or inhibit it from doing so. 
1 define the intervening variable ln terms of recognition versus 
nonrecognition of secessionist states by regional or great powers rather than in 
terms of support versus non-support to these states. Indeed, supporting a 
secessionist group is likely to increase tension between a third state and a host 
state but will not pro duce structural changes. The diplomatic recognition of a 
secessionist state, however, has a direct impact on the regional system, that is to 
sayon the regional environment of the secessionist state since it potentially makes 
independence a fait accompli. Here 1 argue that it is the issue of whether or not 
other powers choose to recognize secessionist states that can impact U.S. foreign 
policy decision-making. The theory asserts, however, that although the American 
government takes into account other states' foreign policy when making its own 
decisions on the matter, the cost-benefit analysis of the U.S. presidency will be 
first and foremost dictated by its regional stability interests no matter what the 
policy of other great powers may be on the issue. 
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FIGURE 3.1: The V.S. Regional Stability Argument 
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FIGURE 3.2: The Dynamics of the Model 
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The regional stability argument defines the United States' preferences 
towards secessionist conflicts. These preferences-which are ranked in order from 
the most to the least favored outcome-identify D.S. foreign policy choices that 
will be made depending on the evolution of the crisis. Preferences are ranked as 
follows: 
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1. The host state is able to maintain external stability and negotiates with 
secessionists and/or is open to third party mediation. Outeome: Regional 
stability. Examples: Canada (Quebec), France (Corsica), Spain (Basque 
Country). 
2. The host state is able to maintain external stability but rejects negotiations 
with seeessionists or third party mediation. Outcome: Stability but a risk of 
regional disorder. Examples: Georgia (Abkhazia), Indonesia (Aeeh). 
3. The host state is unable to maintain external stability but is open to 
negotiation and/or to third party mediation. Outeome: Instability but the 
restoration of regional order remains possible. Example: Moldova (Trans-
Dniester). 
4. The seeessionist group demonstrates ability to maintain external and 
internaI stability, while the host state does not. Outcome: The US. extends 
diplomatie recognition to the secessionist state. Examples: Eritrea 
(Ethiopia), Slovenia (Yugoslavia). 
5. The seeessionist group is unable to guarantee externallinternal stability and 
the host state represents a clear obstacle to regional stability. Outeome: 
Status quo. The U.S. does not recognize secession. Examples: Kosovo 
(Serbia), Tamils (Sri Lanka). 
Built on rationalist assumptions and previous deductions regarding the behavior of 
U.S. foreign policy towards secessionist crises, the regional stability model 
generates the following testable hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 
Hl: The United States opposes secession if the host state maintains external 
stability. 
H2: The u.s. opposes secession if the host state is open to negotiation with 
secessionists and/or to third party mediation. 
H3: The u.s. recognizes the secessionist state ifit demonstrates the ability to 
maintain internai and external stability, while the host state does not. 
H4: The U.S. opposes secession if the secessionist state does not demonstrate clear 
ability to maintain internai and external stability even if the host state likewise 
lacks ability to maintain order. 
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Theoretical Contribution 
Most of the time, the concept of stability is imprecisely used in the 
literature on U.S. foreign policy and very little explanation is offered as to how 
this concept impacts the behavior of the United States. As for the notion of 
"national interest", for example, the concept of stability is often used without 
proper definition and often draws from intuitive thinking rather than from sound 
theoretical justifications and explanations. Alexander George and Robert Keohane 
point out that national interest is "so elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role 
as a guide to foreign policy is problematical and controversial".39 The same 
observation applies to the concept of stability. It performs poorly as a scientific 
concept when not properly defined and operationalized. 
This research attempts to clarify the ambiguous notion of stability that is 
often used to explain U.S. policy toward secession. It is often assumed, for 
instance, that the United States opposes secessionist movements because it values 
stability; or that secessionism must be contained because it is inherently unstable 
and challenges the international status quo (i.e. the geopolitical order). These 
arguments, however, do not account for variations in US. policy. 
The stability model that l propose provides theoretical mechanisms that 
establish a c1ear connection between U.S. foreign policy and regional stability. On 
the basis of these mechanisms, the theory generates a rationalist explanation that 
accounts for the fluctuation ofU.S. foreign policy toward independentist states. In 
39 Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests: Uses and 
Limitations", in Alexander L. George, (ed.), Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The 
Effective Use of Information andAdvice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, p. 217. 
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other words, it provides a theoretical understanding as to how the notion of 
stability plays on the American behavior toward secessionism. 
The regional stability model is also testable and parsimonious. It could be 
disproved if one could demonstrate, for instance, that the United States had 
recognized a secessionist state, while the host state was still able to maintain 
external stability or was open to negotiations. It would also be wrong if someone 
could show that the U.S. extended recognition to a secessionist group that could 
not maintain stability. 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that the function of a theory is to simplify 
the complexity of a phenomenon without losing the essence of what we perceive 
as reality. As Kenneth Waltz indicates in his seminal Theory of International 
Polities, a theory "is not an edifice oftruth and not a reproduction ofreality [ ... ]. 
A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections 
among its parts".40 Thus, the regional stability the ory seeks to isolate the main 
variables that affect American foreign policy and to explain how they interact 
together to pro duce the observable outcomes. As a result, the purpose of this 
research is not to raise the myriad of factors that may play a role in the U.S. 
foreign policy decision-making but to circumscribe the major variables on which 
the theoretical model can be operationalized and generalized to other cases. 
40 Kenneth N. Waltz, op. cit., p. 8. 
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Methodology 
ln order to test whether the regional stability argument accurately explains 
D.S. foreign policy variations toward secession, 1 propose to compare my model to 
the business interests and ethnic politics propositions which have been presented 
in Chapter 2. These domestic considerations are arguably the most serious rival 
hypotheses to my model since they have been relatively influential in the recent 
years. My aim is to demonstrate that the American policy fluctuation toward 
secessionist quarrels does not primarily depend on its domestic political process 
but rather on the systemic effects of international relations. To achieve this goal, 1 
selected empirical cases of secessionist attempts that are likely to validate the 
ethnic politics and business interest argument. For each of these cases, 1 first test 
my own theoretical proposition, and then see whether the competing theories do a 
better job at explaining the research question. If these domestic explanations are as 
good as their proponents suggest they should succeed these empirical tests. 
Case Selection 
Instances of secession are limited and, therefore, the selection of cases 
cannot be randomly generated. For this reason, 1 have selected cases that are 
significant for the measurement of my research hypotheses. Here 1 proceed to a 
systematic analysis of cases picked in two different regional contexts namely the 
Balkans and the Hom of Africa. For each region, 1 assemble recognized and 
unrecognized cases of secession. The Balkan context also includes a case where 
recognition was delayed, for a final total of six cases. The cases are: Croatia, 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Slovenia (Balkans); Eritrea and Somaliland (Hom of 
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Africa).41 Croatia and Slovenia are treated together since the United States issued 
the same policy toward them and recognized their independence at the same 
moment. 
1 compare Croatia and Slovenia to Kosovo because these cases evolved in a 
similar regional context although they had a very different political fate. Croatia 
and Slovenia are former Yugoslav republics that were recognized by the U.S. in 
1992, while Kosovo failed to achieve recognition. Macedonia is also included 
because the United States delayed its recognition for a long period of time. Its 
independence was declared in 1991 but was only recognized by the U.S. in 1994 
and the Clinton administration waited until late 1995 to send an ambassador to 
Skopje, the Macedonian capital. 
As for Eritrea, it is the only successful case of secession that happened in 
Africa in the post-cold war era. Eritrea formally seceded from Ethiopia in 1993 
after more than 30 years of war. It is one of the most recent cases of secession. As 
for Somaliland, Eritrea's secessionist neighbor, it attempted to secede from 
Somalia in 1991 by declaring itself the independent Republic of Somaliland. 
However, contrary to Eritrea, it has never been recognized by the international 
community. Thus, although these two cases are very similar given that they come 
from the same sub-regional context and that they both emerged from collapsing 
states in the early 1990s (Ethiopia and Somalia), they experienced very different 
outcomes. 
41 The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina was left out because it is not an instance of secession but rather 
the result of Yugoslavia's disintegration. When the Bosnian population opted for independence in 
late February 1992, Yugoslavia had already ceased to exist. Yugoslav president Mesic had declared 
the end ofYugoslavia in September 1991 when it became apparent that the central govemment had 
lost control over the Yugoslav People's Army. 
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These cases provide very different dynamics as well as a good 
representation of the U.S. foreign policy variation toward secession. 1 am hoping 
that this selection will confirm the generalizability of the model. Moreover, by 
selecting for variation in my dependent variable, 1 counter the problem of selection 
bias. Indeed, this selection of cases represents the whole range of possibilities on 
the empirical axis of cases (Le. recognition vs. nomecognition cases). This 
selection will, therefore, allow for a proper estimation of the strength of the model. 
TABLE 3.3: Case Studies 
Region 
Balkans 
Rom of 
Africa 
V.S. Response 
Recognition 
Croatia 
Macedonia 
Slovenia 
Eritrea 
Nonrecognition 
Kosovo 
Somaliland 
1 chose not to include cases of secession from the Soviet Union since it was 
a superpower. Therefore, as long as the Soviet Union remained, the U.S. did not 
step forward to recognize the Baltic States, for instance, which were the first to 
secede.42 The United States issued recognition to these former Soviet Republics 
only once Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine agreed to dismantle the U.S.S.R. in 
42 Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "The Formulation of an American Response to Lithuanian Independence, 
1990", East European Quarter/y, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1995, pp. 17-41. 
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December of 1991. Acting otherwise could have jeopardized U.S. security and 
stability interests as explained previously. 
How are us. Foreign Policy Decisions Framed? 
To be accurate, the D.S. theory of regional stability must take into account 
the internaI process of U.S. foreign policy decision-making so that it can explain 
the causal mechanism that generates observable outcomes (i.e. recognition versus 
nonrecognition of secessionist states). This is not an easy task. The D.S. foreign 
policy apparatus includes a large number of foreign policy actors and the 
information concerning inter-agency debates on foreign policy issues is sometimes 
scarce. Despite these difficulties, 1 attempt to shed sorne light on the causal 
process or sequence of events that intervenes between my independent and 
dependent variables. To achieve this objective 1 use the method of process-
tracing.43 By tracing the processes of D.S. decision-making through detailed case 
studies, this method helps to circurnscribe the nurnber of potential causes that 
explain the variation of my dependent variable (recognition vs. nonrecognition). 
This method allows me to demonstrate the extent to which the independent 
variables of the regional stability model really influence D.S. decision-makers 
toward secessionist crises abroad. The understanding of the causal explanation is 
crucial. As George and Bennett argue: 
[E]ven when rational choice theory or other formal models predict 
outcomes with a fairly high degree of accuracy, they do not 
constitute acceptable causal explanations unless they demonstrate 
43 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. See especially chapter 10, pp. 205-232. 
75 
U.S. Foreign Poliey, Seeessionism, and Regional Stability 
(to the extent the evidence allows) that their posited or implied 
causal mechanisms were in fact operative in the predicted cases".44 
Thus, each case study will attempt to reconstitute the U.S. decision-making 
pro cess toward the secessionist conflict under investigation. To study the causal 
process of V.S. foreign policy decision-making l focus on what Alexander George 
calls the individual and the small group contexts of U.S. policy making. The 
individual context concentrates on the discussions that the President has with one 
of his Cabinet members or close advisors (e.g. his Secretary of State). As for the 
small group context, it focuses on the President' s meetings with a few advisors 
coming from different governmental spheres (e.g. National Security Council 
meetings, Oval Office meetings with foreign policy experts).45 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, one of the core assumptions of the 
model is that the presidency makes rational decisions but that it is not a monolithic 
body. Several executive agents and advisors have their own views toward foreign 
poHcy issues, which often lead them to compete to influence the President's 
decÏsions. By focusing on the individual and the small group contexts, this 
research will attempt to identify executive actors, among those who have foreign 
affairs responsibilities, who emphasize the importance of regional stability at the 
expense of other interests, and to analyze whether these actors are the most 
44 Ibid., p. 208. 
45 Alexander L. George (ed.), Presidential Decision Making in Foreign PoUcy, Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1980, p. Il. George also mentions the organizational context as part of the foreign policy 
machinery. This context involves the whole bureaucracy that is concemed with foreign policy 
issues. However, 1 chose not to integrate this third context into the analysis. Although relevant for 
certain types of foreign policy studies, the organizational context would move the analysis away 
from the straightforward objective of finding whether agents and advisors who emphasize stability 
considerations have the most influence in the decision making process. 
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influential in the decision-making process toward secessionist conflicts. For the 
regional stability argument to be valid, the analysis should demonstrate that 
executive agents who promote regional stability have more influence in the 
decision-making process than those who emphasize other policy concems such as 
ethnic politics or private business interests. The study should also show that the 
preponderant influence of stability-seeker agents is consistent throughout the 
different cases. 
Measuring Regional Stability and Domestic Variables 
1 now tum to the systematic measurement of both my regional stability 
model and rival propositions by testing them on selected case studies. To achieve 
this task, 1 combine the "method of structured, focused comparison" with process-
tracing.46 1 formulate a limited number of theoretical questions that are 
systematically asked for aIl cases in order to measure the veracity of competing 
arguments. The aim of asking such standardized questions is to structure empirical 
inquiry. Thus, the research will produce comparable data and will facilitate the 
identification of similarities and differences among chosen cases. More generaIly, 
as Alexander George mentions: "the se questions are designed to illuminate the 
orientations of a leader to the fundamental issues of history and politics that 
46 For a complete explanation of this comparative method of research, see Alexander L., George, 
"Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method ofStructured, Focused Comparison", in Paul 
Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and PoUcy, New York: Free Press, 
1979, pp. 43-68. Sorne interesting research has used structured, focused comparison. See for 
instance Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1994. 
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign PoUcy: Theory and 
Practice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 
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presumably influence his calculation and choice of foreign policy".47 Moreover, 
the "structured, focused comparison" is also characterized by the fact that it 
selectively analyzes aspects of historical cases that are relevant to the analysis. 
Therefore, the treatment of historical accounts of secessionist conflicts that 
occurred in Central Europe and in Africa in the post-Cold War era is limited to 
what is relevant to answer the standardized questions. The set of questions that 
will be systematically asked are as follows. 
Regional Stability: Does the U.S. presidency always support the host state 
when it maintains external stability? If so, do es the United States sustain this 
policy in cases in which the host state is unable to guarantee external stability but 
attempts to negotiate with secessionists and is willing to let a third party intervene? 
If this is the case, what happens when a host state fails to keep external stability 
and refuses to negotiate with secessionists; does the U.S. revise its policy and 
consider recognizing secession? If so, is U.S. recognition of secessionist states 
granted only to those that achieve internaI and external stability? If "yes" is the 
answer to the above four questions, it will then be possible to conc1ude that the 
regional stability argument explains the U.S. behavior and that it can be 
generalized to other empirical cases. 
Moreover, a few questions derived from process-tracing of U.S. foreign 
policy decision-making are inc1uded in the analysis. Do executive agents 
promoting the interest of regional stability have the most influence on the 
President's decisions? Is this influence consistent through time? A set of questions 
47 Alexander L. George, op. cit., 1979, p. 56. 
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conceming rival theories will also be applied to the selected sample of cases, and 
they are as follows. 
Rival Domestic Arguments: Are V.S. ethnic groups that share ties with 
protagonists in the secessionist conflict abroad well-organized at the national 
level? Do these groups represent a considerable number of V.S. voters? If so, do 
these ethnic groups exercise pressure on the V.S. government and, more 
specifically, on the executive branch? Is the foreign policy decision regarding the 
secessionist crisis in accordance with the interests of the strongest ethnic group 
involved in the issue? As for the business interests argument: Do American 
multinational corporations (MNCs) have significant economic interests in the 
central state or in the secessionist entity? If it is the case, do American firms 
influence the decision-making process? Does the V.S. executive response to the 
secessionist effort conform to the interests of powerful MNCs or, more 
specifically, to V.S. firms with which U.S. executive agents keep strong ties? 
These straightforward questions provide clear research guidance and will 
allow us to compare empirical findings. The "structure d, focused comparison" is 
thus a good answer to Kenneth Waltz' s observation that "without sorne guidance 
we can know neither what information to gather nor how to put it together so that 
it becomes comprehensible".48 
48 Kenneth N. Waltz, op. cit., p. 11. 
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4. 
The Us. Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, 
1991-1992 
Introduction 
The secessions of the Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia from the 
Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia in 1991 are among the first instances of 
effective secessions to happen in a non-colonial context since the foundation of the 
United Nations. l By precipitating the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Croatian 
and the Slovenian government compelled the United States to formulate a 
response to their daims and to express its preferences toward secessionist issues in 
the emerging post-cold war order. As this chapter will demonstrate, the American 
response to the Yugoslav secessionist quarrel was primarily guided by its interests 
in regional stability rather than by domestic considerations. 
Before measuring the accuracy of the U.S. regional stability argument as it 
applies to Croatia and Slovenia, a review of events leading to the Yugoslav 
secessionist crisis is presented. The purpose here is not to investigate in detail the 
causes of the Yugoslav demise but to sketch the political context in which the 
United States got involved in the conflict.2 
1 Bangladesh was the only other case ofsuccessful secession to happen since 1945. 
2 Several books have been written on the dissolution of Yugoslavia. For good analyses of the 
conflict see for instance: Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, London: Routledge 
Editions, 1999. Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration ofYugoslaviafrom the Death of 
Tito to Ethnie War, 3rd Edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999. See also Susan L. Woodward, 
Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1995. 
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A Brief Review of the Secessionist Crisis 
The secession of Croatia and Slovenia arose from the failure of Yugoslav 
political elites to create a new state designed to accommodate growing divergent 
interests among the republics. At the turn of the 1990s, the central source of 
contention concemed the issue of power sharing between the Yugoslav federal 
state and the republics. The northem republics of Croatia and Slovenia, which 
were more economically developed than the southem republics, favored a strong 
decentralization of power from the central govemment and the creation of a 
Yugoslav confederation. Two main factors explain these demands: Croats and 
Slovenes wanted to safeguard their economies from Yugoslavia's rapid economic 
decline as weIl as limit Serbia's growing influence in the central government.3 
Serbia and Montenegro, on the contrary, supported the maintenance of a 
centralized federal govemment as weIl as a strong federal control of the economy. 
The polarization between republics was intensified by the rise of Slobodan 
Milosevic in Serbia in the late 1980s and by the election of nationalist parties in 
Croatia and Slovenia at the first multiparty elections in 1990. Following the 
elections, the Croatian and the Slovenian parliaments declared the sovereignty of 
their respective republics (i.e. the right to make all kinds of decisions including the 
right to secede) and adopted constitutional amendments to suspend federallaws on 
their territory. 4 
3 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Economies of Secession, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 
pp. 95-97. 
4 Susan L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 146. 
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The tuming point of the Yugoslav crisis came in May 1991 when Serbia, 
Montenegro, and the no longer autonomous republics of Kosovo and Vojvodina, 
opposed the election of Croatia's Stjepan Mesic as the new Yugoslav President to 
protest against Croatia' s constitutional demands.5 This incident transformed 
political tensions into a major constitutional crisis that led to the collapse of the 
entire federal system. Constitutionally, the failure to elect Mesic at the rotational 
presidency left Yugoslavia without a State President and without a commander in 
chief ofthe Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). Following this political rebuff on the 
part of Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia held referendums on 
independence to press demands for the creation of a Yugoslav Confederation.6 
Their strategy was simple: either negotiate a confederal union that would provide 
greater autonomy to republics, or else secede from Yugoslavia if no confederal 
agreement can be reached. 
Facing Serbia's refusal of decentralizing federal powers, Croatia and 
Slovenia proceeded to make unilateral dec1arations of independence on June 25, 
1991 and seized control of their borders. The Yugoslav federal government 
dec1ared these unilateral actions illegal, and ordered units of the YP A stationed in 
Croatia and Slovenia to take control of Yugoslavia's international frontiers. This 
intervention marked the beginning of a ten-day war with Slovenia's national 
5 Together, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina had the majority ofrepresentatives in the 
Yugoslav federal council. See Milan Andrejevich, "State Presidency Deadlocked over Election of 
State President", Report on Eastern Europe, RFEIRL Research Institute, June 7, 1991, p. 21. 
6 In Slovenia, 94.6 percent of those who voted agreed to secede. In Croatia, 92 percent favored 
independence, although Croatia's Serbian minority boycotted the referendum. See Milan 
Andrejevich, "The Croatian and Slovenian Declaration of Independence", Report on Eastern 
Europe, RFE-RL Research Institute, Vol. 2, No. 29, July 19,1991. 
82 
( 
The Recognition ofCroatia and Slovenia 
troops, which was eventually transformed into a major ethnic conflict over internaI 
borders in Croatia, and later in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The United States' Response 
The resolution of the Yugoslav constitutional crisis was not a top priority 
for the administration of George H.W. Bush. In the summer of 1991, the U.S. was 
dealing with major international transformations, among which the Soviet political 
disintegration was certainly the most demanding. This issue was directly related to 
the security of the United States since it raised concerns about the Soviet nuclear 
arsenal and the stability of the Eurasian continent. The political aftermath of the 
Gulf War was also at the center of President Bush's foreign policy. The State 
Department was deeply involved in the Middle East peace negotiations that 
followed the liberation of Kuwait and suffered, in the words of Richard 
Holbrooke, from a "post-Iraq Fatigue".7 The relative weight of the Yugoslav crisis 
was therefore minor for the Bush administration, and U.S. policy-makers treated it 
as a simple regional dispute.8 As Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's National 
Security Advisor, would later observe about the Yugoslav conflict: "[Secretary] 
7 Richard Holbrooke, Ta End a War, New York: The Modem Library, 1998, p. 26. 
8 In his memoir, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is unambiguous about this. He writes: "unlike 
in the Persian Gulf, our vital national interests were not at stake [in Yugoslavia]. The Yugoslav 
conflict had the potential to be intractable, but it was nonetheless a regional dispute. Milosevic had 
Saddam's appetite, but Serbia didn't have Iraq's capabilities or ability to affect America's vital 
interests, such as access to energy supplies. The greater threat to American interests at the time lay 
in the increasingly dicey situation in Moscow, and we preferred to maintain our focus on that 
challenge, which had global ramifications for us". See James A. Baker, III, The PoUlies of 
Diplomacy, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995, p. 636. 
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Baker would say 'we don't have a dog in this fight.' The President would say to 
me once a week 'tell me again what this is aU about' .,,9 
With the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia was no longer the neutral buffer 
zone protecting Western Europe from a potential Soviet continental invasion and, 
as a result, it lost its geopolitical importance in Washington. Susan Woodward 
points out that Yugoslavia became "unnecessary to V.S. vital security". It was 
being removed from a special category in the V.S. State Department [ ... ] and 
returned to its pre-1949 category". 10 The Bush administration was also very 
pessimistic about the future of Yugoslavia and judged that nothing could reaUy be 
done to avoid its disintegrationY For these reasons, the V.S. was not inclined to 
take a leading role in the Yugoslav conflict, and was pleased to follow the 
leadership of the European Community (EC) on this matter. As V.S. Secretary of 
State James Baker indicates: "The Bush administration felt comfortable with the 
EC's taking responsibility for handling the crisis in the Balkans. The conflict 
seemed to be one the EC could manage. More criticaUy, Yugoslavia was in the 
heart of Europe, and European interests were directly threatened".12 The European 
Community had indeed much more at stake in the Yugoslav conflict. Two of its 
members, Greece and Italy, respectively shared borders with the Yugoslav 
Republics of Macedonia and Slovenia, and the prospect of Yugoslavia's 
9 Cited in Richard Holbrooke, op. cit., p. 27. 
10 Susan L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 104. 
Il James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 203-04. See also David C. Gompert, "The United States 
and Yugoslavia's Wars", in Richard H. Ullman, (ed.), The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, New 
York: A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1996, p. 122. 
12 James A. Baker, III, op. cit., p. 636. 
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disintegration raised the Issue of ethnic conflicts and instability in the whole 
region. 
The United States Supports Yugoslavia 's Unity 
Even if the Bush administration did not see the Yugoslav crisis as a central 
issue, it did formulate clear preferences toward it. The primary U.S. interest was to 
avoid, and then, to contain war in the Balkans. From the early days of the 
Yugoslav secessionist crisis to the formaI disintegration of Yugoslavia, which 
happened in the faU of 1991, the United States supported the unit y of the 
federation and was categorically opposed to the unilateral secession of its 
constituent republics. At that time, the White House was deeply worried that war 
would breakout in Yugoslavia as a result of secessionist attempts, and Secretary 
Baker stressed the importance of peaceful negotiations.13 During his visit to 
Yugoslavia, a week before Croatia and Slovenia declared independence, Baker 
13 See Warren Zimmermann, "The Last ambassador: A memoir on the collapse of Yugoslavia", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, 1995, p. 11. President Bush had also declared a few months earlier 
that the United States "would not reward" republics that would choose to secede unilaterally. See 
The Economist, "The road to war", Vol. 320, No. 7714, July 1991, p. 45. 
According to David Gompert who served on the National Security Council as special assistant to 
President Bush and as senior director for Europe and Eurasia: "The top floors of the State 
Department and the West Wing of the White Rouse saw clearly a year before the fighting began 
that Yugoslavia was being led toward the abyss by a few demagogic politicians". See David C. 
Gompert, op. cil., p. 122. 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had warned the administration in December 1990 that 
Yugoslavia would probably disintegrate by the end of 1991. In a prophetie analysis, the CIA 
concluded that "Yugoslavia probably will break up in the absence of a confederal arrangement 
[ ... ]. The military may oppose Slovene and Croatian moves by trying to impose unity by force, 
splitting the Army along ethnie lines and hastening the country's breakup". See Central Intelligence 
Agency, "Yugoslavia: Dissolution Accelerating", December 28, 1990. http://www.foia.cia.gov 
(accessed July 2006). 
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mentioned: "Instability and break-up of Yugoslavia, we think, could have some 
very tragic consequences, not only here, but more broadly, in Europe, as well".14 
The Yugoslav State Maintains Stability 
The unilateral declarations of independence issued by Croatia and Slovenia 
in June 1991 had a disastrous effect on the Yugoslav state. The central government 
was increasingly paralyzed as Croatian and Slovenian federal officiaIs gradually 
returned to their republics. Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic, however, 
was still in a position to exercise control on the YP A and his decision to send 
troops into Slovenia asserted-at least in the short term-Yugoslavia's 
sovereignty. The Yugoslav state, therefore, managed to contain secessionists 
inside its borders, no cross-national refugees resulted from secessionist attempts, 
and Belgrade remained at peace with its foreign neighbors. At the internaI level, 
Prime Minister Markovic demonstrated his willingness to negotiate with 
secessionists in the summer of 1991 by welcoming the EC mediation. Markovic 
was even ready to accept the secession of the republics as long as it would be 
democratically negotiated with the federal government. 15 
14 James A. Baker, III, "US Concerns About the Future ofYugoslavia", US. Department ofState 
Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 26, July 1, 1991, p. 468. The fear inspired by the breakup ofYugoslavia led 
the V.S. govemment to support a variety of constitutional reforms such as a confederal 
arrangement. The Bush administration even indicated that it would accept a peaceful disintegration 
of Yugoslavia. Secretary Baker writes in his memoir: "while we supported the territorial integrity 
of Yugoslavia and existing republic borders and would not accept unilateral changes, the 
international community, of course, recognized that if the republics wanted to change borders by 
peaceful, consensual means, that was an altogether different matter". James A. Baker, III, op. cit., 
1995, p. 480. 
15 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, New York: Times Books, 1996, p. 135. 
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In addition to being able to maintain the stability of Yugoslavia's 
international borders and being open to negotiations, Prime Minister Markovic had 
been strongly supported by the United States since his accession to power in 1989. 
With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, Markovic 
came to symbolize democracy and market reforms in Yugoslavia. Warren 
Zimmermann, the last U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, indicates that "[w]ithin the 
[Bush] administration there was little dissension: Prime Minister Markovic, as a 
democratic figure striving to hold the country together, should receive continued 
support.,,16 Markovic was also a strong supporter of liberal economic reforms for 
his country. As Zimmermann recalls: 
Markovic made a successful visit to the United States in October 
1989. He met President Bush, Secretary of State Baker [ ... ] sorne 
Congressionalleaders, and U.S. businessmen and bankers. During 
their meeting the President reaffirmed his strong support for 
Yugoslav independence, unit y, and sovereignty, and welcomed 
Markovic's commitment to market-oriented economic reform and 
democratic pluralism. 17 
Markovic's openness had also allowed the European Community to negotiate a 
cease-fire between the Yugoslav army and Slovenian troops in July 1991. This 
demonstrated the central state's good will and illustrated Belgrade's determination 
to settle the crisis. The cease-fire supervised by Brussels established a three-month 
moratorium on Craatia and Slovenia' s secession, which aimed to facilitate a 
political compromise on Yugoslavia's future. 18 Moreover, Serbia had consented in 
16 Warren Zimmennann, "Yugoslavia: 1989-1996", in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. payin, (eds.), 
U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect ta the Use of Force, Santa Monica: RAND Center for 
Russian and Eurasian Studies, 1996, p. 183. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Lenard J. Cohen, "The Disintegration ofYugos1avia", Current History, November 1992, p. 373. 
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early July to the election of the Croatian candidate, who had initially been 
boycotted by Milosevic, to the post of President of the collective state presidency. 
This was seen in the United States and among EC members as a positive step 
forward toward the resolution of the conflict. 19 In this context, and despite the fact 
that the Yugoslav central government was increasingly paralyzed, the United 
States did not reach the second step of the regional stability model since the 
Yugoslav central state was not only able to maintain its external stability but was 
also open to negotiate with secessionists. Throughout this period, the question of 
whether or not the U.S. should recognize Croatia and Slovenia's independence 
was not even debated among U.S. foreign policy agencies. 
This political situation, however, did not last very long and European 
efforts to sertIe the dispute collapsed in the fall of 1991 when the YP A agreed to 
retreat from Slovenia but moved simultaneously to Croatia to bring assistance to 
the Serbian minorities living in the Krajina and Slavonia regions. The intervention 
of the yP A in Croatia complicated the nature of the Yugoslav conflict by 
emphasizing its ethnic dimension. This event had a major impact on the U.S. 
perception of the conflict. The intervention of the former YP A in Croatia was seen 
in Washington as a Serbian war of aggression against Croats and the Bush 
administration, as weIl as the European leaders, began to seriously question the 
legitimacy of the YP A and its real motivation in the conflict. The secession of 
Croatia and Slovenia had led to a rapid "serbianization" of the Yugoslav army and 
as a result the YP A quickly became a military instrument at the service of Serbian 
19 Keesing's Record of World Events, "Yugoslavia: Approach of Civil War", Vol. 37, No. 7-8, 
August 1991, p. 38374. 
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interests. As Richard Holbrooke would later argue: "In the brief war in Slovenia 
the Yugoslav Army seemed to be defending the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia; 
when that same army went to war only a few weeks later against Croatia, it had 
become a Serb army fighting for the Serbs inside Croatia". 20 
External Instability Emerges 
At the first meeting of the United Nations Security Council on Yugoslavia 
III September 1991, the United States for the first time adopted a pro-active 
attitude toward the conflict. James Baker expressed his great concern about 
Yugoslavia's external stability as several thousand Croats began to flee to other 
countries to escape Serbian aggression. He dec1ared that the Bush administration 
was highly concerned about "the dangerous impact on Yugoslavia's neighbors 
who face refugee flows, energy shortfalls, and the threat of a spillover in the 
fighting,,?l Robert Pearson, who was the Executive Secretary of the State 
20 Richard Holbrooke, op. cU., pp. 29-30. David Gompert mentions that "by mid-1991 the officer 
corps of the once-multiethnic YP A had become almost entirely Serbian". David Gompert, op. cit., 
p. 143. See also Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, op. cit., p. 142. Because of the 
intensification of the contlict in Croatia, the three month moratorium on independence reached in 
early July 1991 did not help to resolve the crisis. At the expiration of the three month period in 
October, Croatia and Slovenia declared formaI and immediate secession. See Facts On File, "New 
Yugoslavia Truce Appears to Hold; EC Delays Sanctions; Croatia, Slovenia FormaIly Secede", 
World News Digest, Vol. 51, No. 2655, October 10, 1991, p. 762. 
The changing nature of the Yugoslav contlict led the Europeans to calI for a U.N. peacekeeping 
intervention in Yugoslavia. The European Community also created a Peace Conference on 
Yugoslavia chaired by Britain's former Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington as weIl as an Arbitration 
Commission known as the Badinter Commission. The role of the commission, headed by the 
French constitutional judge Robert Badinter, was to establish criteria for international recognition 
and to evaluate the merits of the republics' secessionist claims along these criteria. The Bush 
administration strongly supported these initiatives but was still reluctant to become more involved 
in the crisis. The U.S. presidential election was just a year away and President Bush's advisors 
thought that nothing could reaIly be done to stop the conflict. 
21 James Baker, "Violent Crisis in Yugoslavia", Us. Department ofState Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 39, 
September 30, 1991. 
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Department, also noted that Hungary was in the process of democratization and 
Yugoslav refugees were threatening its stability as well as the stability of central 
Europe.22 Refugees were mainly fleeing to Austria, Germany and Hungary. Six 
months after Baker's address to the UN Security Council, the CIA reported that 
Germany had taken more than 135,000 refugees and Hungary 48,000.23 
Baker also pointed out that Serbia and the YP A bore a special 
responsibility for the Yugoslav conflict, "The apparent objective of the Serbian 
leadership and the Yugoslav military working in tandem is to create a 'small 
Yugoslavia' or 'greater Serbia"'.24 Baker also warned Serbia that the use of force 
to modify Yugoslavia's internaI boundaries or external borders was "simply not 
acceptable". The issue of Yugoslavia's safeguarding internaI borders was 
extremely important to the U.S. Like the Europeans, the United States believed 
that changes in republics' intrastate borders would create more violence and would 
22 Interview with Robert Pearson, Washington D.C., February 14,2005. Ambassador Pearson was 
the Executive Secretary ofthe Department ofState from 1991 to 1993. 
23 Central Intelligence Agency, "Yugoslavia: Update on Trends in Population Displacements and 
Relief Efforts", Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Resources, trade, and Technology, June 9, 
1992. http://www.foia.cÏa.gov (accessed July 2006). The estimated number ofYugoslav refugees in 
Europe in the summer 1992 was 415,795. See Iva Dominis and Ivo Bicanic, "Refugees and 
Displaced Pers ons in the Former Yugoslavia", RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, Research 
Report, Vol. 2, No. 3, January 15, 1993, p. 2. According to Sabrina Petra Ramet, by the summer 
1992 the number ofrefugees in Germany was up to 200,000, and several other countries had also 
taken refugees: Sweden 40,000; SwitzerIand 13,000; Netherlands 4,000. See Sabrina Petra Ramet, 
"War in the Balkans", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4, FaIl1992, p. 79. According to Judith Pataki, 
12,000 Yugoslav refugees, mainly from Croatia, had already tled to Hungary in September, 1991. 
See Judith Pataki, "Refugee Wave from Croatia Puts Strain on Relief Efforts", RFE/RL Report on 
Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, No. 39, September 27, 1991, p. 12. 
24 James Baker, op. cil, September 30, 1991. 
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open the Pandora' s box to internaI boundaries revisionism throughout 
Yugoslavia?5 
Baker' s speech to the Security Council marked a tuming point in the 
evolution of the D.S. policy toward Yugoslavia. For the first time, Washington 
designated Serbia and the former YP A as the main aggressors in the conflict and 
as a threat to regional stability. In an attempt to restore peace and to establish a 
cease-fire in the Croatian republic, the U.S. voted in favor of D.N. resolution 713 
establishing a "general and complete embargo on aIl deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Yugoslavia,,?6 Then, in November, D.N. Secretary-General 
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar named D.S. former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his 
personal envoy to mediate the war in Croatia. Vance's objective was twofold: to 
reach a cease-fire in Croatia and eventually establish a D.N. peacekeeping 
operation in Yugoslavia?7 
As the YPA's aggressive behavior intensified in Croatia in the faH, 
Yugoslav President Mesic officiaHy declared on September 16 that Yugoslavia 
2S This is why the United States refused, for instance, to address the issue ofCroatia's Serbian self-
proclaimed republic of Krajina. Peter Galbraith points out: "We were insistent on the internaI 
borders remaining unchanged in Yugoslavia because then you would have just had a mess trying to 
defme them [the new internaI borders]." Phone interview with Peter W. Galbraith, January 23, 
2005. 
26 U.N. Security Council, Resolution 713: Socia/ist Federal Repub/ic of Yugoslavia, 3009th 
meeting, 25 September 1991. Facts on File, "EC Imposes Sanctions On Yugoslavia", World News 
Digest, Vol. 51, No. 2660, November 14, 1991, pp. 858-859. See also David Binder, "U.S. 
Suspends Trade Benefits To A1l6 Yugoslav Republics", The New York Times, December 7, 1991. 
27 Moreover, the White Rouse along with the G-7 powers called for the creation of a U.N. 
peacekeeping force in Yugoslavia, which led to the adoption of U.N. Security Council resolution 
721. As stated in this resolution, the Security Council "Approves the efforts of the Secretary-
General and his Personal Envoy, and expresses the hope that they will pursue their contacts with 
the Yugoslav parties as rapidly as possible so that the Secretary-General can present early 
recommendations to the Security Council including for the possible establishment of a United 
Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia". See U.N. Security Council, Resolution 721: 
Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, 3018th meeting, 27 November 1991. 
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had ceased to exist. This declaration came following the refusaI by the Minister of 
Defense of Yugoslavia to comply with President Mesic's request that the YPA 
stop fighting in Croatia?8 By then, the D.S. was much more realistic in its 
approach. It concluded that Yugoslavia could not be saved, and that secessionist 
republics would eventually have to be recognized as sovereign states. As Lenard 
Cohen points out: "By this point in time, it had become apparent to most observers 
that there was very little chance of restoring Yugoslavia' s unit y [ ... ] and that the 
most urgent matters at hand were to end the fighting in Croatia and to prevent a 
further expansion of violence,,?9 The question was no longer how the D.S. could 
help to maintain Yugoslavia together but when and under which conditions it 
should recognize secessionist states. 
The Conditionality of V.S. Recognition 
In the fall of 1991, the State Department clearly understood that the 
conditionality of the D.S. recognition of secessionist states could be used as a way 
to contain and reinforce regional stability in the Balkans. The main question was 
how to play the "recognition card". Even if the Yugoslav state had collapsed, the 
secessionist states were still not in a position to keep the stability of their borders 
since war was raging in Croatia. Thus, there was a risk that conflict could resume 
at anytime in Slovenia and that it could spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The State 
Department and the NSC believed, therefore, that premature or uncoordinated 
28 See Susan Woodward, op. cit., p. 179. 
29 Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Boulder: Westview Point, 
1993, p. 232. 
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recognition of secessionist republics would risk intensifying violence by irritating 
Serbia and the former YP A. 
In a note sent to Secretary Baker, the director of the State Department's 
policy planning office, Dennis Ross wrote: "U.S. interests will not be served by 
uncoordinated, ad hoc dec1arations and recognitions--or rejections.,,30 Baker 
reported to President Bush that the U.S. should coordinate a collective 
nonrecognition policy with the European Community to invalidate, or at least to 
reduce, the destabilizing effect of secession. Such a common policy was seen 
among U.S. executive agents as an important political lever to moderate the 
behavior of Yugoslavia's protagonists and to find a peaceful agreement between 
them.31 As Baker indicates in his memoir: "each of the republics craved legitimacy 
in the West, and withholding recognition (or conferring it) was the most powerful 
diplomatie tool available. Earned recognition was one of our key points of 
leverage over the combatants".32 The United States, therefore, decided in 
conjunction with the European Community that the recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia would be withheld as long as the Yugoslav conflict would not be 
resolved peacefully. Although the U.S. only played a supporting role in the early 
phase of the Yugoslav conflict, empirical evidence indicates that it was pro-active 
in coordinating the Western policy toward secessionist republics. 
30 James A. Baker, III, op. cit. p. 638. 
31 Ibid., p. 483. Thomas Niles, who was the U.S. Ambassador to the European Community until 
September 1991, points out that France, Greece, and the United Kingdom, were the strongest 
proponents of the U.S. nonrecognition policy. Phone interview with Thomas Niles, January 29, 
2005. 
32 James A. Baker, III, op. cit. p. 638. 
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Moreover, on the basis of a policy recommendation issued by the State 
Department which suggested that the U.S. should develop a "philosophical and 
practical framework" to evaluate the merits of the Yugoslav secessionist states,33 
the State Department unveiled a list of criteria that would guide its decision to 
grant or deny recognition once negotiations were completed between the Yugoslav 
protagonists. Secretary Baker declared that recognition was to be granted to 
Yugoslav secessionist republics that would respect the five following criteria: 
1) Determining the future of the country [Le. seceding republic] peacefully and 
democratically. 
2) Respect for internaI and external borders. 
3) Support for democracy and the rule oflaw, by promoting the democratic process. 
4) Safeguarding human rights, including equal treatment ofminorities. 
5) Respect for internationallaw and obligations, especially the Helsinki Final Act and 
the Charter ofParis.34 
This extensive list of criteria departed from the traditional standard of state 
recognition, which was developed in the 1930s at the Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of the State. This convention had ruled that to be recognized 
as a sovereign entity, astate had to possess four qualifications: a permanent 
population; a defined territory; a government; and the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states?5 The United States' new guideline for state recognition 
33 Ibid. 
34 These criteria were unveiled before the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) in the Fall of 1991. Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans 
Smit, International Law, Third Edition, West Publishing Co., 1993, p. 250. The Charter of Paris 
was signed by CSCE members in 1990. The Charter had the objective ofreinforcing the protection 
ofhuman rights, democracy, and rule of law in Europe that were part of the Helsinki Final Act. For 
more information on the Charter of Paris, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 1990. 
http://www.osce.orgldocuments/mcs/199011114045 en.pdf(accessed July 2006). 
35 Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia", The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, No. 3, 1992, p. 588. 
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was unique to the extent that it integrated normative criteria that reflected its 
democratic values and its strong interest in regional stability.36 
The guideline reveals the importance that the Bush administration gave to 
the internaI and external stability of the secessionist states. Although these criteria 
were not mutually exclusive, points 1, 3 and 4 refer to internallegitimacy, to the 
governing ability, and to the democratic stability of the secessionist states. 
Principles 2 and 5 refer to both internaI and external elements of stability. Point 2 
implies, for instance, that a secessionist state that either pursued irredentism or 
unilaterally redrew its internaI territorial divisions would fail the test. Point 5 
requests that secessionist leaders obey international norms of state conduct, such 
as respecting the territorial integrity of other states. 
By designing the guidelines, the State Department wanted the assurance 
that recognized republics would not perpetuate instability by replicating 
Yugoslavia's ethnic tensions on a smaller scale. These criteria had as an aim the 
assurance that newborn states would conform to certain standards of internaI order 
and governance so that regional stability would endure. More generally, the 
conditionality of recognition was a way to socialize seceding states so that they 
36 These criteria were codified in the Helsinki Final Act and in the Charter of Paris. In December 
1991, the European Community issued its own guideline for recognition. The guideline was very 
similar to that of the United States. The EC Doctrine of Recognition inc1uded the five following 
criteria: 1) Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Final Act of 
Helsinki, and the Charter of Paris with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights; 2) 
Guarantees for the rights of minorities and for the rights of ethnic and national groups; 3) Respect 
for the inviolability of aH frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common 
agreement; 4) Acceptance of disarmament and nuc1ear non-proliferation; 5) Commitrnent to settle 
by agreement aH questions concerning state succession and regional disputes. See European 
Community, Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe 
and in the Soviet Union, International Legal Material (I.L.M.), [December 16, 1991], 1992, 
p. 1487. 
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would conform to the rules and values of the international system and would not 
develop into aggressive (or revisionist) states. 
These principles of state recognition also reflected the evolution of the U.S. 
policy toward secessionist movements. For the first time in its history, the United 
States elaborated clear principles on which its decision of whether or not to 
recognize secessionist states would be made. The guidelines did not only seek to 
address the Yugoslav crisis but were actually seen as a standard for evaluating 
future independentist claims around the world. It is not a coincidence that the 
guidelines were set down in late 1991. With the forthcoming disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the U.S. suddenly had the opportunity to ernphasize liberal 
principles throughout Central and Eastern Europe without fearing political 
tensions with the USSR. To a certain extent, criteria contained in the U.S. 
guidelines for state recognition were a prelude to the set of conditions that Central 
and Eastern European States would have to meet to join NATO and the European 
Union later in the 1990s. 
The evolution of the Western policy toward the Yugoslav conflict, 
however, was not a linear process. Indeed, in Decernber of 1991, Germany decided 
to break unilaterally from the cornrnon Western policy by recognizing the 
independence of Croatia and Slovenia despite widely expressed objections by the 
United States and the EC mernbers.37 In order to avoid diplomatic confrontation 
and disunity within the cornrnunity, EC foreign ministers reluctantly agreed to 
37 For a good analysis of the German defection see Beverly Crawford, "Explaining Defection from 
International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia", World Polilies, Vol. 48, 
July 1996, pp. 482-521. 
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follow Germany and granted recognition to the two republics in January 1992. 
This decision resulted in several international consequences: it ended the Western 
diplomatie front toward the issue of recognition; it marginalized the D.S. policy of 
nonrecognition; and it made the secession of Croatia and Slovenia a fait accompli. 
The Bush administration, however, remained steadfast in its policy and 
hoped that its position would counter-balance the effect of the EC recognition of 
the two republics.38 The D.S. was worried that recognition would break the 
Serbian-Croatian ceasefire that had been reached in early January by U.N. envoy 
Cyrus Vance?9 The D.So's main objective was to preserve the cease-fire so that the 
Dnited Nations could begin the deployment of its peacekeeping force in the 
region. These two elements were seen, in Washington, as the main conditions for 
the restoration of stability in the Balkans. lndeed, as long as war was raging in the 
former Yugoslavia, secessionist states could not secure their national borders. 
The U.S. Recognizes Secessionist States 
In early 1992, the prospect of a war in multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
a major impact on the D.S.'s perception of the Yugoslav conflict. Ethnie tensions 
between Croats, Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia were intensifying as the government 
announced its intention to hold a referendum on independence in late February.40 
38 The New York Times, "U.S. Not Jumping on Bandwagon", January 16, 1992. 
39 The unconditional ceasefrre between Croatia and Serbia set the ground for the deployment of the 
United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in Croatia in April of 1992. 
40 The result of the referendum showed the extent to which Bosnia-Herzegovina's politics was 
polarized. Of the 64.4 percent ofvoters who cast votes (mainly Croats and Muslims), 99.7 percent 
favored independence. Most of the Bosnian-Serbs, however, who represented 36 percent of the 
population of Bosnia, chose to boycott the referendum. See Leonard J. Cohen, op. cit., p. 237. See 
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The United States predieted that ethnie eonfliet in Croatia would soon spread to 
Bosnia as the Bosnian Serbs were expected to oppose independence and to react 
violently to the results of the referendum. This led the United States to undertake a 
major transformation in its strategy. While recognition had been seen as a 
disruptive action that could have intensified violence by irritating Serbian 
authorities, the U.S. came to the conclusion that nonrecognition would not stop 
Serbia's violent irredentist ambitions. 
A few days before the Bosnian referendum, Thomas Niles, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs, wrote to James Baker that since it was 
almost certain that the Bosnian Muslims and Croats wouid vote for Bosnia's 
independence, the United States should recognize this republic to "reinforce 
stability" and to deter Serbia's eventual attempt to annex Bosnia's territory 
populated by Serbs.41 This position was aiso supported by the NSC. Brent 
Scowcroft who was President Bush's National Security Advisor formulated the 
same recommendation: "We were hoping that the confliet wouid not spread into 
Bosnia and that we might be able to keep the Yugoslav army from invading 
Bosnia if we reeognize the independenee of Bosnia.,,42 Niles also reeommended 
also Colin Warbrick, "Recognition of States Part 2", The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1993, p. 435. 
The Bush administration saw the tense situation in Bosnia as the result of the European decision to 
recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Bosnia was seen as "a victim of circumstance", which was 
somehow forced to consider independence as a way to escape from Serbia's domination and 
aggression. It is hard to establish whether the European Community's recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia really caused the intensification of violence and spread the conflict to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. What is clear, however, is that this is how the Bush administration perceived the 
issue, and that the intensification of violence to Bosnia ultimately led the U.S. to recognize the 
independence of the Yugoslav republics. 
41 James A. Baker, III, op. cit. p. 639. 
42 Interview with Brent Scowcroft, Washington D.C., February 8, 2005. 
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that in order to maximize the effect of this strategy, the U.S. should coordinate a 
common Western recognition of Bosnia. This would render Bosnia's 
independence effective and would deter violence between Serbs and Croats. 
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger added another dimension to this 
strategy. He recommended that the United States recognize the Yugoslav republics 
that sought international recognition an at once (i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, and Slovenia).43 According to him, the nonrecognition of sorne 
republics would leave them vulnerable to potential aggressive actions on the part 
of the new sovereign republics. Eagleburger wrote: "My concern an along has 
been that a halfway policy on recognition would invite Serbian and Croatian 
adventurism in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia".44 This argument 
convinced Baker to adopt a global policy on recognition to avoid violence that 
would result from a differential treatment of republics. 
Thus, in the winter of 1992, the Bush administration came to see 
diplomatie recognition as a stability-making action rather than as a decision 
leading to more disruption. Since recognition was to transform Yugoslavia's 
internaI boundaries into international borders, Washington saw it as a political dam 
against Serbia's ongoing aggression against neighboring territories and expected 
that this could slow down the diffusion of war. Recognition of Croatia's 
43 The CUITent chapter does not focus on the case of Macedonia since it will be analyzed in the next 
chapter. Macedonia declared independence in September, 1991 foIlowing a winning referendum on 
secession. In January 1992, the Badinter Commission, which was in charge of evaluating whether 
seceding republics met the EC criteria for recognition, ruled that Macedonia met aIl the BC 
requirements. 
44 James A. Baker, III, op. cit., p. 640. 
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international boundaries, for instance, meant that Milosevic could not hope to 
obtain a recognized conquest of Croatia's territory. Moreover, the diplomatie 
recognition of secessionist republics meant that the United Nations would take 
actions in cases where the sovereignty of these states was violated. Peter Galbraith 
who became the first U.S. Ambassador to Croatia indicates: 
Once you recognize these countries as independent states, the 
republican boundaries became international borders not internaI 
domestic borders. And international borders would be extremely 
hard to change by force. l mean internal borders you can change, 
but international borders basically nobody has successfully changed 
them by force since 1945. [ ... ] Because of the difficulty or the near 
impossibility [to change international borders] it would be a 
deterrent to Serbia from trying.45 
The new position of the U.S. administration on the issue, therefore, was 
contradictory to its initial policy. When Bosnia declared its independence, 
however, the U.S. main objective was to contain, if not, to isolate Serbia. The 
Yugoslav federation no longer existed at the time and the deployment of the 
United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in Croatia, which gathered 
14,000 UN peacekeepers, provided stability guarantees for recognition. This was 
part of the U.S. strategy for Serbia's containment.46 With a major contingent of 
U.N. peacekeeping troops in place (the second-large st UN force deployed since 
1945), the U.S. believed that the recognition of the northern republics of Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Slovenia was a more realistic and efficient way ta restore stability 
than waiting for a generai agreement among republics, which became unIike1y as 
45 Phone interview with Peter W. Galbraith, January 23,2005. 
46 UNPROFOR was established by Security Council resolution 743 in February 1992 for a period 
oftwelve months. The mission was officially deployed on April 7, 1992. Its objective was to end 
fighting in Croatia and to create conditions for stability. 
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time went on. Thus, although changing its policies, the Bush administration 
remained constant in its objectives of containing war and restoring regional 
stability in the Balkans. As Viktor Meier summarizes: "American decision-makers 
came to the conclusion that it was senseless to wait for a 'global solution' for an 
Yugoslavia. The alternative of independent states on the foundation of the former 
republic boundaries seemed to have established itself,.47 The U.S. support for 
Bosnia's independence was also a strategie move to regain politicalleverage on 
the Yugoslav issue, and to be diplomatically consistent with Western Europe. By 
extending recognition to Bosnia, Washington moved away from its diplomatie 
isolation and was able to work in tandem with the Europeans. 
The United States and the European Community finally reached an 
agreement in Brussels in March 1992 on a common policy of recognition toward 
secessionist states. U.S. officiaIs declared that they were ready to work in tandem 
with the EC now that the Bosnian referendum had been held and that a U.N. 
peacekeeping force was to be sent to the former Yugoslavia.48 The U.S. then 
convinced the EC to recognize Bosnia and proposed in return to recognize Croatia 
and Slovenia. As Patrick Moore argues, the key aim of the Washington-Brussels 
agreement "was precisely to guarantee the territorial integrity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and thereby preserve as much stability in the Yugoslav and Balkan 
47 Viktor Meier, op. cif., p. 242. 
48 Barbara Crossette, "Baker Hints at U.S. Shift on Slovenia and Croatia", The New York Times, 
March 10, 1992. According to David Binder, the Bush administration's "rationale was that it would 
serve no purpose to extend recognition until the United Nations had completed plans for 
positioning a peacekeeping force of 14,400 in the war zones of Croatia". See David Binder, "U.S. 
Set to Accept Yugoslav Breakup", The New York Times, March 12, 1992. 
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areas as possible".49 The common U.S.-EC declaration emphasized the need for 
internaI stability in the secessionist republics by pointing out that the internaI 
borders of Yugosiav republics should be maintained and that they should not be 
changed "by force or absent mutuai consent". 50 
The United States extended recognition to Croatia, Slovenia as weIl as to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6, 1992 one day before the arrivaI of UNPROFOR 
in Croatia, and accepted the republics' pre-crisis borders as their legitimate 
international frontiers. 51 Macedonia, however, was left out and failed to obtain 
U.S. recognition despite the fact that it pursued independence democratically 
without any violence. The next chapter will deal with this issue. 
Were Croatia and Slovenia Stable Enough? 
Slovenia was a good candidate for recognition as it quickly achieved 
internaI and external stability. Fighting in Slovenia in July 1991 was brief and the 
Yugoslav army quickly withdrew from the territory, which stabilized the 
Slovenian state. This event made Slovenia a de facto independent state. The ethnic 
homogeneity of the republic also facilitated peaceful relations with both Croatia 
49 Patrick Moore, "The International Relations of the Yugoslav Area", RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol. 1, No. 18, May Ist 1992, p. 34. 
50 The U.S. and the EC also reiterated the importance of the "strong protection for human rights 
and the rights of aIl national and ethnic groups in aIl republics". See Department of State, "US-EC 
Declaration on the Yugoslav Republics", U.S. Department ofState Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. Il, March 
16, 1992, p. 210. 
51 Facts On File, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Gains EC, U.S. Recognition", World News Digest, Vol. 52, 
No. 2681, April 9, 1992, p. 252. 
U.S. recognition came three months after the European Community's decision to recognize Croatia 
and Slovenia and more than nine months following Ljubljana and Zagreb's unilateral declarations 
of independence. The European Community recognized the independence of Bosnia the day before 
the United States did. 
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and Serbia and it contributed to fostering Slovenia's external stability. The 
Slovenian government also demonstrated that it fully respected international 
borders. As Thomas Niles indicates: 
Although supportive in a way of Croatia, Slovenes really didn't get 
involved [in Croatia's war]. They announced that they fully 
respected all of the borders of the former Yugoslavia-the internaI 
and the external borders [ ... ] and that they were at peace with all 
their neighbors.52 
Moreover, the Slovenian referendum on independence showed a c1ear 
public consent for secession and gave strong internaI legitimacy to secessionist 
leaders. F ollowing the referendum, constitutional reforms were also adopted that 
guaranteed minority rights. In fact the only reason why Washington did not 
recognize Slovenia before April 1992 was the instability in Croatia. The Bush 
administration thought that a simultaneous recognition of both republics would 
avoid disruption. Thus, aIthough the political situation in Slovenia was better than 
the one in Croatia, the American government did not make a distinction in terms 
of policy, and Slovenia r~mained in the V.S. "diplomatic waiting room" until 
Croatia was able to offer sorne guarantees of stability. 
In contrast to Slovenia, Croatia only partially met the V.S. requirements for 
stability, which shows that this case do es not perfectly fit the mode!. In January of 
1992, Croatia had also failed to meet the requirements for recognition issued by 
the European Arbitration Commission headed by Robert Badinter. The 
commission, however, had dec1ared that Slovenia met ail the criteria. 53 The 
52 Phone interview with Thomas M.T. Niles, January 29,2005. 
53 The Economist, "Yugoslavia: Wreckognition", January 18, 1992, p. 49. 
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judgment of the Badinter Commission did not prevent members of the European 
Community from extending recognition to Croatia at the same time as Slovenia. In 
terms of external stability, the Croatian government of Franjo Tudjman respected 
international borders (although his government would eventually pursue 
irredentism in Bosnia) and had consented to a cease-fire with the Serbs under the 
supervision of the United Nations. The U.N. agreement, however, was precarious 
and did not constitute a solid guarantee that no interstate war would occur 
following recognition (the cease-fire indeed lasted only a few months). At the 
internaI level, the Croatian government had held a democratic referendum on 
independence for which an overwhelming majority of Croats had supported 
secession. However, despite the referendum result and the mandate to realize 
independence, the Tudjman government did not have complete control of 
Croatia's territory. Zagreb had indeed lost one-third of its territory to Serbian 
troops in the faH of 1991 (i.e. the Krajina and Slavonia regions). Furthermore, 
Tudjman had failed to provide sufficient constitutional guarantees to its 600,000 
ethnic Serbs.54 
How can we explain then that the United States consented to recognize the 
independence of Croatia if Zagreb did not obtain a very high stability score? The 
complexity and the magnitude of the Yugoslav conflict led the State Department 
and the National Security Council to conc1ude that the cease-fire between Serbs 
and Croats and the D.N. peacekeeping operation in Croatia provided sufficient 
54 According to Susan Woodward, Croatia failed to offer clear protections for the rights of Serbs 
and other minorities. "Instead of revising the constitution," writes Woodward, "the [Croatian] 
government proposed a constitutionallaw, which [ ... ] had little legitimacy with the Croatian public 
and did little to dissuade Serbs from their fears of discrimination". See Susan Woodward, op. cit., 
pp. 190-191. 
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conditions for stability such that Croatia could be recognized.55 The fact that 
Washington came to perceive recognition as a strong deterrent to Serbian 
aggression in Croatia and in Bosnia also accelerated the decision to recognize the 
republic. Even if the Croatian state was not as stable as Slovenia, its recognition by 
the United States had the objective to prevent a much greater level of instability in 
the region. At that time, the behavior of the Serbian army was inappropriate and 
the U.S. administration felt that there was no other choice but to recognize Croatia. 
David Gompert, NSC Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia, emphasizes the 
difficulty of the issue to U.S. foreign policy makers. We were trying "to maintain 
sorne principles, trying to keep our eye on everything else that was going on in the 
world, but [ ... ] we were also trying to make decisions in a way that would not 
foster violence [in the former Yugoslavia]."s6 
The American attitude toward Croatia's independence, therefore, fell into 
the larger framework of stability even if each of the internaI and extemai 
indicators of stability were not met by the Croatian govemment. On the day the 
United States recognized Croatia, Margaret Tutwiler, the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Public Affairs, made clear, however, that despite its decision to recognize 
the independence of Croatia, the U.S. govemment expected Zagreb to conform to 
55 The cease-frre, however, did not last very long since a few months later the Croatian army fought 
to regain control over its Serbian-populated regions. Cease-fires reached in 1993 and 1994 between 
Serbs and Croats were also broken by Croatia, which led military offensives to get control of the 
Serbian region of Krajina. Thus, facts reveal that the V.N. intervention in Croatia and the V.S. 
recognition of the republic did not solidify Croatia's internai stability. Croatia finally agreed to a 
permanent cease-fire in December 1995 by signing the Dayton agreement. See Department of 
State, "Background Note: Croatia", Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, October 2004. 
http://www.state.gov/r/palei!bgn!3166.htm (accessed July 2006). 
56 Interview with David C. Gompert, Washington D.C., January 25, 2005. 
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the V.S. principles of internaI stability especially those regarding minority rights. 
Tutwiler declared: "We expect Croatia [ ... ] to extend strong constitutional and 
legal protections to the human rights of Serbs and considerable autonomy to 
Serbian majority areas".57 
Inside the Executive Black-Box 
The literature on the Yugoslav disintegration as weIl as declassified 
documents from the State Department and interviews conducted in Washington 
D.C. show that executive agents who worked on the resolution of the Yugoslav 
issue in 1991-92, stressed the importance of the regional stability factor over other 
considerations such as domestic politics. In the State Department, Dennis Ross, the 
director of the policy planning office; Robert Pearson, the Executive Secretary of 
the Department; Thomas Niles, the Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs; Warren Zimmermann, the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia; Lawrence 
Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary; and James Baker emphasized stability issues. 
In the National Security Council, main actors like David Gompert, the special 
assistant to President Bush and senior director for Europe and Eurasia; Jonathan T. 
Howe, the NSC Deputy Assistant to President Bush; and NSC advisor Brent 
Scowcroft also emphasized regional stability in their assessment of the crisis. 
These policy makers aIl supported the continuation of Yugoslavia until the 
federation feIl apart.58 There was also a consensus among these agents on the fact 
57 Margaret Tutwiler, Daily Press Briefing, V.S. Department of State, April 7, 1992. 
58 Thomas Niles dec1ares: "There was uniform support within the national security agency for 
effort to preserve the unity of a Yugoslav state. Nobody though, as far as 1 can recall, that the 
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that recognition of independence should be conditional on the domestic stability of 
seceding republics as weIl as to their respect for international borders. As Jonathan 
Howe recaIls, we were "a group of colleagues coming together trying to work out 
what was the sensible position for the U.S. to take. It was not a hugely divisive 
issue even though different people had different perspectives and points of view. 
Sometimes issues are very divisive. This one was not a big one."S9 In sum, there 
was no interagency disagreement on the course of action to follow. There was 
rather a consensus on the fact that both internaI and external dimensions of 
stability should guide the V.S. response toward the issue even if the case of 
Croatia shows that broader stability considerations also guided the V.S. decision to 
recognize Zagreb. 
Were Regional and Great Powers Influential? 
Another important question to ask is what kind of impact did regional and 
great powers (the intervening variable) have on the V.S. behavior toward the 
Yugoslav secessionist crisis? To measure the importance ofthis variable, we have 
to look for critical events or turning points in the evolution of the international 
dimension of the secessionist crisis that were caused by regional or great powers 
and see whether the V.S. behavior changed accordingly. The German decision to 
unilaterally recognize Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991 was the only 
significant critical junction produced by a regional power to disturb the linearity of 
disintegration ofYugoslavia was a desirable thing to happen". Phone interview with Thomas M.T. 
Niles, January 29,2005. 
59 Phone interview with Jonathan T. Howe, March 3, 2005. 
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the Western response to the crisis. This event led the European Community as a 
whole to recognize the two republics in January of 1992, and several other 
countries (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Finland, Hungary, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland) 
immediately followed suit.60 However, as shown above, this event did not cause 
the V.S. policy to change. The strong consensus existing within the presidency on 
the fact that the basic conditions for stability would have to be in place before 
recognition could be granted led the Bush administration to withhold Slovenia and 
Croatia's recognition for another three months. The Bush administration patiently 
waited for a U.N. mission to be deployed in Croatia before making its move. In 
fact, the U.S.-EC agreement on the recognition of secessionist republics reached in 
Brussels in March 1992 stipulated that the United States' support for Croatia and 
Slovenia's independence had to go together with the deployment of the U.N. 
peacekeeping force. 61 This shows the determination with which the Bush 
administration treated the issue as well as the emphasis that it placed on regional 
stability. 
The empirical record indicates, therefore, that the German defection from 
the western consensus on nonrecognition did not directly affect Washington's 
response to the issue. The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the fall of 1991 had 
made the independence of Croatia and Slovenia inevitable and the United States 
was fully aware ofthis. Thus, the German action simply stressed this inevitability. 
60 Patriek Moore, "Diplomatie Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia", RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol. 1, No. 4, January 24, 1992, p. 9. 
61 Patrick Moore, op. cit., Vol. 1, No. 18, May l st 1992, p. 33. 
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Did Ethnie Polities Matter? 
This section focuses on the impact of the Croatian-American lobby on the 
U.S. executive decision to recognize the independence of Croatia. 1 chose to leave 
aside the study of the impact of the Slovenian-American community since this 
diaspora group is much smaller and less organized than its Croatian counterpart.62 
The American Croats represent a re1ative1y powerful ethnic group. This 
diasporic community gathers around 2.5 million people, is well organized at the 
nationallevel, and has large c1usters located in "swing" states such as, for instance, 
Ohio. By eoneentrating on the activities of the Croatian-Americans, 1 choose the 
case that is more likely to validate the proposition sustained by many scholars that 
ethnic diasporas impact the formulation ofU.S. foreign policy toward secessionist 
confliets. 
To measure the accuracy of the ethnic diaspora argument, this research has 
looked at variations in the V.S. policy toward Croatia that could have been caused 
by Croatian-American lobbies. Evidences indicate that the Croatian-American 
community was highly mobilized throughout the Yugoslav confliet and was very 
active in promoting the cause of Croatia's self-determination following the 
secession of the republic in June 1991. The Croatian diaspora contributed to the 
62 During the 1990 U.S. census, 124437 Americans have declared to be of Slovenian descent and 
only 87 500 of them indicated that Slovenian was their only ethnic origin. See Embassy of the 
Republic ofSlovenia, Slovenian Heritage in USA, 
http://www.gov.silmzz-dkp/veleposlanistva/eng/washingtonlslovenian comm.shtml (accessed June 
2006). 
Moreover, Slovenian-Americans are dispersed in several cities throughout the United States and do 
not constitute large ethnie constituents that could significantly impact the result of a U.S. 
Presidential election, for instance. The largest cluster of Slovenian-Amerieans in the early 1990s 
was located in the State of Ohio with 49 598 people out of a total state population of more than 10 
million. There are alsol Slovenian-Americans in Pennsylvania (14 584), Illinois (11 743), 
Minnesota (6614), Wisconsin (6 478), and a small population in Califomia. See ibid. 
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establishment of an office of the Republic of Croatia in Washington and Croatian 
organizations launched lobbying campaigns in the White House and Congress.63 
The Croatian organizations also hired professional lobbing firms, such as the 
public relations firm Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs, to promote Croatia' s daim 
for independence and to shape the debate in Washington in a way that would give 
a positive image of the Croatian government. Croatian-American associations also 
helped to organize U.S. Congressional hearings on the situation in Croatia and 
were successful in enlisting well known Congressmen, such as Senate Majority 
Leader Bob Dole (R-Kansas), to support Croatia's dedaration of independence.64 
Moreover, in the summer of 1991, more than 35,000 Croatian-Americans rallied in 
Washington urging the Bush administration to recognize the secession of 
Croatia.65 According to Pero Novak, who lobbied the V.S. government in favor of 
Croatia's recognition and who is now President of the Ohio Chapter of the 
Croatian-American Association (CAA), the American Croats clearly had an 
impact of the V.S. final decision to recognize Croatia.66 On the CAA's website it 
is even written that "being directly involved in the V.S. recognition of Croatia" is 
63 Yossi Shain, op. cit., pp. 65-66. 
64 Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism & the Balkan Wars, Ithaca: Comell 
University Press, 2003, p. 130. 
65 Embassy ofCroatia, Croatian-Americans: The Bridge between Two Homelands, 
http://us.mfa.hr/?mh=182&mv=1075&id=587 (accessed June 2006). 
66 Correspondence with Pero Novak, January 26,2005. 
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one of the main achievements that the organization accompli shed in the last 15 
years.67 
Thus, there is evidence that strong political pressure was put by the 
Croatian American lobby on both Congress and on the White Rouse (political 
rallies, letters to Congress members, etc.) in the summer and faH of 1991. 
However, if Croatian-Americans were so pro-active in the weeks and months 
following Croatia's secession and obtained the support of influent Congress 
members like Robert Dole, why did U.S. recognition of Croatia come only in April 
1992, almost ten months foHowing the independence of the republic? One would 
expect that if Croat Americans were truly influential, the U.S. would have 
proceeded earlier with recognition, perhaps even before Germany unilaterally 
recognized the republic in December 1991. Yet, in the summer and the faH of 1991 
the State Department and the NSC were working toward the formulation of a 
coherent Western policy of nonrecognition for the Yugoslav secessionist states. 
Despite the strong political determination of Croatian-American organizations, the 
Bush administration was strongly opposed to Croatia's secession and maintained 
this position even after Germany and the other EC members recognized the 
republic. There was, therefore, no change in the U.S. policy toward Croatia's 
independence until 1992. 
As seen above, until the faH of 1991, the United States was convinced that 
a unified Yugoslavia offered the best opportunity to keep stability in the region. 
The question of whether or not the V.S. should recognize Croatia was not even an 
67 Croatian American Association, "Croatian American Association Celebrates its 15th 
Anniversary", http://www.Iijepanasadomovinahrvatska.com/folder/CAA -
15thTH%20ANNIVERSARYY.htm (accessed March 2005). 
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issue. There is no evidence indicating that the Bush administration was influenced 
by ethnic Croats during that time. It seems that the Croatian-Americans were 
simply ignored by the Bush administration. According to Thomas Niles, who was 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and later worked c10sely on the 
issue of Croatia and Slovenia's recognition, U.S. decision-makers did not pay 
attention to these ethnic lobbies when they formulated the U.S. position toward the 
issue.68 
David Gompert who was involved in the recognition of the Yugoslav 
republics and who often met with Croat-American organizations also categorically 
dismissed that the Croatian-American lobby was an important factor in President 
Bush's decision to recognize Croatia. "I learned from them," he did remark, "but 
at no point, as far as l know, did somebody in the White Rouse make a calculation 
that, if we recognize Croatia, we will pick up sorne votes in Cleveland. It really 
wasn't the way that the White Rouse functioned".69 Robert Pearson, who was the 
Executive Secretary of the State Department, and Peter Galbraith, the first 
Ambassador to Croatia, shared this view.70 
In his memoir, James Baker explains that the U.S. government resisted 
pressure from the Croatian-Americans to recognize Croatia because it believed 
68 When asked whether Croatian-American associations influenced President Bush's policy toward 
Croatia, Thomas Niles declared: "We paid no attention to them". Phone interview with Thomas M. 
T. Niles, January 29, 2005. This view is shared by David Gompert. Interview with David C. 
Gompert, Washington D.C., January 25, 2005. 
69 Interview with David C. Gompert, Washington D.C., January 25, 2005. 
70 Interview with Robert Pearson, Washington D.C., February 14,2005. Phone interview with Peter 
W. Galbraith, January 23, 2005. 
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that a premature recognition could compromise the United Nations' effort to 
achieve a cease-fire in the former Yugoslavia. Baker indicates: 
After the EC decision, 1 had Larry Eagleburger talk to Cy Vance. 
He told us to wait at least two weeks, and preferably a month, 
before moving ahead with recognition. That would allow time to 
begin the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force. Vance felt that 
our decision to withhold recognition had had an important 
restraining effect on the Serbs and had discouraged Milosevic and 
Tudjman from carving up Bosnia. This put us in a difficult position 
domestically with the Croatian-American lobby, but 1 told the 
President at lunch on January 24, 'We can and should take the 
public and congressional heat. We should do all we can to support 
Vance's efforts, because our best hope for resolving the crisis is 
maintenance of the cease-fire and introduction of U.N. 
peacekeepers.' The President agreed, and so we waited.71 
President Bush's decision to focus the U.S.'s attention on regional stability 
considerations alienated him from the Croatian community at home. As Gompert 
notes, all along during the Yugoslav crisis, "George Bush declined to recognize 
Croatia despite intense pressure from the influential Croatian-American 
community, which as a result deserted him in the election of 1992".72 
One could wonder, however, whether the Serbian-American lobby was 
partly responsible for President Bush's refusaI to recognize Croatia. This would 
imply that a "horse race" between the two diasporic communities was the reason 
for why the U.S. recognition came so late. It is true that Serbian-Americans were 
mobilized in the early 1990s (mainly through the Serbian Unit y Congress-SUC) 
and that the Serbian diaspora tried to influence the debate in Washington. 
However, Congress Representative Helen Delich Bentley (one of the most 
71 James A. Baker, III, op. cil., p. 639. 
72 David C. Gompert, op. cil., p. 129. 
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prominent Serbian-American voices lU the U.S.) indicates that the Bush 
administration quickly identified the Serbs as the aggressors in the conflict and 
opposed Slobodan Milosevic policies. With such a dear bias against the Serbs, it 
was difficult for the Serbian community to influence the Bush administration. 
According to Warren Zimmermann, it did not help the Serbian community that it 
was unable to distinguish Serbia's legitimate political daims from the actions 
undertaken by Milosevic. Moreover, despite one million Serbian-Americans, the 
Serbian lobby was unable to orchestrate a public relations campaign in favor of 
Serbia, while the Croatian lobby was quite successful at rallying support.73 There 
was, therefore, no "horse race" between Serbian and Croatian-Americans and the 
two communities did not cancel each other's effort to influence V.S. decision-
makers, which could have explained the delay in the V.S. decision to recognize 
Croatia. 
In sum, 1 do not pretend that the Croatian community did not have an 
impact on the V.S. perception of Croatia's bid for independence or that it did not 
help to shape the debate in Washington. 1 do assert, however, in the light of the 
previous analysis, that the pressure exercised by the Croat-Americans did not have 
an impact on the process by which the Bush administration came to recognize the 
Republic of Croatia nor did it influence the speed with which the V.S. recognition 
was granted. 
73 Paul Hockenos, op. cit., p. 128. 
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Did Money Talk? 
David Gibbs maintains that connections between decision-makers and 
private business interests affect the conduct of V.S. foreign policy toward 
secessionist crises (see Chapter 2). Did American decision-makers share ties with 
V.S. corporations involved in Yugoslavia in the eady 1990s? If yes, were private 
economic interests of V.S. executive agents strongly reflected in the American 
response to the Yugoslav secessionist crisis? 
Following the demi se of Yugoslavia in 1992, policy analysts and some 
State Department officiaIs argued that Lawrence Eagleburger and Brent 
Scowcroft-who were respectively, Deputy Secretary of State and National 
Security Advisor under President Bush-had supported for too long the unit y of 
Yugoslavia and failed to answer adequately to interethnic violence in the Balkans 
because they had cultivated strong ties over the years with the Yugoslav regime. 
Some even suggested that because they had business interests in Yugoslavia in the 
1980s, both officiaIs had a strong bias against Croatia and Slovenia's secessionist 
attempts.74 According to Roy Gutman, the pro-Yugoslav bias of Eagleburger and 
Scowcroft led them to support the State Department view according to which 
Yugoslavia should be supported as long as possible and Croatia and Slovenia 
should not be recognized.75 
74 See Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, 
pp. xxiv-xxv. See also David Binder, "Eagleburger Anguishes Over Yugoslav Upheaval", The New 
York Times, June 19, 1992. 
75 Their private interests "enhanced their support for the State Department analysis that unity was 
the best option and that Slovenia and Croatia were the problem". Roy Gutman, op. cit., p. 205. 
115 
The Recognition ofCroatia and Slovenia 
1 As U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1977 to 1981, Lawrence 
Eagleburger established close connections with the Yugoslav political elites and 
became friends with Slobodan Milosevic who was then the head of the largest 
bank of Serbia. Once retired from the V.S. government, Eagleburger and 
Scowcroft worked from 1984 to 1988 respectively as president and vice-president 
of Henry Kissinger Associates Inc., a New York consulting firm that offered 
strategic consulting services to international companies. During this time, both 
men maintained close ties with Yugoslav leaders and dealt with several Yugoslav 
and Serbian state-owned companies. As president of Kissinger Associates, 
Eagleburger joined the board of Yugo America, the American division of a 
Serbian car company that was owned by Global Motors Inc., and served on the 
board of the Ljubljana Bank.76 The money Eagleburger earned from business 
dealings with Yugoslav state companies, however, only represented a small 
fraction of his salary at Kissinger Associates. According to David Binder, 
Eagleburger earned $5,000 a year from business ties to Yugoslavia (e.g. Yugo 
America and the Ljubljana Bank) while his total income at Kissinger Associates 
was $900,000 a year.77 Moreover, Yugo America went bankrupt and c10sed its 
do ors in 1989, which greatly reduced Eagleburger's economic involvement with 
Yugoslavia. 
Upon returning to the State Department and the NSC in 1989, Eagleburger 
and Scowcroft attempted to stay away from the Yugoslav crisis to avoid being 
76Th'd . 1 ., pp. XXIV-XXV. 
/ 
77 See David Binder, op. cit., June 19, 1992. 
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subject to particular scrutiny, even if they no longer had official business ties to 
Yugoslavia. Susan Woodward maintains that they "were inc1ined to keep sorne 
distance from the Yugoslav imbroglio because questions about their private 
business ventures with Yugoslavia [ ... ] had already threatened public 
embarrassment over possible conflicts of interest". 78 
There is little doubt that Eagleburger and Scowcroft were biased in favor of 
Yugoslavia's state unity. For decades they had built strong relationships with 
Yugoslav leaders throughout the federation. 79 However, to argue that their past 
private business interests in Yugoslavia, which had been relatively minor, guided 
their actions toward the crisis is doubtful. President Bush and Secretary Baker 
were also strongly in favor of the maintenance of Yugoslavia and yet they had not 
maintained business ties with Yugoslav companies in the pasto It seems that the 
aversion of the Bush administration to changes in international politics as well as 
Eagleburger and Scowcroft's personal attachment to Yugoslavia explain why the 
D.S. overlooked the obvious collapse of the federation and why they were slow to 
react. Eagleburger and Scowcroft simply could not conceive-despite the 
information they received from the CIA and the Embassy in Be1grade-that 
Yugoslavia would break apart. As Lenard Cohen writes: "Eagleburger's 
experience in Yugoslavia-he had been ambassador to Belgrade during the early 
1980s, and had extensive business ties with the country from 1984 to 1988-had 
convinced him that Yugoslavia would not ultimately disintegrate because, as he 
78 Susan L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 155. 
79 Brent Scowcroft was assistant air attaché to Belgrade in the early 1960s while Eagleburger 
worked for the economic section ofthe U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. 
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put it, the 'Yugoslavs know well what would happen to them ifthey divided,,,.80 In 
fact, the U.S. beliefthat state unit y was the only possible way to avoid war, led it 
to adopt an approach based on wishful thinking that confused its desire for 
stability with the reality of the conflict. 
Moreover, even if business interests would have explained why the U.S. 
waited so long before granting recognition to Croatia and Slovenia, it would still 
not have e1ucidated why the Bush administration decided to reverse its policy in 
April, 1992. Thus, David Gibbs' model also fails to explain the change ofpolicy in 
favor of recognition. In sum, no evidence was found to support the argument that 
U.S. business interests accounted for the variation in the American response to 
Croatia and Slovenia's secessionist bid. 
Conclusion 
Observed facts point in the direction of the regional stability model. In the 
initial phase of the Yugoslav conflict, the United States conformed to the first step 
of the stability model. It supported the central state, which attempted to maintain 
external stability by securing its international borders. The Yugoslav federal 
govemment, led by Primer Minister Markovic, was also willing to negotiate with 
Croatia and Slovenia' s secessionist leaders and we1comed the European 
Community's efforts at mediation 
As predicted in Chapter 3, the United States revised its policy and moved 
to the second step of the stability mode1 once it became c1ear, in the fall of 1991, 
80 Lenard J. Cohen, op. cif., 1993, p. 215. 
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that Yugoslavia was disintegrating and could no longer handle constitutional 
reforms or maintain its international borders. The Bush administration, however, 
did not immediately proceed to the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia since war 
in the Croatian republic produced high instability. As facts indicate, the cease-fire 
and the deployment of UN peacekeepers were essential conditions for recognition 
to be granted by the United States. 
The analysis also shows that the case of Croatia does not perfectly fit the 
second step of the regional stability model. This does not mean, however, that the 
case goes against the logic of the theory. Indeed, the desire for regional stability 
was clearly the main motive behind the U.S.'s recognition ofCroatia. The purpose 
of recognition was to improve the security of the Croatian state and to discourage 
Serbia's aggressive behavior toward neighboring states. The American decision 
was, therefore, shaped by stability considerations. 
More generally, the analysis reveals that the United States' policy toward 
Yugoslavia was indecisive. First, the U.S. showed its inability to find a peaceful 
resolution to the crisis. Second, it took a long time for the Bush administration to 
conceive of political alternatives to Yugoslavia's unity. If, on the one hand, 
Washington was aware of the risk of a civil war, it failed, on the other hand, to 
understand the determination of secessionist republics who wanted to separate 
from Yugoslavia. Finally, the administration failed to manage the transatlantic 
quarrel over recognition and was quickly outstripped by the decision of Germany 
and the EC to grant international recognition. 
The following chapter examines the case of Macedonia's secession, which 
was recognized by the United States after a period of delay. This case will allow us 
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to extend the scope of the regional stability model by considering whether the 
instability of Macedonia accounted for the V.So's decision to withhold recognition 
for more than two years. 
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5. 
Macedonia: A Us. Delay of Recognition in Four Episodes, 
1991-2004 
Introduction 
The American recognition of Macedonia's independence is a special case 
to the extent that it did not follow the normal process by which the United States 
usually grants recognition to emerging secessionist states. It took thirteen years 
and three successive administrations for the U.S. to complete Macedonia's process 
of diplomatie recognition. The saga began in the fall of 1991 with the dec1aration 
of independence of the republic from the rump Yugoslav federation and it ended 
with the U.S. recognition of Macedonia's constitutional name in 2004. During this 
period, the United States first delayed recognition for more than two years. Then, 
the Clinton administration recognized the seeessionist state in 1994 under the 
temporary designation "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) 
because of strong po1itical tensions between Greece and Macedonia. Yet, the first 
U.S. ambassador to Skopje, Maeedonia's capital, was only named in 1996 after the 
White House had delayed extending full diplomatie relations to FYROM at the 
ambassadoriallevel. Finally, the last chapter of the saga was written in 2004 when 
the administration of George W. Bush, in an unexpeeted and unilateral decision, 
reeognized the republic under its constitutional name, the Republie of Macedonia 
in a deeision that was opposed by the European Union and even more strongly 
opposed by Greece. 
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As a result of its complexity and richness, the Macedonian case makes an 
important contribution to this research by allowing for intra-case comparisons. The 
different episodes of this saga will be broken down into different units of 
interactions and will be treated as separate cases for the purpose of this analysis. 1 
As Richard Lebow notes, the benefit of the intra-case comparison is that it "builds 
variation within a fundamentally similar political and cultural context".2 Thus, by 
breaking this case into an intra-case analysis, 1 increase the number of points of 
measurement for the testing of the regional stability model. 
This chapter will proceed by looking at the following four intra-cases: 1) 
The U.S. withholding of Macedonia's recognition in 1992; 2) The American 
diplomatie recognition of "FYROM" in 1994; 3) The extension of full diplomatie 
relations to the republic in 1995-96; and 4) President Bush's recognition of 
Macedonia's constitutional name in 2004. By using these four sub-units of 
analysis, this chapter will evaluate whether Macedonia's internaI and external 
stability were the main factors in explaining the American behavior toward the 
republic across time and, more specifically, whether these factors account for the 
U.S. delay of diplomatie recognition. 
Competing propositions will also be measured. Facts show that the 
independence of Macedonia awakened the powerful Greek-American lobby which 
opposed, for historical reasons, the recognition of the Yugoslav republic under the 
1 For more on intra-case analysis see Richard Ned Lebow, "What's so Different about a 
Counterfactual?", World Polities, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2000, p. 562. See also Alexander L. George and 
Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2005. Especially Chapter 8. 
2 Ibid. 
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name Macedonia. The strength of the Greek-American community and its 
mobilization against recognition will allow me to seriously test the validity of the 
ethnic politics proposition. The analysis will look at the evolution of the American 
stance toward Macedonia to detect whether the pressure exercised by the Greek-
Americans may have caused the U.S. policy toward the issue to fluctuate over 
time. 
As for the business interest argument, the fact that Macedonia's secession 
originates from the same political context as that of Croatia and Slovenia limits the 
addition of new and relevant information to validate or refute this proposition. 
This chapter, therefore, only provides a brief treatment of this argument. Before 
proceeding with the analysis, 1 first retrace the main events leading Macedonia to 
secede from Yugoslavia in the faH of 1991 as weIl as the political context in which 
the United States intervened. 
A Quick Look at the Secessionist Crisis 
Prior to the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis in 1991, the Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia was in favor of the maintenance of a strong federal government. As 
Yugoslavia's poorest republic and as one of the smallest in terms of population 
(around two million inhabitants), Macedonia greatly benefited from federal 
economic resources as weIl as from Belgrade's military protection.3 When Croatia 
and Slovenia raised their voice in favor of a Yugoslav confederal arrangement, 
3 Yugoslavia guaranteed Macedonia's protection against its foreign neighbors (i.e. Albania, Greece 
and Bulgaria), and unity among the six republics acted as an internaI balance of power which 
prevented powerful republics from establishing domination over the others. See John Phillips, 
Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, London: LB. Tauris, 2004, p. 49. 
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however, the Macedonian government chose to support decentralization. Kiro 
Gligorov, the President of Macedonia, believed that by fulfilling Croatia and 
Slovenia's political demands, Yugoslavia would remain united and that this was in 
the best interest of his republic. 
Political events did not tum out as Macedonia expected, however. 
Consecutive meetings held by the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics in the 
spring of 1991 resulted in a major political failure to compromise on the country's 
future. As seen in Chapter 4, Serbia and Montenegro firmly rejected the idea of 
massive decentralization of federal powers and vetoed the election of the Croatian 
candidate to the rotating Yugoslav presidency. Moreover, Serbian official declared 
that in the event that Yugoslavia would collapse, Serbia would annex the "artificial 
nation" of Macedonia to recreate the Greater Serbia of the pre-1945 era.4 The 
increasing domination of Serbia on the federal political scene and its overt 
territorial aspiration over Macedonia compelled Skopje to rethink its political 
options. In May of 1991, Gligorov declared that in the event of Croatian and 
Slovenian secession, Macedonia would follow suit to preserve itself from Serbia's 
domination.5 
When Croats and Slovenes seceded from Yugoslavia in June of 1991, the 
Macedonian parliament immediately adopted a declaration asserting Macedonia's 
right to secede, and the government announced that a referendum on independence 
4 Duncan Perry, "Macedonia: Balkan Miracle or Balkan Disaster?", Current History, March 1996, 
Vol. 95, No. 599, p. 113. 
5 Nina Dobrkovic and James Pettifer, "A chronology of events in Yugoslav-Macedonia relations, 
1990-8", in James Pettifer, (ed.), The New Macedonian Question, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1999,p.XXI. 
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would be held.6 Macedonia participated nonetheless in political negotiations 
sponsored by the European Community in the summer of 1991 in the hope of 
finding a solution to the Yugoslav crisis. However, when the Serbian dominated 
Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) invaded Croatia, hope for a peaceful compromise 
vanished and Macedonia chose the path to independence. The option of remaining 
within a reconfigured Yugoslav state controlled by Serbia was clearly not viable.7 
As a result, a referendum on Macedonia's independence was held in September of 
1991 and secession was officially declared by the Macedonian parliament in 
November.8 
The case of Macedonia is very similar to that of Croatia and Slovenia to the 
extent that it emerged from the same constitutional crisis. What is different, 
however, is that Skopje did not achieve the same political outcome as the two 
northem republics. While Croatia and Slovenia were recognized as sovereign 
states by the European Community and by the D.S., respectively in January and in 
April of 1992, Macedonia was left in the diplomatie waiting room and Washington 
denied it recognition for more than two years. How can we exp Iain this D.S. 
diplomatie deferral? Why is it that the Bush administration, which refused to deal 
separately with Croatia and Slovenia, withheld Macedonia's recognition at the 
expense of increasing the insecurity and the vulnerability of the republic? This 
chapter provides an explanation. 
6 See Jens Reuter, "Policy and economy in Macedonia", in James Pettifer, (ed.), Ibid. p. 33. 
7 The Economist, "Next on the list", Vol. 322, No. 7745, February 8, 1992, p. 46. 
8 Among those who cast ballot, 74.4 percent opted for independence. However, Macedonia's 
Albanian minority boycotted the election. See John Phillips, op. cit., p. 50. 
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Episode 1: The Bush Administration Delays Macedonia's Recognition 
The United States had already moved to the second step of the regional 
stability model when Macedonia dec1ared independence. The Yugoslav federation 
was indeed in an advanced stage of disintegration, and State Department officiaIs 
were focusing on when and under what conditions the U.S. should grant 
recognition to Macedonia and to the other secessionist republics.9 In contrast to 
Croatia, and to a lesser extent Slovenia, Macedonia managed to secede without 
any violence. The fact that the former YP A was already involved in a brutal war in 
Croatia (and later in Bosnia) partly explains Macedonia's ability to secede 
peacefuHy. By January 1992, the Macedonian government had removed aH its 
representatives from federal institutions and the YP A completed its withdrawal 
from the republic in March. IO 
The peaceful and democratic nature of Macedonia' s secession placed the 
republic in a very good position to be recognized by the United States and by the 
European Community. In early 1992, the Badinter Commission had ruled that 
Macedonia and Slovenia were the only two republics to meet the European criteria 
9 A few days after Macedonia declared its independence, Yugoslav President Mesic proclaimed the 
end ofYugoslavia. See Chapter 4 pp. 91-92. 
10 Serbia's president Slobodan Milosevic, who was then in control of the YPA, was reluctant to 
open another front in Macedonia. Moreover, Serbia had little incentive to fight in Macedonia since 
very few Serbs were living in this republic in comparison to Croatia or Bosnia, which contained 
large clusters of Serbian populations. The republic was also not economically appealing for Serbia 
as it only contributed 5 to 7 percent ofYugoslavia's GDP. As a result, the Macedonian govemment 
managed to sign an agreement with Milosevic on the withdrawal of former Yugoslav troops from 
Macedonia. See Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma", 
RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. l, No. 25, June 19, 1992, p. 37. 
Moreover, the adoption of a new constitution by the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 
1992 indicated that Belgrade implicitly agreed to the secession of Macedonia. Indeed, the new 
constitution referred to Serbia and Montenegro as the only two components ofthe new FRY. 
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for state recognition. Il Macedonia was aiso in Hne with the princip les inc1uded in 
the D.S. guidelines for state recognition (see Chapter 4). As a result, the State 
Department was of the opinion that recognition would bring greater stability to the 
republic by transforming its republican frontiers into international borders. This 
was seen as a major deterrent against possible Serbian or Greek aggression. In a 
note sent to Secretary of State James Baker in the winter of 1992, Deputy 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger stated his appreciation of Macedonia and 
Bosnia's process toward independence and argued in favor oftheir recognition. He 
wrote: 
[O]n the issue of principle, both Macedonia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina will have met every criterion regarding recognition. 
They have used a democratic process to establish the groundwork 
for their declaration of independence; they have both moved very 
reluctantly toward independence recognizing that the situation in 
Yugoslavia has left them with no alternative as a simple matter of 
self-preservation; their govemments are, at least by standards of the 
region, representative and committed to the principles of 
democracy. 
Eagleburger conc1uded his analysis by warning that nonrecognition of Macedonia 
"could create real instability, which less than mature players in Serbia and Greece 
might decide to exploit" .12 This analysis reveals the extent to which the internaI 
and the external dimensions of stability of the secessionist states were D.S. key 
concerns. 
In terms of internaI stability, Macedonia had held a successful referendum 
on independence with a majority of three-quarters in favor of secession. The 
11 As explained in Chapter 4, the Badinter Commission was the European Community's 
commission headed by the French constitutionai judge Robert Badinter. The role of the 
commission was to evaluate which Yugoslav republic met the EC criteria for state recognition 
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Macedonian government had also achieved effective control of the republic's 
territory, it respected internaI borders, it guaranteed minority rights, and it was 
committed to liberal democracy. Moreover, a new Macedonian constitution that 
was adopted following the declaration of independence guaranteed civil rights to 
aIl Macedonian citizens and described Macedonia as a civil state as opposed to the 
"state of the Macedonian nation", as it was previously defined, in order to reassure 
its own minorities.13 
As for the external dimension of its stability, Macedonia had a well defined 
territory (i.e. recognized republican borders) and respected international borders. 
The Macedonian government had also amended its constitution to prove that it had 
no irredentist ambitions toward Greece' s neighboring province of the same name. 
The amendment denied any territorial ambitions "prohibiting interference in the 
internal affairs of other states, and reaffirming the inviolability of existing 
frontiers".14 In a word, both Washington and Brussels viewed Macedonia as a first 
rate candidate for diplomatie recognition. 
12 James A. Baker, III, The Polilies ofDiplomacy, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995, p. 640. 
13 See Patrick Moore, "The International Relations of the Yugoslav Area" RFE/RL Researeh 
Report, Vol. l, No. 18, May Ist 1992, p. 33. 
14 Ibid. Greek officiaIs had denounced article 49 of the Macedonian constitution, which stated that 
"the Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people 
in neighboring countries". Greece maintained that this constitutionai statement implied that the 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had territorial aspirations toward the Greek province of 
Macedonia. See Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma", op. 
cit., p. 40. The constitutionai amendments adopted by the Macedonian Parliament on January 6, 
1992 stipulated that: 1) "The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial pretensions towards any 
neighboring state"; 2) that the international borders of Macedonia could only be changed in 
accordance with accepted international principles in that matter; and 3) that "Macedonia will not 
interfere in the sovereign rights of other states or in their internaI affairs". See Jens Reuter, "Policy 
and economy in Macedonia", in James Pettifer, (ed.), op. cil., p. 32. 
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Greece Steps In: Externat Instability Arises 
The Greek government of Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis quickly 
cast a shadow on Macedonia's hope to achieve international recognition. Athens 
argued that because Macedonia was the name of its northern province, famously 
known for being the native soil of Alexander the Great and Aristotle, the former-
Yugoslav republic of Macedonia had no right to refer to itself as 'Macedonia' .15 
Greece requested that the govemment of Skopje remove the word Macedonia from 
its constitutional name as a condition for recognition even if the republic had 
adopted constitutional amendments to eliminate any irredentist suspicions that the 
Greek authorities may have had. 
As a member of the European Community, Greece led a vigorous 
campaign against the recognition of Macedonia and managed to veto the EC 
decision to recognize the republic in January of 1992.16 The European Community 
was clearly embarrassed by Athens's attitude but remained loyal to Greece. Since 
Prime Minister Mitsotakis was an advocate of the Maastricht Treaty, EC members 
agreed to delay recognition to Macedonia in order to save the Mitsotakis 
govemment from possibly losing the upcoming election. The name issue had 
become a burning electoral issue in Greece. In return, Mitsotakis consented to sign 
the Maastricht Treaty, which gave birth to the European Union, and supported EC 
economic sanctions against Serbia. 
15 The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia represents approximately one-third of geographic 
Macedonia. The other two-thirds are under Greece's sovereignty. 
16 Marlise Simons, "Europeans Put Off Macedonia Issue", The New York Times, February 25, 
1992. 
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Although the State Department had initially concluded that Macedonia 
deserved to be recognized and that this was the best option to reinforce its 
stability, the Bush administration ultimately delayed recognition in April of 1992 
because of the growing political tension between Greece and Macedonia over the 
name issue. The Greek opposition to Macedonia definitely had a major impact on 
the D.S. policy, not so much because the Bush administration was supportive or 
empathetic to Athens's position, but because the political dispute between Athens 
and Skopje was a great source of regional instability. The D.S. feared that by 
recognizing Macedonia it would intensif y the already exacerbated Greek 
nationalist feeling toward the issue, and might provide the justification for a 
Greek-Macedonian conflictY Following Macedonia's declaration ofindependence 
in 1991, hundred of thousands of Greeks had demonstrated for months against 
Macedonia's recognition, and the Greek army had been very active on the 
Macedonian border by conducting maneuvers to intimidate the government of 
Skopje. l8 In this context, Macedonia could not guarantee that peace and harmony 
would prevail following its recognition and, therefore, the Bush administration 
concluded that Macedonia was not in a position to sustain its external stability.l9 
Macedonia was evolving in a very insecure regional setting and had been 
conquered several times in the past by its neighbors, which made the Bush 
administration extremely cautious about the instability resulting from the name 
17 Interview with General Brent Scowcroft, Washington D.C., February 8, 2005. 
18 John Phillips, op. cif., p. 54. 
19 Interview with Marshall Freeman Harris, Washington D.C., February 17,2005. 
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issue.20 Albania had always been sympathetic to the faith of the ethnie Albanians 
living in Macedonia, and extremists in Tirana had made the case for the creation of 
a Greater Albania which would inc1ude parts of Macedonia. As for Bulgaria, 
although it was the first state to recognize the independence of Macedonia, it 
refused to acknowledge the existence of a distinct Macedonian nation and several 
Bulgarian politicians considered Macedonians to be Bulgarians under a different 
labe1.21 Serbian nationalists also referred to Macedonia as being what used to be 
South Serbia before 1945, and Serbia could have easily used the pretext of a 
Greek-Maeedonian war to try to split Macedonia's territory with Greece.22 Most of 
these scenarios would have probably led Turkey to intervene on the side of 
Macedonia since the republic held a large Muslim minority. This explains why the 
D.S. administration was worried that a confliet between Greece and Macedonia 
eould have sparked a regional confliet in which Greeee and Turkey, two NATO 
members, eould have c1ashed against eaeh other?3 In sum, sinee the stability of 
Maeedonia was synonymous with peaee in Southem Europe, the eonfliet between 
20 Macedonia is made of 1.3 million of Slav-Orthodox Macedonians, between 400,000 and 500,000 
Albanians, 100,000 Turks, as well as of several small ethnic minorities sueh as Bulgarian and 
Serbian minorities. In the past, geographic Macedonia had been successively conquered by Greece, 
Bulgaria, Serbia, and the Ottoman Empire. See Dunean M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem 
and a European Dilemma", op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
21 Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the 
War for Kosovo, Third Edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, p. 176. 
22 Serbian President Milosevic had discussed with Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis the possibility 
ofpartitioning Macedonia in the early 1990s. See John Phillips, op. cit. 
23 As David Gompert, President Bush's NSC senior director for Europe and Eurasia, argues: "[t]he 
chief American strategic concem during the Bush administration and later under Clinton was to 
keep the Yugoslav confliet from spreading southward, where its flames could leap into the Atlantic 
alliance". See David C. Gompert, "The United States and Yugoslavia's Wars", in Richard H. 
Ullman, (ed.), The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, New York: A Couneil on Foreign Relations 
Book, 1996, p. 136. 
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Greece and Macedonia over the name issue was seen in Washington as a very 
important concem. 
Two other important factors contributed to delay U.S. recognition. First, 
Greece was a NATO ally and the United States had historically maintained close 
ties with Greek govemments. Hence, the U.S. did not want to oppose Greece by 
recognizing Macedonia and it did not want to spoillong standing Greek-American 
relations. Second, the U.S. desired to act in conjunction with the Europeans on the 
issue. The U.S. and the EC (from now on the European Union-EU) had just 
ended their disagreement over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and 
President Bush was, therefore, reluctant to move unilaterally on Macedonia. These 
complementary factors were certainly part of the cost-benefit equation that led the 
Bush administration to defer diplomatie recognition. 
This first episode demonstrates that policies and politics obey very 
different rationales. On paper, Macedonia was one of the best candidates for 
recognition. In practice, however, the Macedonian issue threatened to destabilize 
the southem Balkans and, ironically enough, the peaceful Macedonian republic 
turned out to be the only seceding state that directly threatened the interest of a 
NATO ally and a member of the European Union (i.e. Greece). On the day the 
United States extended recognition to Croatia and Slovenia, Macedonia was, 
therefore, left aside. 
The U.S. indicated in April of 1992 that the purpose of the delay in 
recognition was to allow Greece and Macedonia to settle their dispute?4 In a letter 
24 Ibid., p. 38. By the summer of 1992, only seven eountries had reeognized the independenee of 
Maeedonia and established diplomatie ties with Skopje: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
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sent to a member of Congress who requested that the U.S. clarify its stance toward 
Macedonia, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for legislative affairs, Steven 
Berry, summarized the U.S. position on the issue: 
While the United States takes very seriously Greek concerns 
regarding its security and is sensitive to the Greek government's 
concerns about the potential for instability on its northern border as 
violence in Yugoslavia continues, President Bush fully endorses 
Macedonian President Gligorov's efforts to maintain calm and 
stability and to lead his people to full independence through 
negotiations with the EC. The United States in no way condones the 
spread of violence to Macedonia. Above aIl, we seek solutions 
which are acceptable to the EC, Greece, and Macedonia noting that 
a close and friendly relationship between Greece and Macedonia is 
an important element in Balkan stability and regional prosperity.25 
This reveals the extent to which tensions between Athens and Skopje inhibited the 
United States from recognizing the republic. More broadly, this episode illustrates 
that the international dimension of secession (i.e. how international actors react to 
secessionist cases) can have an impact on the United States calculation of stability 
and on its decision to recognize or not secessionist states. 
Did the Greek-Americans Play a Role? 
At this point, the Greek diaspora was not an important factor in the U.S. 
cost-benefit analysis. In fact, the Greek-American campaign against Macedonia 
seriously began in the summer of 1992, a few weeks after the U.S. decided to 
delay recognition. There is no empirical evidence showing that the Greek-
Lithuania, the Philippines, Slovenia, and Turkey. Russia had recognized Macedonia in May but 
waited for the European Community's recognition before exchanging ambassadors. See Sabrina 
Ramet, op. cil., p. 184. 
25 Department of State, October 22, 1992. Unclassified Document, case 200502041. Unclassified 
on June 15,2005. 
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American diaspora caused the Bush administration to withhold Macedonia's 
recognition. 
Following the V.S. delay of recognition, however, the Greek-Americans 
launched an aggressive and expensive campaign against Macedonia in the summer 
of 1992. Their objective was to transform President Bush's delay of recognition 
into a permanent rejection of Macedonia's independence. Greek-Americans sent 
letters to their representatives in Congress to promote their views. The Hellenic-
American National Council also sponsored a rally in Washington D.C. against 
recognition, which gathered more than 20,000 Greek-Americans.26 A Hellenic 
organization called the "Americans for the Just Resolution of the Macedonian 
Issue" even paid for two full-page advertisements in The New York Times in April 
and May of 1992 to make its case against the recognition of Skopje under the 
name Macedonia. The maneuver was directed toward President Bush. The 
organization argued that the "recognition of Skopje as the Republic of Macedonia 
would only legitimize its extremist and false claims upon sovereign Greek 
territory" .27 
The mobilization of the Greek-American lobby was significant but can 
hardly explain why the V.S. government sustained its delay of recognition. 
According to Thomas Niles, who acted as the Vnder Secretary of State for 
European Affairs at the time, the pressure exercised by Greek-Americans was not 
26 Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma", op. cit., p. 40. 
27 Ibid. 
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a major issue for the Bush administration in 1992.28 NSC David Gompert also 
points out that the administration of George H.W. Bush was, for better or for 
worse, relatively insensitive to the Greek-American lobby?9 The fear of a conflict 
between the Greek aIly and Macedonia that would destabilize the entire region, 
and the U.S. desire to act conjunctly with the Europeans, appear to be the main 
reasons explaining the decision of the Bush administration. 
The decision to delay recognition, however, was only a political band-aid 
on an unresolved political issue and Macedonia remained a real puzzle to the 
United States. On the one hand, it is true that the recognition of Macedonia would 
have probably contained the Bosnian conflict from spreading southward by 
transforming Macedonia's republican borders into international ones, but on the 
other hand, such a decision wouid have infuriated Greece. The nonrecognition of 
Macedonia aiso carried its share of problems.3o It probably reduced the tension 
between Athens and Skopje, but it greatly increased the instability and the 
vulnerability of the Macedonian republic vis-à-vis Serbia. Moreover, the lack of 
recognition was a great threat to Macedonia's economic viability since foreign aid 
and loans were only available to sovereign and recognized states.31 
28 Phone interview with Thomas M.T. Niles, January 29,2005. 
29 Interview with David C. Gompert, Washington D.C., January 25,2005. 
30 Marlise Simons, "For the Name of Macedonia, a Burst of Greek Pride", The New York Times, 
April 17, 1992. Macedonia's foreign minister, Denko Maleski declared: "If the European 
Community and the D.S. government leave this land in a state of limbo, l'm afraid that our 
neighbors will get ideas". BIaine Barden, "In Europe: New World Order vs. Old Nationalisms; 
Greece BIocks Recognition of Macedonia", The Washington Post, June 10, 1992. 
31 Without recognition, the republic was not eligible for economic assistance from the World Bank 
or from the International Monetary Fund, and could not receive direct foreign aid from the U.S. or 
the EC. President Bush's effort in 1992 to provide 10 million dollars in aid to Macedonia, for 
instance, was blocked by the Bouse of Representatives. Democrats on the Bouse Foreign Affairs 
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In sum, the recognition issue soon became a catch-22 situation and it 
placed the U.S. in a very delicate position. In the weeks following its decision to 
delay recognition, the Bush administration stated that it would support any rapid 
solution on the name issue that could satisfy both parties and President Bush told 
Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov that the recognition of his republic was only 
a matter oftime. 
The Greek-Macedonian struggle, however, reached new height later in 
1992 when Greece, which was determined to win the name battle, chose to 
increase pressure on the Macedonian government by closing its border to the 
republic and by imposing an oil embargo against Skopje. Macedonia counter-
attacked by adopting a new national flag that pictured the Star of Vergina, which 
appeared on the tomb of Philip of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great. This 
move was seen by the Greek authorities as a falsification of Greece's history and 
as a direct provocation. The adoption of the new flag bolstered Greek nationalist 
passions and dashed hopes for a quick resolution of the conflict. 
Enter President Clinton 
The election of Bill Clinton in 1992 did not result in any variation in the 
U.S. policy toward Macedonia's recognition. As time went on, however, and as 
the conflict resulting from Yugoslavia's disintegration threatened to consume the 
whole southem Balkans, the U.S. interest in the region slowly moved from a 
Committee objected the allocation arguing that Macedonia was not recognized by the United States 
as a sovereign country. See Don Oberdorfer, "Macedonia Appeals for Recognition, Aid", The 
Washington Post, November 10, 1992. 
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peripheral to a core concem. A few weeks after he took office, President Clinton 
made clear to his senior foreign policy advisors that the U.S. had to be more 
involved in the Balkans. "Ifthe United States doesn't act in situations like this", he 
declared in reference to the war in Bosnia, "nothing will happen".32 Since the U.S. 
recognition of Macedonia depended on the resolution of the Greek-Macedonian 
dispute, the Clinton administration made two important decisions that strengthen 
the stability of the republic without aggravating the tense political situation. 
First, the White House consented for the first time since the beginning of 
the Yugoslav crisis to send U.S. troops to the Macedonian republic as a substitute 
to diplomatic recognition in order to reinforce Macedonia's security. As Richard 
Holbrooke points out: "The situation was so explosive that the United States made 
its only exception to the policy of not sending troops to the region [ ... ] in order to 
prevent the war in Bosnia from spreading to the south and igniting a general 
Balkan conflict".33 This decision came after the CIA had wamed the White House 
that a Serbian atlack on Macedonia was imminent and that this conflict could 
consume the region.34 Thus, in May of 1993, 300 U.S. soldiers joined the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for Macedonia, which already counted 
700 U.N. troopS.35 The deployment of these troops along the Macedonian border 
32 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting ta Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy, Washington D.C.: 
Brooking Institution Press, 2000, p. 9. 
33 Richard Holbrooke, Ta End a War, New York: The Modem Library, 1999, pp. 122. 
34 John Phillips, op. cit., p. 60. 
35 The New York Times, "300 U.S. Troops in Macedonia To Try to Contain Balkan War", July 13, 
1993. The UNPROFOR in Macedonia had been authorized by the UN Security Council in late 
1992. Its mandate was to protect Macedonia's border with Albania and Serbia. The creation of the 
UNPROFOR-Macedonia was recommended by the UN Secretary General following a request 
l37 
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with Serbia gives a clear indication of the importance that the United States gave 
to the stability of the republic, especially given that the government of Skopje had 
not formulated demands for any U.S. protection force.36 This decision was part of 
the U.S. containment strategy in the region, which attempted to build a cordon 
sanitaire around Serbia to contain Milosevic's regime from committing further 
aggressions. This measure, however, placed the United States in a very odd 
position: American troops were sent to protect the territorial integrity of an 
unrecognized entity. 
Second, the Clinton administration agreed to sponsor the admission of 
Macedonia to the United Nations in April of 1993, despite the fact that it had not 
yet recognized the republic. The objective here was to encourage Greece and 
Macedonia to settle the name issue through the auspices of the United Nations. 
Greece had reluctantly agreed to U.N. admission of the Yugoslav Republic under 
the provisional name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to show 
its good faith and its will to resolve the issue. Macedonia was thus admitted as the 
181 st member of the U.N. through a Security Council resolution under the name 
FYROM. 
At tirst look, this event is puzzling since it raises the question of why the 
U.S. opposed Macedonia's recognition but sponsored its candidacy to the U.N. 
made by the Maeedonian government. See Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and 
Dissolution Afler the Cold War, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 295. See 
also Nokolaos Zahariadis, "External Interventions and Domestie Ethnie Confliet in Yugoslav 
Maeedonia", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 2, 2003, p. 269. 
36 However, according to Elizabeth Drew, the decision to send U.S. troops in Macedonia was "a 
way of putting the emphasis on containment and of looking like the United States was doing 
something about the war in the Balkans". See Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton 
Presidency, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 161. 
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This also raises the issue of the difference between sponsoring a state's admission 
to the United Nations and issuing diplomatie recognition. If the U.S. were opposed 
to U.N. recognition of FYROM, it could have vetoed the Security Council 
resolution, but it did not. And neither did England and France, two important 
members of the European Union with permanent seats on the U.N. Security 
Council. How can we make sense ofthis U.S. decision then? 
Macedonia's admission to the U.N. allowed the United States (and the EU 
members) to advance its stability agenda in the Balkans without increasing 
tensions between Athens and Skopje. The welcoming of Macedonia as a member 
of the U.N. bolstered the stability of the republic by underlying the inevitability of 
its independence. This was made without compelling the White House to change 
its official position on the issue.37 
Episode 2: President Clinton Recognizes Macedonia as FYROM 
Toward the end of 1993, six members of the European Union (Denrnark, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands) decided to disregard 
Greece's sensibilities toward the Macedonian issue and recognized the 
independence of Macedonia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM).38 The decision was issued days before Greece took over the revolving 
37 According to Marshall Freeman Harris, who served in Macedonia in the early 1990s as aState 
Department official, the U.N. recognition of FYROM was seen in Washington as a first step in the 
inevitable process of Macedonia's recognition. Interview with Marshall Freeman Harris, 
Washington D.C. February 17,2005. 
38 By then, more than 40 states had extended diplomatie recognition to the republic. See Paul 
Lewis, "Europe to Defy Greece on Ties to Macedonia", The New York Times, December 12, 1993. 
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presidency of the EU. Despite the fact that Greece had shown openness by 
accepting FYROM's admission to the U.N., the Europeans remained upset about 
Greece's counter-productive campaign on the name issue, which impeded progress 
on the matter for almost two years. The nonrecognition of Macedonia also had a 
bad effect on both the EU and the U.S.'s attempt to strengthen economic sanctions 
against Serbia and Montenegro in 1992-93. Since Macedonia was not recognized 
and could not, therefore, obtain economic support from the United States or from 
international economic organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, Skopje 
was compelled to violate U.N. sanctions by trading with Serbia in order to sustain 
its economy. 
The EU decision to disregard Greece's objection created a window of 
opportunity for Washington. The Clinton administration had the option to move 
along with the Europeans to advance its agenda of regional stability in the Balkans 
without being condemned by Greece as the instigator of the measure. Moreover, 
the timing for recognition was better than in 1992 since tensions between Greece 
and Macedonia had significantly diminished and the two parties had undertaken 
negotiations. In early 1994, the Clinton administration decided to follow the 
Europeans despite Greece's strong resistance.39 The Clinton administration 
justified its decision to recognize FYROM by stating that there was "a potential 
See also Loring M. Danforth, The Maeedonian Confliet: Ethnie Nationalism in a Transnational 
World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 151. 
39 Interview with Anthony Lake, Washington D.C., April 4, 2005. 
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for instability to grow" in the South Balkans and that the recognition of the 
republic as a sovereign state would increase its stability.40 
The White House also emphasized the importance of the internaI and the 
external stability of the republic in the justification of its decision: 
Today, the United States extended formaI recognition to the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and declared its intent to 
establish full diplomatie relations. [ ... ] This action will help 
promote stability in the region. We join nearly every other country 
of Europe in taking this step. In extending formaI recognition, we 
have taken into account the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia's commitment to peaceful cooperative relations and its 
respect for the territorial integrity of aIl of its neighbors, and the 
inviolability of existing boundaries. [ ... ] We recognize that Greece 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have outstanding 
differences which we expect will be resolved through good faith 
negotiations. [ ... ] We also take note of the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia's commitment to democratic principles, to 
human rights, to the creation of an open, free market economy and 
to its desire to seek peaceful solutions to problems in the regions.41 
According to Matthew Nimetz, who was President Clinton's special envoy 
to Macedonia in charge of the Greek-Macedonia crisis in 1993-94, recognition had 
first and foremost the objective of fostering Macedonia's stability. The purpose 
was "to reinforce the recognition of sovereignty and to give them [the 
Macedonians] equality with countries that might be hostile".42 
40 David Binder, "U.S. to Recognize Macedonia", The New York Times, February 9, 1994. 
Moreover, the American recognition of the republic had a positive impact on its economy. The 
U.S. administration provided sorne 76 million dollars in foreign aid to Skopje in the next four 
years, which shows that diplomatie recognition can carry tangible economic benefits. See Sabrina 
Petra Ramet, op. cU., pp. 186-187. 
41 The White Rouse, "U.S. Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", 
Statement by the Press Secretary, February 9, 1994. 
42 Phone interview with Matthew Nimetz, February 18,2005. 
141 
/ 
Macedonia: A Delay in Recognition 
Greece's reaction to the US. decision was immediate. President Clinton 
was depicted as a traitor and the US. consulate in Thessaloniki was attacked by 
angry Greek protesters who threw eggs at the consulate's windows. More 
importantly, and as a direct reaction to the V.S. recognition of FYROM, Greek 
Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou-who defeated Mitsotakis in the 1993 
election-announced the imposition of a major trade embargo against Macedonia 
to retaliate against Washington's recognition ofthe republic.43 
Greek-Americans vs. Macedonian-Americans 
The V.S. decision to recognize Macedonia's independence was made 
despite the strong opposition expressed by the Greek-American community, which 
indicates that the Greek diaspora was not the main factor influencing the Clinton 
administration. But what about the Macedonian-American community? Did this 
diaspora play a role? 
According to Ivan A. Lebanov, the president of the Macedonian Patriotic 
Organization (MPO), the Macedonian-Americans played a significant role in the 
V.S.'s recognition of FYROM. The Macedonian Patriotic Organization worked 
with several members of Congress and "there were many trips to Washington, 
thousands of letters, hundreds of faxes and tons of paper used by the Macedonian 
43 Ibid., p. 284. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou deelared that he was foreed to impose the 
embargo to proteet Greeee's national security. He pointed out: "this is a real threat to our national 
seeurity, beeause Skopje's aim is to gain an exit to the Aegean Sea. We closed the border after six 
EU eountries reeognized Skopje ... We had to remind the world there is a problem eoneeming 
stability and seeurity in the region". Cited in John Shea, Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to 
Define a New Balkan Nation, North Carolina: MeFarland, 1997, p. 285. 
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Tribune", MPO's news paper, to promote the independence of Macedonia.44 For 
Lebanov, the answer is clear, the D.S. recognition did not just happen, 
Macedonian-Americans made it happen. 
This small Macedonian cornrnunity, which gathered less than 40 thousand 
Arnericans, may have made the Clinton administration aware of Macedonia's 
political and economic difficulties.45 Rowever, during their battle for recognition, 
Macedonian-Americans were competing against the Greek-American lobby, which 
was better organized at the national level and represented a community of 1.1 
million Arnericans (the largest Greek community outside of Greece). If the Greek-
Arnerican lobby, which had strong connections to Congress members in both 
Rouses and strong ties to an influential member of the White Rouse (President 
Clinton's senior advisor George Stephanopoulos), failed to dissuade President 
Clinton from recognizing Macedonia, it is very unlikely that the Macedonian 
Arnericans were able to influence the Clinton administration. Indeed, we can 
seriously doubt that the White Rouse made the calculation that it would be 
profitable to please the Macedonian-Arnericans at the expense of alienating the 
large Greek-Arnerican community. 
The Clinton Administration Backtracks 
The recognition of FYROM had a major impact on the mobilization of the 
Greek-Arnericans. Within a few days, the American Rellenic Educational 
44 Ibid., p. 183. The Macedonian Patriotic Organization was established in North America in 1922. 
One of the central aims of the organization has been to promote Macedonia's independence. 
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Progressive Association collected 30,000 signatures against President Clinton's 
decision.46 Several leaders of the community, among which Representative 
Michael Bilirakis of Florida and Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, asked 
President Clinton to reverse its decision to recognize FYROM and managed to 
convince George Stephanopoulos to talk to President Clinton about it.47 Members 
of a national Hellenic group also pressured the U.S. Congress "to urge that 
President Clinton rescind American recognition of the Republic of Macedonia", 
which led Congress to pass a resolution asking the president to reconsider its 
decision.48 
Under the auspices of George Stephanopoulos, leaders of the Greek-
American community (Greek Orthodox Archibishop Iakovos, Senator Sarbanes, 
and a dozen prominent Greek-Americans) managed to meet with President Clinton 
in a private meeting in the White House to discuss the Macedonian problem. The 
meeting was attended by Vice-President Al Gore and National Security advisor 
Anthony Lake. Neither Secretary of State Warren Christopher nor any State 
Department officiaIs were present at the meeting. Following the reunion, President 
Clinton ehose to baektraek from its initial decision to extend full diplomatie 
relations to FYROM (e.g. to send an ambassador and to open an Embassy in 
45 The 2000 U.S. census listed 38,051 Macedonian-Americans. Michigan was the State that 
gathered the largest cluster of Macedonia-Americans with 7,801. 
46 Hanna Rosin, "Why we flipped on Macedonia", The New Republic, June 13, 1994, p. 11. 
47 Marshall Freeman Harris, "Macedonia: The Next Domino?", The National Interest, Spring 1999, 
Vol. 55, pp. 44-45. 
48 John Shea, op. cit., p. 186. 
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Skopje). The president indicated that no ambassador would be sent to Skopje as 
long as the name and the flag issue remained unresolved with Greece.49 
The Greek-American crusade clearly impacted Clinton's foreign policy 
decisions toward Macedonia. Commenting on this rather unusual episode of 
foreign poliey making, Marshall Freeman Harris, who served in Macedonia in the 
early 1990s as astate department official, writes: 
The normally automatic process by which diplomatic relations 
immediately follow recognition was halted, not because sorne D.S. 
national interest was invoked but because, in one of the most 
hysterical moments of the new presidency, Greek-Americans 
persuaded White House adviser George Stefanopoulos to intervene 
with Clinton. 50 
Moreover, the Greek-American lobby managed to make the D.S. postal service 
deliver mail to FYROM instead of to Macedonia and it also intervened with 
American phone companies so that long distance caUs from the U.S. to the 
republic be logged under the name FYROM instead of Maeedonia.51 
Interagency Disagreement 
By delaying the establishment of diplomatic relations to FYROM, 
President Clinton was hoping to avoid further antagonizing the Greek-Ameriean 
community. This decision, however, led to an important interagency disagreement 
between the White House and the State Department. Officials from the State 
Department were upset about the drastic tum of events and openly denounced the 
49 Hanna Rosin, op. cit., p. 11. Sabrina Petra Ramet, op. cif., p. 186. 
50 Marshall Freeman Harris, op. cit., pp. 44-45. 
51 Ibid. 
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White House decision contending that President Clinton was "bowing" to pressure 
from the Greek-Americans.52 Former Secretary ofState James Baker characterized 
the Clinton administration as being "confused" and "inconsistent" on the issue and 
accused the President of "failure to stand up to pressure from the Greek-American 
community".53 
As tensions between Greece and Macedonia had significantly decreased 
over the last year, the State Department was strongly in favor of extending 
diplomatie relations to Macedonia to strengthen its security toward its neighbors. 
Following the V.S. recognition of FYROM in February of 1994, Secretary of State 
Christopher had urged President Clinton to name an ambassador to Skopje to give 
added weight to recognition. In an interview with The Washington Post, sorne 
State Department officiaIs also declared that delaying establishment of full 
diplomatie relations with Macedonia would empower and legitimate Greece's 
recent decision to impose a trade embargo against Macedonia. 
Facing this interagency discord, the White House defended its decision by 
pointing out that it had succeeded in reaching a middle-ground position on the 
issue. Its recognition of the republic satisfied the need for greater stability in the 
South Balkans, and the delay in sending an ambassador satisfied the Greek-
American community. White House officiaIs also argued that the maintenance of 
52 Steven Greenhouses, "State Dept. Criticizes White House on Macedonia Ties", The Washington 
Post, April 19, 1994. 
53 John Shea, op. cit., p. 365. 
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the decision to recogmze FYROM was a clear demonstration that the 
administration had not "caved in to political pressure".54 
This V.S. interagency division clearly shows that the V.S. government is 
not monolithic and that agencies within it sometimes have different views and 
interests. The State Department was primarily concemed with the stability of the 
Balkans and, in contrast to President Clinton, did not have to cope with the V.S. 
domestic dimension of foreign policy. This explains the gap between their 
respective positions toward Macedonia. 
Did the Greek-Americans Really Play a Major Role? 
The intervention of the Greek-American community did cause the reversaI 
of President Clinton's decision to exchange diplomatie relations with Macedonia. 
However, one could wonder whether the Greek-American lobby would have been 
as successful without the presence of a Greek-American in the White House? In 
other words, can this episode really give credit to the ethnie politics argument or 
does it simply show that the personal beHefs and interests ofV.S. officiaIs, such as 
George Stephanopoulos, often determine the decision-making process? 
Regardless of the real impact of the Greek-American lobby, largue here 
that the American decision to postpone the extension of diplomatie relations was 
relatively insignificant considering that the V.S. had not reversed its recognition of 
54 Steven Greenhouse, op. cit. 
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the republic. As Anthony Lake points out, this decision did not signify a "reversaI 
of course" in the U.S. 's foreign policy toward the republic. 55 
Moreover, even if Greek-American pressure slowed the process by which 
full diplomatie relations were established following FYROM's recognition, it 
failed to stop it. According to Marshall Freeman Harris, the Greek-Americans 
were condemned to lose the battle over the recognition of Macedonia. They 
managed to win a fight by making the Clinton administration retreat from its 
earlier decision to send an ambassador, but they did not manage to win the war of 
recognition. 56 
Episode 3: The V.S. Extends Full Diplomatie Relations to FYROM 
In the months following the admission of FYROM to the United Nations, 
the organization hosted a series of talks to tackle the Macedonian issue but none of 
them produced any significant progress. Things started to move forward in the fall 
of 1995 when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke (who was 
working on a peace plan to end the Bosnian war), undertook discussions with both 
Athens and Skopje. After a few meetings with the leaders of the two states, 
Holbrooke squared the circle by making Greece and Macedonia agree on an 
interim agreement of mutual recognition in which they consented to normalize 
their relations. Vnder this agreement, Athens and Skopje agreed to recognize their 
mutual frontiers, the inviolability of their borders, and their respective 
55 Interview with Anthony Lake, Washington D.C., April 4, 2005. 
56 Interview with Marshall Freeman Harris, Washington D.C., February 17,2005. 
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independence. Macedonia also agreed to adopt a new flag and, in counterpart, 
Athens lifted its economic embargo. 57 The two states also exchanged liaison 
officers and agreed to begin commercial negotiations. FinalIy, both parties began 
serious negotiations on the name issue. 58 
On the day of the agreement, Richard Holbrooke talked to George 
Stephanopoulos to inform the White House of the new development. Holbrooke 
recalIs: "1 calI George Stephanopoulos, the President's senior advisor, who was 
also the key Administration connection to the Greek-American community. When 
he heard the news, George's voice [ ... ] broke for a moment. He said he would 
immediately caU key members of the Greek-American community, starting with 
Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland". 59 This anecdote shows the extent to which 
Stephanopoulos was involved in the issue and it reflects his strong connection to 
the Greek-American lobby. 
It is in the context of mutual agreement between Greece and Macedonia 
that the United States established diplomatie relations with FYROM at the 
ambassadoriallevel by upgrading its Liaison Office to an Embassy in February of 
1996. The U.S. decision was made after Skopje and Athens had shown a clear 
commitment to respect each other' s sovereignty and had made efforts to find a 
solution to the name dispute. This interim accord acted as the missing piece of the 
puzzle that guaranteed Macedonia's external stability. 1ndeed, as a result of the 
57 Richard Holbrooke, op. cil., pp. 121-127. See also Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: Balkan 
Miracle or Balkan Disaster?", Current HiSIOry, March 1996, Vol. 95, No. 599, p. 115. 
58 John Philipps, op. cil., p. 59. 
59 Richard Holbrooke, op. cil., p. 126. 
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accord, political tensions dropped significantly, and virtually eliminating the 
probability of an interstate conflict between the two states. 60 
For Matthew Nimetz, who was named UN special envoy to Macedonia to 
resolve the crisis with Greece in 1994, the establishment of a D.S. Embassy in 
Skopje greatly strengthened the security of the Macedonian state. He indicates: 
In smaller countries, you have to understand how important it is to 
have an Ambassador of the large superpower, which we are, and 
until that happens there is always a question of whether there will 
be support for the very survival of the country. And this is a country 
in the Balkans that never had a history of being an independent 
country. So, l think that it was a high priority in Skopje to have not 
only formaI U.S. recognition, and a membership in the UN, but a 
tangible D.S. demonstration of support.61 
After signing the accord with Athens, Macedonia was also able to internationalize 
and to institutionalize its status as sovereign state by joining a series of 
international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). 
Episode 4: The V.S. Recognizes FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia 
The fourth and last episode of the Macedonian saga took place under the 
presidency of George W. Bush and concerns the D.S. recognition of the 
constitutional name Macedonia which, at the time of this writing, is still opposed 
60 In response to the V.S. recognition of its republie, Maeedonian Prime Minister Branko 
Crvenkovski declared: "The establishment of full diplomatie relations with the U.S.A. at 
ambassadorial level, is an event of exeeptional, rd say historie, signifieanee for the republie of 
Maeedonia. It's something we have been anticipating for a long time, aware that this would 
eontribute, to a great extent, to the strengthening of Maeedonia's position not only on a bilateral 
basis in relations with the U.S., but overall in the international eommunity, as weIl". See John 
Shea, op. cif., p. 306. 
61 Phone interview with Matthew Nimetz, February 18,2005. 
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by Greece. Conventionally, the diplomatie recognition of a new state cornes with 
the recognition of its constitutional name. Macedonia once again failed to 
experience the conventional process of recognition as the United States recognized 
its constitutional name ten years after it recognized its independence. The question 
to ask here is why the U.S. suddenly felt the need to recognize the name 
"Macedonia" while Athens and Skopje had still not entirely resolved their 
contention regarding this issue? This is even more puzzling considering that the 
EU members were waiting for a final agreement on the name before completing 
Macedonia's recognition process. What kind of incentives led the U.S. to make 
such a bold decision? 
Macedonia 's Growing Internai Instability 
In the years following its independence, Macedonia faced growing internaI 
divisions between its Slavic orthodox majority and the Muslim Albanians who 
constituted the largest minority with approximately 23 percent of the population.62 
The Albanian minority was poody represented within political institutions and 
only a few ministers of the government were Albanian Muslims. In the second half 
of the 1990s, ethnie Albanians rose up against discrimination and began to express 
their grievances more vocally. They requested more political autonomy and better 
constitutional recognitions. Renee, Macedonia soon went from the status of a 
62 At that time, a large portion of the Albanian community had boycotted the referendum on 
independence. Albanians argued that they enjoyed more power under the communist Yugoslav 
federation and that the new Macedonian constitution might not respect Albanian rights. Under 
Yugoslavia, Albanians had the constitutional right to be educated in the Albanian language in 
Kosovo and they had better educational opportunities. Moreover, they could fly the Turkish and the 
Albanian flag on special occasions. These rights and privileges were removed when Macedonia 
seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991. See Susan Woodward, op. cit. p. 262. 
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secessionist state struggling for independence to the one of a host state facing an 
Albanian autonomist movement. 
The growing political tension In Macedonia eventually led to ethnic 
violence in early 2001. Albanian insurgents from Macedonia's National Liberation 
Army (NLA)-an offshoot of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)-launched 
several attacks in the northwest of the republic.63 Insurgents asked for the 
recognition that ethnic Albanians were equal to the Slav majority; for the 
recognition of Albanian as an official language; for the creation of an Albanian 
state funded university; and for a better representation of Albanians in the armed 
forces, police, and civil service.64 
The conflict that erupted in January 2001 produced more than 120,000 
displaced persons, before a ceasefire between the NLA and the Macedonian 
authorities could be reached in July.65 With the assistance of special 
representatives from the United States and the European Union, a political accord 
63 Sorne argue that the conflict was in fact imported to Macedonia by members of the KLA who 
wanted to create a Greater Albania. Although the idea of a Greater Albania might have motivated a 
certain fringe of Macedonia's Albanian community, most of the ethnic Albanians only asked for 
more autonomy within Macedonia. Moreover, the Kosovo war in 1998-99 is often cited as a 
determining factor that boosted the ethnic Albanian community of Macedonia to request more 
power and recognition. According to Zahariadis, the crisis in Kosovo "served as the catalyst for 
bringing an end to the idyllic portrayal of ethnie relations in FYROM". See Nikolaos Zahariadis, 
op. cif., p. 272. 
64 John Phillips, op. cif., p. 80. 
65 P.H. Liotta, "Spillover Effect: Aftershocks in Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia", European 
Security, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 97. In June 2001, the President of Macedonia Boris 
Trajkovski asked for NATO military assistance to resolve the crisis. The North Atlantic 
organization agreed to provide a peacekeeping force but only once a peaceful agreement would be 
settled between Macedonian and Albanian politicalleaders. See Suzette R. Grillot, Wolf-Christian 
Paes, Hans Risser, and Shelly O. Stoneman, "A Fragile Peace: Guns and Security in Post-conflict 
Macedonia", United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), June 2004. 
htm://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/sas-mkd-30jun.pdf(accessed July 2006). 
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known as the Ohrid Agreement was signed in August.66 Following the signing of 
the agreement, NATO sent ground troops-as requested by Macedonian Prime 
Minister Hari Kostov-to lead "Operation Essential Harvest" mandate to 
demilitarize the NLA and restore order in the republic. 
The implementation of the Ohrid accord, however, turned out to be more 
difficult than expected. Although the agreement had officially put an end to the 
cri sis, ethnic tensions persisted and a significant portion of Slavic Macedonians 
opposed certain aspects of the agreement. The main political contention between 
Slavs and Muslims concerned the modification of the municipal boundaries, which 
was to give more power to the ethnic Albanians in important Macedonian cities.67 
In the summer of 2004, Slavic nationalists mobilized and called for a referendum 
on a proposaI to override the decentralization law, which was to redraw municipal 
boundaries. 
While international observers initially estimated that the nationalist 
proposaI had little chance to succeed and, therefore, that it did not threaten the 
survival of the Ohrid agreement, opinion polIs showed, ten days before the vote, 
that no less than 43.5 percent of Macedonians would oppose the decentralization 
66 This agreement addressed the core Albanian demands: greater civil rights were guaranteed for 
Albanians (Le. political, cultural, and religious rights); better representation of Albanians in the 
civil service and in the police force; the recognition of the Albanian language as an official 
language in districts where Albanians formed the majority; and a double-majority parliamentary 
system was created. The system required that at least half of the Albanian representatives in 
Parliament vote in favor of a bill for it to come into law. This measure gave Albanians a veto power 
over Macedonia's political life. See Ted Galen Carpenter, "Kosovo and Macedonia: The West 
Enhances the Threat", Mediterranean Quarter/y, Winter 2002, p. 30. See also The New York 
Times, "Macedonia Appeals for World's Help to Restore Stability", November 17,2001. 
67 The redrawing of municipal boundaries made "ethnic Albanians a dominant force in 16 of 84 
districts and gave them more control over schools, healthcare and jobs in those areas." See Los 
Angeles Times, "Macedonia; Bid to Abolish Albanian Autonomy Fails", November 8, 2004. 
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law in the referendum. Thus, days before the vote, the yes side was gaining 
momentum and the referendum threatened to put an end to the three-year peace 
agreement that had been reached in 2001 by the V.S. and the EV.68 
In the first days of November 2004, officiaIs from the Macedonian 
governrnent called on the Bush administration for help and support.69 As a key 
instigator of the Ohrid peace plan, the V.S. administration saw the accord as the 
best way to preserve stability in the southem Balkans. The agreement was seen in 
Washington as Macedonia' s first step toward a successful multiethnic state, and as 
the only credible solution to ensure Macedonia's eventual integration into the 
European Vnion and NATO. In a 1999 interview, Christopher Hill, the first V.S. 
arnbassador to Macedonia, revealed the important role that Macedonia was playing 
in the region and the V.S. cornrnitment to reinforce its cohesion: "Macedonia", he 
said, "has an important role as a factor of stability in the Balkans ... ultimately, as a 
multiethnic state, we very much want to see it succeed, and we're going to stand 
by it, and help ensure that it does succeed".70 The strong V.S. support to the Ohrid 
agreement clearly reflected Hill's point ofview. 
A few days before the referendum, the State Department was worried that a 
winning referendum might destabilize Macedonia and that ethnic conflicts might 
68 James Pettifer, Macedonia: Recognition, Referendum, Resignation, Conflict Studies Research 
Centre, Balkans Series, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Sandhurst, December 2004, 
p. 4. http://www.da.mod.uk!CSRC/documents/balkans/04%2839%29-JP.pdf (accessed June 2006). 
69 Interview with aState Department official, Washington D.C., February 25, 2005. 
70 John Phillips, op. cit., p. 74. As Matthew Nimetz recalls: "The administration was concemed 
about the referendum, and felt that recognition would help the govemment there to defeat the 
referendum". A winning referendum "would have lead to the unravelling of the Ohrid accord, 
which would have lead maybe to the breakup of the country". Phone interview with Matthew 
Nimetz, February 18,2005. 
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resurface. The Macedonian issue literally became short-term crisis management 
for the us. administration.7! On November 3, the day a:fter the reelection of 
President Bush, members of the State Department and of the National Security 
Council met to discuss measures to secure the survival of the Ohrid agreement. 
The option of recognizing Macedonia's constitutional name was then retained by 
V.S. top officiaIs. This option was seen as a measure to appease Slavic nationalists 
who had been struggling for the right to use the name Macedonia since the 
independence of the republic in 1991.72 This recognition was expected to bring 
more confidence to the Slavic majority as well as more evidence of the US. 
support of Macedonia's territorial integrity. Certain members of the State 
Department who attended the meeting pointed out, however, that the Greek-
American community would clearly be angry at the US. if the Bush 
administration was to move on with recognition.73 Despite this domestic 
consideration, Secretary of State Colin Powell recommended to President Bush 
that he recognizes Macedonia's constitutional name. The decision was made in a 
very short period of time and resulted from a relatively large consensus on the 
issue between the State Department and the NSC.74 It is not a coincidence that the 
71 Interview with aState Department official, Washington D.C., March 10,2005. 
72 James Pettifer argues: "there is an entrenched and obstinate constituency within the Slav-
Macedonian community, perhaps between a third and a half of them, who do not really accept 
Ochrid at aH and have no real intention of putting it into practice. It is to these people that the US 
decision to recognize the name Macedonia was directed. In late summer 2004 they had begun to 
move into a rejectionist position in the referendum campaign". See James Pettifer, Macedonia: 
Recognition, Referendum, Resignation, op. cit., p. 3. 
73 Interview with aState Department official, op. cil., February 25, 2005. 
74 According to State Department officiaIs who have been interviewed by the author, the United 
States would have been unable to make such a quick decision if foreign policy agencies had 
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Bush administration recognized the constitutional name of the republic 24 hours 
after the U.S. presidential election. The administration knew that the decision 
would alienate the Greek-American community and the White Bouse was aware 
that it would have been politically costly to make such a unilateral decision before 
the election. 
During the State Department daily press briefing that followed the U.S. 
decision, officiaIs emphasized the importance of stability. State Department 
spokesman Richard Boucher declared: 
The fact that the referendum is coming up is part of the equation. 
We are certainly looking for ways to support the full 
implementation of the Ohrid Agreements, including the 
decentralization that' s so important to that, and we felt therefore 
this was the appropriate time to take the step. [ ... ] The point is to 
show support for a multiethnic society in Macedonia as they 
proceed in a direction that we feel contribute to their own stability 
and the stability of the region, and by taking this step in terms of 
recognizing Macedonia under its chosen name we feel that we 
bolster that progress.75 
For the first time since the breakup of Yugoslavia, the United States had made a 
decision on recognition without consulting its European counterparts beforehand. 
The U.S. did not attempt to bring EU countries on board because it did not want to 
offend and isolate Greece, which still opposed FYROM's use of the name 
Macedonia.76 The Bush administration, however, was so determined to save the 
Ohrid agreement that it only informed the Greek government of its decision to 
disagreed on the issue. Interview, op. cit., February 25, 2005, and Interview, op. cit., March 10, 
2005. 
75 Richard Boucher, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C., 
November 4, 2004. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/37819.htm (accessed July 2006). 
76 Interview, op. cit., February 25,2005. 
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recogmze Macedonia once the decision was made, a lack of delicacy that 
infuriated Athens. However, as much as Secretary of State Colin Powell repeated 
that the V.S. decision "was not aimed at upsetting Greece", this did not prevent 
Athens from taking offence at the V.S.'s decision.77 The Greek government 
dec1ared that regardless of the V.S. stance on the issue, it would not recognize 
FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia and that it would oppose its integration in 
the EV and NATO as long as a compromise was not be reached on the name of the 
republic. 
This last episode of the saga shows that the V.S. cost-benefit analysis 
produced a different outcome than ten years earlier. It was c1early more important 
in 2004 to foster Macedonia's order and internaI cohesion than to manage 
Greece's feelings toward the issue.78 This can be explained by the fact that the 
Greek-Macedonian tension of the early 1990s, which inhibited President H.W. 
Bush from recognizing the republic, was much less significant in 2004. Indeed, as 
a result of the 1995 interim accord, Athens and Skopje had normalized their 
relations and Greece had become the largest economic investor in Macedonia in 
the second half of the 1990s. In the late 1990s, the two states also agreed to build 
an oil pipeline that crossed both states and they signed a bilateral security accord. 
Moreover, Greece had supported the Macedonian government during the 2001 
conflict against Albanian insurgents.79 This growing economic and military 
77 Patrick Quinn, "Greece Complains to the United States over Reported Macedonia Recognition", 
Associated Press, November 4,2004. Interview, op. cit., March 10,2005. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Greece offered, among other things, material support to Skopje to prevent the breakup of the 
state. See Nikolaos Zahariadis, op. cil., p. 277. 
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interdependence made any interstate conflict very unlikely, and this explains why 
this factor was no longer part of the D.S. cost-benefit analysis.8o 
The Macedonian referendum was ultimately defeated on November 7, 
2004 because of a low turnout.81 It is difficult to measure whether the D.S. 
decision to recognize Macedonia really had an impact on the referendum result. 
We can assume, however, that it did influence the outcome in a positive way since 
supporters of the proposaI to override the decentralization Iaw were fewer than 
polIs had shown the week before.82 Those who saw the D.S. move as purely 
symbolic and as a reward for Macedonia' s help during the Kosovo war and for its 
support in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 have misread the meaning of Bush's 
decision. The main objective of the American recognition was to help maintain 
Macedonia's internaI stability and to reinforce order in the whole region. This 
episode shows that, once again, recognition was a tool to foster the D.S.'s interest 
in regional stability in the Balkans and that this focus remained relatively 
consistent over the years. 
80 John Phillips, op. cit., pp. 59 and 182. 
81 The Macedonian constitution required that at least 50 percent of the population cast ballots for 
the referendum to be valid, while on1y 26 percent of the eligible voters voted. This was a major 
victory for the supporters of the Ohrid agreement. 
82 According to James Pettifer: "The great short term achievement of the American recognition 
decision is that it cut the ground from under the feet of the rejectionists in the Slavophone 
community, and reinforced the minority who are prepared to accept, if not like, the Ochrid 
Accords". See James Pettifer, Macedonia: Recognition, Referendum, Resignation, op. cit., p. 4. 
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The Second Crusade of the Greek-Americans 
Twenty-four hours after the U.S. decided to recognize the Republic of 
Macedonia, the head of the Greek-American Church, Archbishop Demetrios, sent 
a letter to President Bush asking him to revoke his decision.83 Ten days later, 
Archbishop Demetrios, accompanied by members of the Greek Orthodox 
Archdiocese and by Greek-American leaders from Boston, New York and 
Washington D.C., met with U.S. top officiaIs hoping to persuade them to change 
their mind. At the State Department, the Greek-American lobby met in private 
with Secretary Colin Powell, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, 
and with Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Elizabeth Jones.84 During the 
meeting, Powell explained that the decision to recognize the name was irrevocable 
and that the U.S. objective was not to hurt Greece. According to aState 
Department official, Secretary Powell declared: "We knew that the decision would 
create great pain to you but we had no choice. The objective was to reinforce 
stability in Macedonia".85 The Greek-American delegation then headed to the 
National Security Council to meet with National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice. Deputy National Security Advisor Fran Townsend and President Bush's 
senior political advisor Karl Rove attended the meeting. Once more, the 
Archbishop asked that the U.S. revoke its decision but he basically received the 
83 The Financial Times, "Archbishop Demetrios Asks U.S. President to Revoke Recognition of 
'Republic of Macedonia' , November 6, 2004. 
84 World Counci/ of Hellenes Abroad, "Powell and Rice Discuss Macedonian Issue with 
Archbishop Demetrios", November 15,2004. 
http://www.sae.grrEN/Nea Eidiseis/nea omogeneias in.asp?nid=37 (accessed August 2006). 
85 Interview, op. cit., February 25,2005. 
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• 
same answer from NSC top officials.86 The delegation finally went on to Capitol 
1 
Hill to meet with Greek-Americans from the House of Representatives and to 
conduct strategic meetings with Greek-American Senator Paul Sarbanes from 
Maryland. In the weeks following its visit to Washington, the Greek-American 
delegation sent numerous letters to Congress members in an ultimate attempt to 
influence the White Bouse's decision. Despite time and energy spent, the Greek-
American lobby bitterly failed to modify the U.S. recognition of the name 
Macedonia. 
ln contrast to the 1994 crusade, which led President Clinton to backtrack 
on his position, the 2004 crusade was a total failure. It is hard to know whether the 
outcome would have been different with a Greek-American adviser in President 
Bush's administration. If we use the 1994 episode as a counterfactual, however, 
we can assume that the Greek-American lobby would have been more influential 
in 2004 with a key ally like George Stephanopoulos in the White Bouse. 
Another difference between 1994 and 2004 is the election factor. There 
was a midterm Congressional election coming in 1994 and so President Clinton 
certainly did not want to alienate the Greek-American community. Whereas in 
2004, the recognition of Macedonia's constitutional name happened hours after 
President Bush's re-election and well ahead of midterm elections. This factor has 
probably influenced both administrations in their policy toward Macedonia. 1 
argue that, although secondary to the analysis, this factor should not be 
undermined. 
86 Ibid. 
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Regional Stability or Ethnie Polities? 
What can we learn from the four intra-cases presented above? First, the 
quest for regional stability was clearly the main factor guiding the O.S. foreign 
policy toward Macedonia. Recognition was initially delayed in large part because 
the republic could not guarantee its external stability (i.e. war was likely with 
Greece, which was also a U.S. ally). Then, recognition was conferred to FYROM 
in order to reduce its vulnerability toward Serbia's aggressive behavior once the 
prospect of a war with Greece became less of a concern. The constitutional name 
of the Macedonian republic was finally recognized by Washington in 2004 in an 
attempt to secure the implementation of the Ohrid agreement, which aimed to 
strengthen the internal stability of the republic and by extension prevent regional 
disorder from spreading. 
Matthew Nimetz argues that U.S. administrations made a clear connection 
between the internaI and the external dimensions of Macedonia' s stability during 
the whole saga of recognition. The first eoneern for the U.S. was the "stability of 
international borders", declares Nimetz, "then internaI stability was connected to 
it. Is this country going to be stable internally or will Macedonia enter into internaI 
black -holes without a leadership and with internal strife? [ ... ] Elements of internaI 
strife could have affected [Macedonia's] international stability because of its 
ethnie issues".87 The previous analysis precisely demonstrates that the connection 
between these two dimensions of stability guided the American response to 
Macedonia. 
87 Phone interview with Matthew Nimetz, February 18,2005. 
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This analysis also cast serious doubt on the validity of the ethnie politics 
argument to explain the V.S. behavior toward secessionist movements. The Greek 
lobby was not a major variable in the Bush administration decision to delay 
recognition in 1992. This lobby failed to prevent President Clinton from 
recognizing the independence of the republic in 1994, and failed again ten years 
later when it attempted to pressure the Bush administration to reverse its decision 
to recognize Macedonia's constitutional name. In fact, the Greek-Americans only 
had an impact on the formulation of the V.S. policy from March 1994 to 
September 1995, that is in the interlude between the American recognition of 
FYROM and the extension of diplomatie relations to the republic. We can also 
question whether the Greek-Americans would have been as successful in 1994-95 
without the help of President Clinton's senior adviser George Stephanopoulos, 
who was working from inside the White House in support of the interests of this 
ethnie community. Thus, although one would expect the ethnie argument to 
perform well in the Macedonian case because of the strength of the Greek-
American community in Washington, this study shows that this argument 
performs poorly overall. 
The Business Interest Argument 
In Chapter 4, we have seen that the Bush administration had a clear 
preference for Yugoslavia's unity, but that the business interest model developed 
by David Gibbs did not account for this inclination nor for the reversaI of policy 
that led the V.S. to recognize Croatia and Slovenia in 1992. This argument faces 
the same problem in the present case study. How could private business interests 
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explain the V.S. delay of Macedonia's recognition for almost two years, while 
Yugoslavia had already ceased to exist? 
The V.S. had no economic investment in Macedonia in the years following 
its independence. Marshall Freeman Harris, who accompanied U.S. Ambassador 
Robert Frowick to Skopje in 1992 to establish a CSCE observation mission, recalls 
that: "we were virtually the only Westerners in town" and that "there was only an 
American library in the city" to illustrate the absence of V.S. private investors in 
the republic.88 In fact, if U.S. top officiaIs would have been involved in 
multinational corporations that were interested in doing business with Macedonia, 
we can assume that the V.S. government would have been logically opposed to the 
Greek economic embargo against the republic in 1992 and in 1994. The American 
government would have also certainly been eager to recognize the independence 
of Macedonia in order to provide development aid to sustain its economy. This, 
however, did not happen. 
The business interest argument, however, was seriously raised in 2004 to 
explain the V.S. decision to recognize the constitutional name of the republic. John 
Phillips argues, for instance, that the Bush administration was really concerned 
about the stability of Macedonia because its interest lay in the construction of a 
1.13 billion dollar pipeline that would run from the Black Sea to the Adriatic to 
supply the V.S. demands for oil. Phillips writes: "American commercial interests 
in Macedonia center on a project to build a trans-Balkan pipeline designed to 
88 Marshall Freeman Harris, "Macedonia: The Next Domino?", op. cif., p. 44. 
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secure a passage for oil from the Caspian Sea".89 The project expected that the 
pipeline would run through Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia and that it would 
transport oil extracted in Central Asia. In February of 2005, three months after the 
V.S. recognition of Macedonia's constitutional name, the President and CEO of 
the Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil Corporation (AMBO), Edward Ferguson, 
indicated that he was negotiating with Exxon Mobil and Chevron Texaco to build 
the line.90 
One can, therefore, wonder whether the decision to recognize Macedonia's 
name had as its main objective the preservation of internaI stability in the republic 
in order to maintain the confidence of private investors. This argument was 
strongly refuted by State Department officials.91 It is a fact that the V.S. 
govemment ordered studies to evaluate the feasibility of the project (the U.S. 
Trade and Development Agency had published papers on the issue in May 2000), 
but the trans-Balkan pipeline project was apparently not part of the decision to 
recognize Macedonia's constitutional name.92 The project was not even raised as a 
concern when V.S. officiais debated the issue of recognition in November of 2004. 
When asked whether V. S. officiaIs had personal economic interests in corporations 
that were doing business with Macedonia in 2004, aState Department official 
replied: "You are totally off the track".93 
89 John Phillips, op. ci!., p. 62. 
90 Ibid., p. 63. 
91 Interview with aState Department official, op. cil., March 10,2005. 
92 Ibid. Interview with aState Department official, op. ci!., February 25,2005. 
93 Interview with aState Department official, op. cil., March 10,2005. 
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The constraints of space and time do not allow me to provide a definitive 
answer on whether private economic interests impacted the U.S. position on the 
constitutional name issue in 2004. This question deserves further investigation. 
This chapter demonstrates, however, that profound security issues were related to 
the survival of the Macedonian state and that these issues were at the center of the 
U.S. decision-making process. In this context, it appears very unlikely that any 
economic interests that governmental officiaIs could have had were important 
enough to influence the course ofthe D.S. decision process toward Macedonia. 
Conclusion 
At first glance, the evolution of the American policy toward Macedonia 
seems rather inconsistent. The U.S. response went from a withholding policy in 
the early 1990s to a unilateral recognition of Macedonia's constitutional name in 
2004. The analysis demonstrates, however, that defensive realism (i.e. defensive 
positionalism) shaped the foreign policy of successive D.S. administrations. It 
shows that the variations in the American response toward the Macedonian issue 
was not the result of a disparity in D.S. foreign policy interests but mainly the 
effect of the evolution of Macedonia's internaI and external stability. 
After having presented the case of Croatia and Slovenia in Chapter 4 in 
which the D.S. granted diplomatie recognition, and then presenting the Macedonia 
case, which is an instance of recognition delay, we will now tum to the American 
position toward the secession of Kosovo from Serbia, which is an interesting case 
of D.S. nonrecognition. This chapter will complete the analysis of the D.S. policy 
variation toward secessionism in the Balkan regional context. 
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6. 
Kosovo: A Case of u.s. Nonrecognition, 
1991-2005 
At this writing, Kosovo is still officially a province of Serbia.1 Its 
declaration of independence issued in 1991 has never been recognized by the 
United States or by any other state except Albania. The purpose of this chapter is 
rather straightforward. Its aim is to answer a simple question: Why has the United 
States never recognized the independence of Kosovo? Although the issue of 
Kosovo's self-determination is well documented and a large amount of literature 
has been published on the 1999 NATO intervention against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY), no research has provided a sound, comprehensible, and 
exhaustive answer to this research question. 
In the 1990s, the most common explanation as to why Western states were 
opposed to Kosovo's secession was constitutional. According to the argument, 
Kosovo did not have the constitutional right to secede because it was a province of 
Serbia rather than a Yugoslav republic. When the Yugoslav war broke out in the 
summer of 1991 and intensified in the spring of 1992, the European Community 
and the United States emphasized this legal argument and used it as a pragmatic 
tool to contain further fragmentation of the Yugoslav territory (Le. the 
fragmentation of constitutive units of the Yugoslav federation). The argument was, 
1 Here 1 use the Serbian name 'Kosovo' instead of the Albanian name 'Kosova' for two reasons: 
First, the province is still officially part of Serbia; and second, Western states still refer to the 
province as Kosovo. The spelling does not imply that the author supports one side or another. 
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however, mainly rhetorical and was more a reflection of Washington's will to 
follow the EC leadership than the expression of a weIl defined policy on the issue. 
As this chapter will demonstrate, the fact that Kosovo was part of the 
Serbian republic does not explain why the United States did not recognize its 
independence. Based on the regional stability model exposed in Chapter 3, this 
chapter makes the argument that Washington was opposed to Kosovo' s secession 
mainly for regional stability considerations. Throughout the 1990s, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslav, composed of Serbia and Montenegro, was able to avoid war 
in Kosovo and was successful at containing the conflict within its national borders. 
Although the U.S. government developed a strong bias against the regime of 
Slobodan Milosevic, Washington supported the territorial integrity of the FRY 
because stability was preserved. 
Things significantly changed, however, in 1998-99 when the Kosovo 
conflict extended outside of the FRY' s national borders as a result of the refugee 
cri sis, and when it became apparent that Belgrade was unwilling to negotiate with 
Kosovo secessionists and was opposed to third party intervention. In early 1999, 
aIl the conditions were reunited for the United States to move to the second step of 
the mode1 and to evaluate the option of the international recognition of Kosovo. 
This option, however, was quickly dismissed as the province was neither in a 
position to maintain its internaI order or to guarantee its external stability. Yet, 
since the political status quo in the region was "untenable" in the words of U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the Clinton administration relied on NATO 
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air-strikes to compel Slobodan Milosevic to accept a D.S.-Western peace plan for 
Kosovo. 
Thus, fourteen years after its unilateral declaration of independence, 
Kosovo is still struggling to obtain international recognition, while Bosnia, 
Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia were aIl recognized more than ten years ago. 
This case of nonrecognition is an interesting empirical contribution to this research 
because it represents an additional piece to the puzzle in the analysis of the 
variation of the D.S. foreign policy toward secessionism. 
It is important here to delimit the timeframe of this study as the Kosovo 
secessionist issue is still underway in contrast to previous cases studied. Since it is 
next to impossible to study a "moving target", this chapter limits the scope of the 
analysis to the 1991-2005 period and does not include recent developments on the 
Issue. 
Following a brief historical background of the Kosovo crisis and the 
presentation of the D.S. policy toward the issue, this chapter will evaluate in its 
last section the importance of D.S. ethnic lobbies in the formulation of the 
American policy toward Kosovo. On the contrary to the two previous chapters, 
however, the business interests argument will not be addressed here. The Kosovo 
crisis does not allow to validate or to refute David Gibbs's argument according to 
which American policy toward secessionist movements reflects the interest of 
corporations with which D.S. foreign policy makers share strong ties. Indeed, there 
were virtually no D.S. business interests in Serbia or in Kosovo during the 1990s. 
The disintegration ofYugoslavia, the war in Bosnia, and the Kosovo crisis, had for 
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consequence to repel D.S. private investors? Moreover, throughout most of the 
1990s, the D.S. maintained though economic sanctions against Belgrade, which 
inhibited multinational corporations from investing in the FRy.3 Thus, Kosovo is 
not a fertile ground on which the business argument can be seriously evaluated. 
The Origins ofKosovo's Secession 
The adoption of a new Yugoslav constitution in 1974 gave considerable 
political autonomy to Kosovo.4 The province, however, was never conferred the 
status of a republic mainly because ethnic Albanians, who formed the maj ority of 
the Kosovo population, were recognized as a national minority rather than as a 
Yugoslav nation.5 Despite this, Serbia perceived Kosovo's constitutional gains as a 
politicalloss over its own republican affairs.6 
2 Interview with James O'Brien, Washington D.C., April 12, 2005. Phone interview with Daniel 
Hamilton, April 11, 2005. 
3 Ibid. 
4 The province had representation in the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly, and had veto 
power on federal decisions that affected its future. This recognition provided Kosovo with similar 
rights as the six republics. See Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's 
War to Save Kosovo, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p. 9. 
According to a 1981 census, ethnic Albanians composed approximately 78 percent of the Kosovo 
population. See Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, 
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 340. 
5 In the post-world war II era, Yugoslav leaders decided that ethnic Albanians of Yugoslavia were 
not entitle to the status of a constitutive nation of the federation because Albania was the nation of 
aU ethnic Aibanians. Richard CapIan, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo", 
International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, 1998, p. 748. The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution indicated that 
the Albanians of Kosovo and the Hungarians ofVojvodina were regarded as "nationalities" and did 
not have a right of self-determination or secession under the Constitution on the contrary to the six 
nations of Yugoslavia. See Roland Rich, "Symposium: Recent Development in the Practice of 
State Recognition", European Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, p. 39. 
6 See Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998, p. 178. 
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Tensions rose in the 1980s hetween the ethnie Alhanian majority-who 
controlled Kosovo's political institutions-and Kosovo Serhs. Ethnie Alhanians 
wanted Kosovo to he recognized as a full Yugoslav republic, while Kosovo Serbs 
argued that they were discriminated and repressed by the Albanian-dominated 
authorities. These political tensions were further intensified by the political 
ascension of Slobodan Milosevic who became President of Serbia in 1987. 
Milosevic made himself the defender of the Serbian minority of Kosovo and 
engaged his regime in a re-conquest of Serbia's control over the autonomous 
province. In 1989, the Kosovo Assembly was forced to vote for a constitutional 
amendment that revoked the autonomy of the province.7 Milosevic argued that the 
intervention of Serhia within Kosovo's internaI affairs was necessary to counter 
Alhanian separatism and to end the Alhanian repression of the Serbs.8 
The decision to repeal Kosovo' s autonomy initiated a sequence of events 
that further antagonized Serhs and Alhanians. In July of 1990, the provincial 
Assemhly of Kosovo unilaterally declared the province an independent Yugoslav 
repuhlic.9 What is unusual here is that Kosovo Alhanians attempted to secede from 
7 On the day of the vote, the Kosovo Assembly was surrounded by Serbian tanks and police 
officers. See Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, 
p. 56. Kosovo and Vojvodina were the two autonomous republics of Serbia. They both lost their 
autonomous status in 1989. 
8 Ibid., p. 235. Serbia's constitutional reform allowed Belgrade to directly intervene in Kosovo's 
security, financial, judicial, and social policies. Kosovo continued to exist officially as a distinct 
province, but the coup had undermined its status ofbeing a federal unit in Yugoslavia. 
With tight political control over Kosovo, Vojvodina (the other autonomous province of Serbia that 
lost its autonomy), and over the small Slavic neighboring republic of Montenegro, Milosevic 
became in the late 1980s the most powerfulleader of Yugoslavia by controlling half of the votes on 
the Yugoslav federal presidency. The other votes on the federal council were those of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Siovenia. 
9 Milan Andrejevich, "Kosovo: A Precarious Balance between Stability and Civil War", Report on 
Eastern Europe, RFEIRL Research Institute, Vol. 2, No. 42, October 18, 1991, p. 26. 
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a federated state (Serbia) rather than from the federation. Secession was not used 
as a means to achieve independent statehood but rather to reach equality with the 
other republics. 10 
Belgrade reacted to the secessionist attempt by dissolving the provincial 
government of Kosovo and by taking executive and administrative control of the 
province. A new Serbian constitution was also adopte d, which defined Kosovo as 
a region within the Serbian Republic. 11 This led Kosovo Albanian deputies in exile 
to create the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, which had its headquarter in 
Zagreb (Croatia).12 Kosovo Albanians also launched a campaign of civil 
disobedience and refused to be involved in the official state structures controlled 
by Belgrade. The Democratie League of Kosovo (LDK) , headed by Ibrahim 
Rugova, put in place a set of parallel institutions (inc1uding schools, hospitals, and 
local governments) that coexisted with the official state structure. 13 Although these 
institutions were declared illegal, Milosevic never used force to bring them down 
10 This rather unusual decision can partly be explained by the fact that an outright dec1aration of 
secession from Yugoslavia would have provided Serbia with the legitimacy and the excuse to crush 
Kosovars' aspirations. See Tim Judah, op. cif., p. 65. 
11 Michael Salla, "Kosovo, Non-Violence and the Break-up of Yugoslavia", Security Dialogue, 
Vol. 26, No. 4, 1995, p. 428. The province ofVojvodina a1so 10st its autonomy. Vojvodina counted 
around 25 percent of ethnic Hungarians and the large majority of its population was Serbian. This 
is far different from Kosovo, which had nearly 90 percent of ethnic Albanians in the early 1990s. 
12 The Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo in Zagreb adopted a constitution that proclaimed 
Kosovo a Yugoslav Republic. Albanian deputies in exile went to Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, 
Turkey, Western Europe and the United States. See Milan Andrejevich, op. cif., p. 27. 
13 ln the 1990s, Ibrahim Rugova was elected and reelected President of Kosovo. Belgrade, 
however, has never recognized the legality of these elections. See Julie Mertus, "Will Kosovo 
Explode Next?", The New York Times, October 21, 1995. 
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mainly because the disobedience movement was peaceful and, therefore, Belgrade 
was able to keep control of the province without military intervention.14 
The reason why Kosovar secessionists remained peaceful was pragmatic. 
On the contrary to Croatia or Slovenia, for instance, Kosovo had no republican 
army to defend itself. The use of violence against Serbia to achieve independence 
would then have been counter productive and even suicidaI. As Rugova explained: 
We are not certain how strong the Serbian military presence in the 
province actually is, but we do know that it is overwhelming and 
that we have nothing to set against the tanks and other modem 
weaponry in Serbian hands. [ ... ] In fact, the Serbs only wait for a 
pretext to atiack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We 
believe it is betier to do nothing and stay alive than to be 
massacred. 15 
The disintegration ofYugoslavia, however, which began with the secession 
of Croatia and Slovenia in the summer of 1991, radically modified the political 
calculation of Kosovo Albanians. With the departure of the northem republics, 
there was no longer a counter weight to Serbia's political power. In this context, 
members of the Kosovo Assembly in exile in Croatia adopted a declaration of 
independence from the rump Yugoslav federation, and in late September of 1991, 
the assembly organized a non-authorized referendum across Kosovo to validate the 
declaration. Among the 87 percent of Kosovars who cast ballot, 99.87 percent 
14 The movement headed by Ibrahim Rugova was one of the most important peaceful resistance 
movements since Gandhi's resistance to British colonialism in India and Martin Luther King's civil 
rights movements in the United States. In a cable sent to the State Department, however, the U.S. 
Embassy in Belgrade mentioned: "This precarious balance [between Kosovo and Serbia] is based 
on fear, however, and could crumb le quickly if extremists on either side push too hard". U.S. 
Department of State, August 1992. Unclassified Document E53, case 200502018. Unclassified on 
December 13, 2005. 
IS Tim Judah, op. cit., p. 61. 
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voted for independence. 16 Belgrade immediately declared that the referendum was 
unconstitutional and that the declaration of independence was null and void. 
Despite Serbia's opposition, the Assembly of Kosovo officially declared the 
independence of the province in October of 1991. A few days later, Albania 
became the first (and only) state to recognize Kosovo independence. 
The V.S. Response: No to Kosovo's Secession but No to Serbian Aggression 
The Bush administration initially followed the European Community' s 
leadership and rejected Kosovo's request for international recognition. 17 The 
argument put forward by Brussels, which was supported by the conclusions of the 
Badinter Commission, was that Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia rather than a 
constituent republic of the Yugoslav federation and therefore that it did not have 
the right to secede. 18 
As stated in the introduction, this legal argument was used as a tool to 
avoid the endless division of the Yugoslav territory. According to a top advisor to 
President Clinton and to Secretary of State Albright for Kosovo, "it was easy to 
16 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 347. 
17 In the early 1990s, the United States focused its attention on the Persian Gulf, on the Soviet 
disintegration, and on the German reunification. These major international events led the United 
States to follow the leadership of the European Community on the whole Yugoslav issue. 
18 Miranda Vickers, op. cil., p. 252. This double standard based on the internationallaw principle of 
uti possidetis juris served Brussels and Washington's diplomatie objectives of containing the war 
in Yugoslavia and stopping the endless division of Yugoslav republics. According to uti possidetis 
juris, the former boundaries of the constitutive units of astate become international borders 
protected by international law when the central state ceases to exist. This princip le has for aim to 
protect the territorial integrity of states by avoiding the endless division of their territory. Thus, the 
six Yugoslav republics had a right to secede and to transform their national borders into 
international ones. Kosovo, however, which had the status of an autonomous province, had no right 
to break apart from Serbia. See Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the 
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base a decision on the fact that Kosovo was different from the Yugoslav republics. 
[ ... ] It was a convenient way ofmaking a distinction, which served a purpose".19 
The United States, however, adopted a more pro active approach toward the 
Yugoslav crisis when the conflict in Croatia spread to Bosnia and expended the 
zone of instability. The American position, which until then echoed the EC legal 
assessment of the right of each Yugoslav republic to secede, was replaced by a 
more geostrategic and pragmatic assessment of the conflict. In the spring of 1992, 
the main questions that were tackled by the National Security Council and the 
State Department were how to terminate the war in Yugoslavia and how to 
stabilize the Balkan region. It is with these puzzles in mind that the United States 
approached the Kosovo crisis. 
FRY Keeps Externat Stability 
In the faH of 1992, the Bush administration evaluated the FRY's internai 
and external stability. Although Belgrade was using politicaI repression against 
Kosovo Albanians and deprived them from their basic constitutional rights, Serbia 
was able to contain the effects of the Kosovar secessionist crisis within its national 
borders. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright writes in her memoir: "Kosovo 
was extremely tense but not at war".20 Slobodan Milosevic was also able to 
preserve FRY's external stability. There was no flow of Kosovo-Albanian 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, 
No. 3, 1992, p. 86. 
19 Interview with a former V.S. official who asked to remain anonymous. Virginia, April 28, 2005. 
20 Madeleine Albright, with Bill Woodward, Madam Secretary: A Memoir, New York: The Easton 
Press, 2003, p. 483. 
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refugees crossing international borders (unlike in Bosnia and Croatia) or any other 
type of interstate disruption. 
As a host state, the FRY succeeded where the former Yugoslav federation 
had failed III 1991. As seen in chapter 4, the Yugoslav People's Army had 
intervened to prevent the secession of Croatia and Slovenia. This response 
provoked internaI disorder (especially in Croatia) and external instability as a large 
number ofrefugees crossed the border to find safe haven in Hungary, Austria, and 
Germany. In the case of the FRY, the declaration of independence of Kosovo did 
not produce war or significant disruption. As a result, the D.S. maintained its 
support for FRY. 
Moreover, the idea of recognizing Kosovo's independence was perceived 
as the worst option for regional stability. In a region where ethnicity and borders 
did not match, the cohesion and survival of the states surrounding Kosovo (i.e. 
Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia) became a central geopolitical concem in 
Washington, and the recognition of Kosovo was perceived as a threat to the 
cohesion of neighboring states. In a cable sent to the D.S. Embassy in Belgrade, 
Secretary of State Eagleburger wrote: "While there is terrible human suffering in 
Bosnia, Kosovo exceeds its potential for destabilizing the area beyond former-
Yugoslavia's borders. The D.S. supports restoration of Kosovo's autonomy, but is 
not in favor of independence". Then he added: "nothing should be done that would 
encourage the Kosovars to rebel. They would be crushed".21 In addition to 
Secretary Eagleburger's opposition to Kosovo's independence, the D.S. embassy 
21 U.S. Department of State, December 1992. UncIassified Document E15, case 200502018. 
Unclassified on November 29,2005. 
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in Belgrade concluded in an anaIysis that: "a shift in Western policy to support 
Kosovo independence [ ... ] could embolden Albanian extremists and/or trigger an 
irrational response from Milosevic (or local Serb extremists) that would have the 
support ofmost Serbs and provoke the feared confrontation".22 
The White House aIso made clear that it was firmly opposed to Serbia's 
military repression against Kosovo Albanians?3 In late December of 1992, the 
U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger sent a waming message to Serbian 
President Milosevic-known as the Christmas Waming-in which he informed 
Belgrade that the United States would not hesitate to use force against Serbia if it 
ever use military repression against Kosovo.24 This waming, which became an 
integral part of the V.S. policy toward Kosovo, was reaffirmed by Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher a few weeks after President Clinton took office. 
Christopher declared: "We remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the 
event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serb action".25 The destabilizing effect of a 
22 U.S. Department of State, December 1992. Unclassified Document E45, case 200502018. 
Unclassified on November 30, 2005. 
23 The U.s. position was clearly exposed by Under Secretary Kanter to Kosovo secessionist 
authorities in October 1992. Kanter indicated that "while the United States government does not 
recognize Kosovo as an independent state, we calI on Serbian authorities in the strongest terms to 
cease repression of the ethnie Albanians of Kosovo not to engage in the use of force, and to restore 
all the elements of autonomy which were taken away from Kosovo in 1989". U.S. Department of 
State, August 1992. Unclassified Document E16, case 200502018. Unclassified on December 14, 
2005. 
24 The cable warning was sent to the V.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade. The cable was 
accompanied by an instruction that the message be read to Milosevic 'verbatim, without 
elaboration, and face to face'. See Tim Judah, op. cit., pp. 73-74. The U.S. government possessed 
credible information according to which Slobodan Milosevic was planning a military intervention 
to crush the Albanian secessionist movement. See Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International 
Community, New York: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2002, p. 34. 
25 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, op. cit., p. 9. 
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potential Serbian attack against Kosovo was seen in Washington as a direct threat 
to the stability of the Balkans and, therefore, to the stability of the European 
continent, which the U.S. viewed as a vital national interest. The Christmas 
Waming was, therefore, purely motivated by regional stability motives rather than 
by human right principles. 
Thus, both the secession of Kosovo and Serbia' s military crackdown in the 
province to prevent independence would have destabilized Kosovo and probably 
inflamed the whole southem region of the Balkans. The "no to secession but no to 
aggression" policy reflected one of the main geostrategic concems of the United 
States in the 1990s: avoiding the diffusion of the Kosovo conflict to surrounding 
states. This fear was expressed weIl by David C. Gompert who served as the 
special assistant to President Bush and as the senior director for Europe and 
Eurasia on the National Security Council: 
Washington feared that a Serbian assault against the Albanian 
Kosovars would consume the entire Southem Balkan region in a 
conflagration that would pit one NATO ally against another. 
Hostilities in Kosovo would probably spill into Albania proper. 
This in turn could incite the large Albanian minority in Macedonia 
and lead to Serbia or Greek intervention there. Bulgaria and Turkey 
would then feel pressure to act in order to prevent Greek control of 
Macedonia. Where the Bosnian war could be contained, conflict in 
Kosovo most likely could not.26 
The Clinton administration made a very similar assessment of the potential turmoil 
in the region. Elizabeth Drew who was a member of the first Clinton 
administration writes: 
26 David C. Gompert, "The United States and Yugoslavia's Wars", in Richard H. Ullman, (ed.), 
The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, New York: A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1996, pp. 
136-137. 
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OfficiaIs believed that if Serbia, which hadn't been stopped in 
Croatia, exacerbated the situation in Kosovo, with its majority 
population of Albanians, or moved on Macedonia, which borders 
Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece, the Albanians, the Greeks, 
and the Turks wouldn't sit by.27 
The warning message certainly had an impact on Belgrade's treatment of 
Kosovo since no attack was launch against ethnie Albanians from 1992 to 1998. It 
is hard, however, to measure the real impact of it since we do not know how 
Milosevic would have behaved otherwise. What we know is that the absence of 
Serbia's military intervention in Kosovo cannot be sole1y attributed to the U.S. 
military threat in this respect. Serbia was already militarily involved in Croatia and 
Bosnia and the opening of a third military front in Kosovo would have been 
difficult to manage.28 The peaceful resistance movement that emerged in Kosovo 
in the early 1990s also allowed Serbia to maintain internaI stability without having 
to rely on force. 
The case of Kosovo is therefore different from those of Croatia and 
Slovenia where the United States quickly moved to the second step of the model 
by recognizing their independence. In this case, the ability of the FRY to maintain 
stable international borders, the absence of Serbia's military crackdown in the 
province and Rugova' s peaceful resistance movement for independence explain 
why the D.S. kept supporting the FRY's territorial integrity. Sorne members of the 
Bush administration also feared that the recognition of Kosovo would have created 
27 See Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1994, pp. 147-148. 
28 As the American Embassy in Belgrade summarized in a cable sent to the State Department: "for 
now both sides have a vested interest in avoiding bloodshed-the Serbs cannot afford another front 
right now and the Albanians do not want to face a massacre". U .S. Department of State, September 
1992. Unclassified Document E49, case 200502018. Unclassified on December 13,2005. 
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a precedent that would have further destabilized the region by bolstering other 
secessionist movements such as the Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia who sought the 
international recognition oftheir independence.29 
This unique combination of factors also explains why Kosovo received 
relatively little attention from Washington for most of the 1990s in comparison to 
Croatia or Bosnia. As Tim Judah explains: "Kosovo was always just an after-
thought. It was the place that the diplomats knew they should do something aboùt, 
but were not sure what and anyway had more important things to dO".30 
Throughout the 1990s, the Bush and the Clinton administration avoided taking 
concrete actions in Kosovo that could have generated regional disorder. They 
estimated that it was better to do nothing than risk causing violence in the province 
and the region by intervening in one way or another. 
The following example illustrates the attitude adopted by the V.S 
throughout most of the 1990s. In June of 1993, a CSCE report indicated that the 
FRY was using brutality against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Belgrade reacted to 
this report by expelling the CSCE mission. Despite the alarming report and despite 
Milosevic's refusaI to cooperate any further with the CSCE, the V.S. maintained a 
soft Hne toward Belgrade. The Christmas Warning was not carried out mainly 
because Serbia's behavior toward ethnic Albanians, although high reprehensible, 
did not produce war in Kosovo or external turmoil in the region. President Clinton, 
therefore, limited his comments to indicating that his administration supported the 
29 Richard CapIan, op. cit., p. 755. 
30 Ibid., p. 92. 
179 
/ 
The Nonrecognition of Kosovo 
reestablishment of the CSCE Mission in Kosovo, and announcmg economlC 
assistance to the province.3i As Alex Bellamy, who has written on third states 
intervention in Kosovo, argues: "Because there was no violent conflict in Kosovo 
its future was viewed as a priee worth paying for peace in the western Balkans".32 
In a document entitled "U.S. Policy on Kosovo" sent by the State 
Department to U.S. Embassies in the Balkans in the summer of 1993, the 
Department clearly exposed its policy on Kosovo: 
We have been concemed about the situation in Kosovo because of longstanding tensions 
there arising from Serb repression of ethnic Albanian Kosovars and because of the high 
risk of conflict there spreading into-or involving-neighboring countries which have 
Albanian populations. 
We seek to deter the Serbs from taking violent action in Kosovo. President Bush's 
"Christmas" message to Milosevic was specifie and clear: We are prepared to respond 
against Serbia in the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. 
In our frequent contacts with Albanian Kosovar leaders such as Dr. Bukoshi and Dr. 
Rugova, we have made clear that they must continue to exercise caution in their approach 
to the Serbian and "FRY" govemments so as not to provide Serbian authorities an excuse 
to initiate a violent crackdown. We also have made clear repeatedly that we do not support 
their independence.33 
This document shows that the United States was concerned by the FRY's 
potential external instability that could have been caused by Serbia's military 
crackdown in Kosovo. The Christmas Waming clearly underlined the American 
concem to that respect. As for the issue of independence, once again it was 
categorically rejected. 
31 Alex J. Bellamy, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 
32 Ibid., p. 65. The U.S. Congress had a different view on the issue and human right violations in 
the former Yugoslavia raised serious concem among Congress members. As in the case of Croatia 
and Slovenia, the U.S. Congress focused on princip les of human rights and self-determination, 
while the executive branch of govemment was fIfst and foremost concemed with systemic 
considerations such as peace and regional stability in the Balkans. 
33 U.S. Department ofState, July 1993. Unclassified Document E28, case 200502018. Unclassified 
on November 29,2005. 
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Toward the FRY's InternaI and External Instability 
The Dayton peace agreements which brought the Yugoslav wars to an end 
had the ironic effect of radicalizing the Kosovo secessionist movement. Since the 
success of the agreement depended in large part on Slobodan Milosevic's good 
faith and willingness to negotiate with his Croatian and Bosnian counterparts, 
Chief American negotiator Richard Holbrooke and U.S. General Wesley Clark 
agreed to exclude the issue of Kosovo from the peace talks as requested by 
Milosevic. This political concession from the part of the United States facilitated 
negotiations and helped to reach peace in Bosnia. 
The fact that Kosovo representatives were muzzled at Dayton was 
perceived in Pristina as an act of betrayal and contributed to radicalizing the 
secessionist movement. The Dayton episode demonstrated that Ibrahim Rugova 
was unable to make tangible progress toward independence and international 
recognition. Hence, Rugova gradually lost credibility among his people and a 
growing number of Kosovars became convinced that armed resistance was the 
only way to achieve independence.34 These events favored the emergence of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
In 1996 the KLA launched several attacks against Serbian police officers 
and ethnic Serb civilians and this served as a pretext for Milosevic to launch 
military operations in the province. Soon, the relative state of peace that had 
34 This opinion was enhanced by the fact that the Bosnian-Serbs who had used force against 
Bosnian-Croats and Muslims in their fight for independence had gained significant concessions at 
Dayton. The Dayton Peace Accord created two political entities within Bosnia-Herzegovina: the 
Bosnian-Croatian Federation and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia (Republika Srpska). Bosnian-
Serbs obtained control of a large part of Bosnia-Herzegovina (49 percent of the territory) and got 
control oftheir own political system. 
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existed in Kosovo sinee 1991 was transformed into a state of reeurrent mutual 
aggression between ethnie Albanians and Serbian troops. 
FRY Becames an Obstacle ta Regional Stability 
As mutual atlaeks between Serbian troops and members of the KLA 
beeame frequent in the fall of 1997, the International Contact Group-a 
transatlantic group of govemment officiaIs composed of the United States, Russia, 
England, France, Germany and Italy-urged Belgrade to negotiate with Kosovo 
secessionists, to allow the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) to send an observation mission in Kosovo and Vojvodina, and to grant a 
special status to KoSOVO.35 The Contact Group dec1ared: "We do not support 
independence and we do not support maintenance of the status quo. We support an 
enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRy',,36 Belgrade, however, rejected the 
demands formulated by the Contact Group and argued that the issue of Kosovo 
was an internaI affair and nobody else's business. Milosevic refused to adopt a 
conciliating approach toward Kosovo arguing that KLA members were pursuing a 
full-fledged civil war to obtain independence.37 As a result, Belgrade maintained 
35 Marie-Janine Calic, "Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Account", in Albrecht 
Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, (eds.), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention, 
New York: United Nations University Press, 2000, p. 28. 
36 See Dick Leurdijk and Dick Zandee, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis, Burlington: Ashgate 
Editions, 2001, p. 29. This position was reiterated several times by the State Department. See The 
New York Times, "U.S. Reinstates Sanctions", March 6, 1998. 
37 It is worth noting that the KLA had been listed as a terrorist organization by the State 
Department in 1998, which placed the U.S. administration in a difficult position. 
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military repression on Kosovo secessionists and the province gradually fall into a 
state ofwar in early 1998.38 
In the United States, the State Department and the Department of Defense 
(DoD) debated whether to update President Bush's 1992 Christmas Warning. 
According to a Clinton administration official: "The United States' view remains 
the same as it was in December 1992-that we're not going to sit back and accept 
a major Serb military operation in Kosovo".39 Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright condemned Belgrade for the instability and violence in Kosovo and made 
clear that Slobodan Milosevic had to accept third party mediation or that otherwise 
he would face reprisals.4o Albright declared: "Kosovo had implications for the 
entire region. We could not allow the Serbs to define it as purely internaI 
matter".41 The Secretary also told the international press that she did not want "a 
repeat of 1991 [ ... ] when the international community did not react with sufficient 
vigor and force [toward the Yugoslav crisiS]".42 
In addition to the increasing internaI disorder within Kosovo, the 
govemment of the FRY gradually lost control over its external stability. In June of 
1998, after the KLA had seized about 40 percent of Kosovo's territory, Belgrade 
38 See Chris Hedges, "Serbia's Police Crush Protest By Kosovo's Ethnie Albanians", The New York 
Times, March 3, 1998. 
39 See Philip Shenon, "U.S. Says It Might Consider Attacking Serbs", The New York Times, March 
13,1998. 
40 Slobodan MiIosevic was President of Serbia from 1987 to 1997 and President of the Federal 
Republic ofYugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. 
41 Madeleine Albright, with Bill Woodward, op. cit., p. 485. 
42 Steven Erlanger, "U.S. and Allies Set Sanctions on Yugoslavia", The New York Times, March 9, 
1998. 
183 
1 
The Nonrecognition of Kosovo 
launched an attack against Albanians with tanks and helicopters to crush the 
secessionist movement. This action produced more than 100,000 Albanian 
refugees who flee to Albania and Macedonia to escape the war. By the faH, the 
V.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were around 90,000 
Kosovo refugees in neighboring states.43 By the end of the year, Serbia's military 
intervention had produced an international refugee crisis that disrupted the entire 
southern Balkan region. The effect of the crisis was particularly felt in Macedonia 
where the large amount of Kosovo Albanian refugees threatened to modify the 
ethnic composition of the country. Macedonian authorities were worried that more 
Albanians would lead to more political demands from their part and to a stronger 
claim for the creation of a Greater Albania, which would imperil the very survival 
of the Macedonian state.44 
The war in Kosovo really became a V.S. top priority in the faH of 1998 
once it became clear that the govemment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
refused to negotiate with secessionists and failed to keep its external stability. The 
Clinton administration was highly concerned that the situation in Kosovo could 
end up being a repetition of the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. Secretary Albright 
declared: "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in 
43 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to 
Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, Ottawa: The International Development Research 
Centre, 2001, p. 113. 
44 Albania's independence was recognized by Western powers in 1913. However, the state included 
only half of the Albanian population of the Balkans. Large Albanian minorities remained in the 
western part of Macedonia and in Kosovo. This is a patent example where political and ethnie 
borders do not match. 
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Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia". 45 At this stage, 
coercive diplomacy was perceived as the only credible option available to resolve 
the issue. 
Christopher Hill, the V.S. ambassador to Macedonia who worked closely 
with Richard Holbrooke to end the war in Bosnia in 1995, was then appointed 
special envoy to Kosovo. His mission was to find a political settlement to the 
crisis. Hill came up with a proposaI calling for a cease-fire, for the withdrawal of 
Serbian police and FRY military forces from Kosovo, and for the return of Kosovo 
Albanian refugees in the province. The plan was backed by the threat of a NATO 
military intervention in the event where Milosevic refused to comply with V.S. 
demands. Acting under the threat of air strikes, Milosevic agreed to reduce the 
number of Serbian military forces in the province and allow 1800 international 
observers to enter the province under the supervision of the OSCE.46 
This agreement eventually failed, however, because Kosovo's shadow 
government and KLA representatives were not bound by the accord. In fact, 
secessionists quickly took advantage of the fact that Milosevic was constrained by 
NATO to intensif y their military campaign against Serbian troops in Kosovo. 
These actions caused fighting to resume and led to the collapse of the agreement. 
Albanian secessionists were cleady responsible for the failure of the accord and in 
early 1999 the V.S. and Western Europe were back to square one as far as 
diplomatie initiatives were concerned. 
45 Madeleine Albright, with Bill Woodward, op. cU., p. 485. 
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The Use of Force as a Last Resort 
With the assistance of Madeleine Albright's closest advisor, James 
O'Brien, U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill elaborated a new plan in early 1999, 
which attempted to reconcile the interests of Belgrade and Pristina. The Hill-
O'Brien proposaI, which was introduced and debated at Rambouillet (near Paris), 
specified that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia but that it would enjoy a large 
degree of self-determination. The plan also included the deployment of an 
international implementation force with a large NATO military component to 
enforce the agreement. The proposal finally called for a three year interim period 
before the issue of Kosovo's independence would be addressed. The option of 
independence remained on the table mainly to please Kosovo Albanians and to 
insure their cooperation.47 Kosovo representatives approved the proposal but the 
Serbs, this time, rejected it because they refused any deployment of foreign forces 
on their territory. 
The failure of this "last chance" accord sealed the faith of the FRY. The 
Milosevic regime was identified as the main obstacle to the reestablishment of 
stability in Kosovo and, in March of 1999, NATO began its strikes (Operation 
Allied Force) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The purpose of the war 
was to compel Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet terms. The NATO campaign 
46 As a result of Serbia's compliance to the U.S. requirements, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright suspended U.S. threat to use force against Belgrade without lifting, however, the order 
authorizing NATO air strikes. 
47 Because Kosovo Albanians repeatedly asked for a referendum on independence, the U.S. 
consented during the Rambouillet negotiations to write a letter to the Albanian delegation 
promising a referendum after three years. 
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was in fact the multilateral application of the Christmas Waming issued six years 
earlier by President Bush. 
Kosovo Failed the Test of Stability 
The question ofwhether Kosovo's independence should be recognized was 
then raised within the U.S. foreign policy apparatus but was never seriously 
debated.48 A consensus already existed on the fact that Kosovo did not possess the 
necessary attributes to be recognized as a sovereign state, and the State 
Department and the NSC agreed that recognition would create more problems that 
it would resolve. 
First, Kosovo Albanians were not in a position to keep the internaI stability 
of their province. The province had no viable state structure and offered no 
guarantee that the Serbian minority would be represented in, and protected by, 
Kosovo's institutions.49 Moreover, Kosovo did not possess coercive capacities. It 
did not have a national army to defend itself against Serbia, and the United States 
was not interested to send troops in Kosovo against active Serbian opposition in 
order to secure its independence.5o 
The international borders of Kosovo constituted another problem. Serbia 
and Macedonia had not delimited their common border when Yugoslavia broke 
48 Washington was no longer preoccupied by the precedent that the recognition of Kosovo could 
have created since both Serbian secessionist movements in Croatia and Bosnia had been settled. 
The Croatian army had expelled its Serbian minority out of Croatia in late 1995, and the Dayton 
accords provided the Serbs of Bosnia with substantial autonomy within Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
49 Phone interview with Daniel Hamilton, April 11, 2005. 
50 This point was raised by James O'Brien who negotiated the Rambouillet agreement in 1998-99. 
See interview with James O'Brien, Washington D.C., April 12,2005. 
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out in 1991. As a result, the southern frontier of Kosovo, which bordered 
Macedonia, was still not officially demarcated.51 James O'Brien who negotiated 
the Rambouillet agreements in 1998-99 points out: 
[Kosovo] had none of the attributes of astate. It didn't have 
recognized international boundaries. It didn't have control over its 
territory. It didn't have the ability to secure its borders. And it 
didn't have a govemment of its own. It had elected a shadow 
govemment and established quite remarkable shadow institutions, 
but it did not have any of the attributes. This is part of why no 
govemment considered seriously recognizing a Kosovo 
independent state.52 
Second, Kosovo failed to guarantee its external stability. There was a real concern 
in the Clinton administration that the recognition of Kosovo would be the first step 
toward the creation of a Greater Albania. According to a 1995 survey, 43 percent 
of Kosovo Albanians had expressed their desire to join Albania rather than to 
obtain independence.53 In addition, KLA representatives had declared in early 
1998 that its ann struggle against Serbia had for main objective to unify Kosovo 
and Albania.54 This was a clear indication that Kosovo Albanians would have not 
restricted their political ambitions to the national borders of Kosovo. Daniel 
Hamilton, who acted as the D.S. Special Coordinator for Southeast European 
Stabilization in the late 1990s, emphasized this problem: "If you listen to sorne of 
the more extreme elements in Kosovo, recognition was simply the first step toward 
51 The frontier was finally demarcated in 2001 following an agreement between Serbia-Montenegro 
(formerly FRY) and Macedonia. 
52 Interview with James O'Brien, Washington D.C., April 12, 2005. 
53 The remaining 57 percent desired independence. See Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, 
op. cit. p. 8. 
54 Duncan Perry, "Kosovo", Current History, March 1998, Vol. 97, No. 617, p. 122. 
188 
! i\ j 
1 
The Nonrecognition of Kosovo 
a greater Albania, which would have gone far beyond the borders of a Kosovar 
state".55 This point ofview is also shared by a former high-rank U.S. official: "The 
ideologues who have talked about a greater Albania were a great concern. And the 
fear ofborders being redrawn by force or by coercion was a real fear".56 
While international recognition had been used by the United States as a 
political tool to reinforce regional stability in Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, it 
was viewed in Kosovo as a stimulus for greater disorder and bloodshed. As former 
President Clinton's advisor on Kosovo argues: "The reason why we didn't and still 
haven't recognized Kosovo was largely a result of our analysis of the likely 
consequences of such a step for stability in the Balkans. [ ... ] The analysis was that 
the recognition of Kosovo's independence would create more conflict, more 
violence, and more confrontation in the region". 57 Secretary Albright emphasized 
this stability concern before the u.s. Institute of Peace a month before NATO 
launched its military campaign. She declared: "The KLA, as it is known, offers a 
deceptive simple answer to the tragedy of Kosovo-independence from the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But there is no guarantee that independence 
would lead to peace in Kosovo and ample reason to fear that it could undermine 
stability elsewhere in the region".58 
55 Phone interview with Daniel Hamilton, April Il, 2005. 
56 Interview with a former U.S. official who asked to remain anonymous. Virginia, April 28, 2005. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Madeleine Albright, "The Importance of Kosovo", U.S. Department olState Dispatch, Vol. 10, 
No. 1, January/February 1999, p. 4. 
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Third, the opposition of the European Union to the independence of 
Kosovo was another element in the u.s. ca1culation. Brussels refused the 
emergence of a new Muslim state at the door step of Western Europe. 
Furthermore, Southern Balkan states with Albanian minorities such as Macedonia 
and Greece saw the recognition of Kosovo as a threat to their national unit y 
because it was susceptible to bolstering the idea of a Greater Albania. In her 
memoir, Madeleine Albright writes: 
Our reluctance to endorse independence was shaped less by 
principle than by a pragmatic assessment of attitudes in the region. 
Macedonia and Greece strongly opposed independence for Kosovo 
because they feared it might inflame separatist ambitions within 
their own ethnic Albanian populations. [ ... ] More generally, sorne 
Europeans feared that an independent Kosovo would become a 
hotbed of Islamic extremism and organized crime. We couldn't 
achieve our goals in Kosovo without support from Europe, and we 
wouldn't have Europe's support if we backed independence for 
Kosovo.59 
The fact that European allies were opposed to Kosovo's independence probably 
dissuaded the Clinton administration from looking farther into that direction. The 
U.S. didnot want to be isolated on the issue and was not ready to accept alone the 
consequences of recognition. This point, however, appears less convincing than 
the two previous arguments presented above. It seems that the U.S. did not 
promote the independence of Kosovo not mainly because the European Union 
opposed it, but because the province was a hopeless case for independence, for 
which it was not worth fighting for. It would have been pointless to persuade 
Brussels on the need to recognize Kosovo if the secessionists were a priori unable 
to guarantee the internaI and the external stability of their province. We can 
59 Madeleine Albright, with Bill Woodward, op. cit., p. 490. 
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assume, however, that if Kosovo would have been stable (i.e. functioning 
institutions, arm forces, defined territory, minority rights) and if the unification 
with Albania would not have been an argument for independence, the U.S. would 
have probably considered recognition and tried to convince its European 
counterparts to accept it. After aIl, Chapters 4 and 5 show that Germany 
unilaterally recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 despite 
Washington's opposition, and Greece succeeded at preventing the EC and the U.S. 
from recognizing the independence of Macedonia in 1992. If two middle powers 
like Germany and Greece were able to influence Washington and Brussels' s 
foreign policy to this regard, we can assume that the U.S. superpower would have 
succeeded at influencing Brussels on the necessity to recognize Kosovo. 
Madeleine Albright's determination to use force against Serbia despite 
Brussels's initial reluctance is a good example showing that the U.S. did not bow 
to European opposition. In 1998-99, Secretary Albright was indeed able to 
convince the 19 NATO members to intervene militarily in Serbia's internaI affairs. 
In sum, the Serbian host state represented a major obstacle to regional 
stability but Kosovo was not recognized because it was not in a position to ensure 
its own stability. As Morton Abramovitz bluntly points out, the United States did 
not recognize Kosovo "because it wanted to end the war and it didn't feel that it 
could end it if it had recognized independence".60 In this context, a U.S.-Ied 
NATO intervention appeared to be the only viable option to move forward toward 
60 Interview with Morton Abramovitz, Washington D.C., May 2nd, 2005. 
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peace and stability in the Balkans. The NATO air campaign lasted 78 days until 
Milosevic consented to the terms of the Rambouillet proposaI. 
Kosovo: Between Secession and Status Quo 
Resolution 1244 adopted by the U.N. Security Council in June 1999, 
following the NATO air campaign, stipulated that Kosovo was officially part of 
Serbia but that it would be administrated by the United Nations. The resolution 
established the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the ultimate authority in the 
province, but did not address Kosovo's final status. UNMIK's main task was to 
build up a civil administration in the province and to gradually transfer political 
authority to this administration to bring autonomy and self-government to 
KOSOVO.61 The resolution also authorized NATO to be in charge of a Kosovo 
peacekeeping force (the Kosovo Force-KFOR), which included 50,000 NATO 
troops as weIl as Russian forces. KFOR's mission was to secure the environment 
and to supervise the disarmament of KLA members. Moreover, the resolution 
called for the withdrawal of aIl Serbian forces from Kosovo and for the return of 
Albanian refugees to their home. In sum, resolution 1244 transformed Kosovo into 
a de facto U.N. protectorate but reaffirmed at the same time the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the FRy.62 
61 Steven J. Woehrel and Julie Kim, Kosovo and u.s. PoUcy, CRS Report for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, Library ofCongress, Updated June 9, 2005. 
62 Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, "Kosovo, the changing contours of world politics, and 
the challenge of world order", in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Kosovo and the 
Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention, New York: United Nations University Press, 2000, p. 5. 
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A Model of Quasi-Sovereignty 
The Rambouillet draft agreement that led to the adoption of UN. 
resolution 1244 represents a new model of conflict resolution to the extent that it 
departed from the traditional Westphalian conception of sovereignty.63 Instead of 
resolving the issue of Kosovo by recognizing its independence, by promoting its 
partition from Serbia, or by re-integrating it to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
the United States and Europe created an unprecedented model of quasi-sovereignty 
for Kosovo without making any final decision on its final political status. This 
singular development departs from the prediction stated in Chapter 3. The regional 
stability model predicts that in the case where both the host state and the 
secessionist state fail to guarantee stability, the status quo will be maintained and 
the U.S. will adopt a wait-and-see approach. In the present case, however, the 
status quo failed to meet President Clinton's will to establish a lasting peace in 
southem Europe. America' s long term plan was to establish liberal democracy in 
the Balkans and to integrate the region into a united Europe. The resolution of the 
Kosovo crisis, therefore, was a burning issue that necessitated intervention. 
The u.s. Strategy Behind Rambouillet 
One of the central objectives of the Rambouillet accord was to provide 
Kosovo with democratic state structures to better evaluate its long-term viability 
before making a final decision on its status. In this respect, UNMIK elaborated a 
63 John Doyle, "International Mediation in Ethnie Confliets and Praetical Models of Non-
Westphalian Sovereignty: From Kosovo to Ireland", 2004 (unpublished manuseript). 
http://64.112.226. 77/one/isa/isa04/index.php?click key= 1 &PHPSESSID=a98365db7a459f4d446ea 
5644da87151 (accessed July 2006). 
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Constitutional Framework for Provisional Government in 2001. A first elected 
government was formed in 2002 and the most recent democratic elections were 
held in the faH of 2004. Another objective was to play for time. By putting the 
final political status of Kosovo on hold, the United States and Europe wanted to let 
the political context evolve so that new solutions could emerge. Washington hoped 
that a new generation of Serbian leaders would eventually replace the Milosevic 
regime and be more open toward Kosovo. The terms of the Rambouillet accord 
also aHowed the Clinton administration to test a certain number of theses. The 
Serbs argued that once Kosovo had self-government, secessionists would stop 
fighting for independence. Kosovars retorted that they would never renounce to 
their claim for independence.64 The accord, therefore, permitted a test of these 
statements. 
The three year interim period also allowed for changes to the nature of the 
debate. Instead of focusing on the final status of Kosovo, UNMIK emphasized the 
importance of democratic standards. The issue of whether Kosovo and the FRY 
would eventually integrate the EU became one of the focal points of discussion 
with the adoption of the policy known as "Standards before Status".65 With this 
policy, the U.S. and Europe proposed a bargain to the Balkan region. Theyagreed 
to integrate the Balkans to the Euro-Atlantic community, but asked that Balkan 
64 Interview with James O'Brien, Washington D.C., April 12, 2005. 
65 The United Nations, Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, March 31, 2004. 
http://operationkosovo.kentlaw.edu/symposiumlresources/KSIP%20fmal%20draft%2031 %20Marc 
h%202004b.htm (accessed June 2006). 
194 
/ 
The Nonrecognition of Kosovo 
states (including Kosovo) conforrn to European political standards.66 This 
conditionality policy, however, was badly received in Kosovo and many believed 
that this approach was intended to weaken their aspiration for independence. 
Toward the V.S. Recognition of Kosovo's Independence? 
After more than half a decade of U.N. administration in Kosovo, the 
population remains deeply polarized along ethnic lines and the Serbian and 
Albanian positions appear irreconcilable. Belgrade remains firrnly opposed to the 
independence of the province, while ethnic Albanians still caU for a referendum on 
independence. 
The decision on the final status of Kosovo remains the main puzzle that 
confronts the United States and Europe. In the long-terrn, it is quite possible that 
the unresolved status may produce more instability that it was initiaUy intended to 
resolve. A major riot that left 19 dead and 900 injured in Pristina in March of 2004 
reminded the U.N. that further delay on the final status of Kosovo may be a time 
bomb.67 Ethnic Albanians increasingly view the U.N. presence in the province as a 
way to defer indefinitely the final resolution on the status. UNMIK had initially 
fixed mid-2005 to review the issue of the status, but the decision was postponed. 
Political leaders in Kosovo also argue that the non-resolution of the status is 
economically costly because the province cannot find foreign investors or obtain 
66 Phone interview with Daniel Hamilton, April Il, 2005. 
67 International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo, Europe Report No. 155, April 22, 2004. 
http://www.crisisgroup.orglhome/index.cfm?id=2627&1 = 1 (accessed June 2006). 
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loans.68 Furthermore, because Kosovo is not a soverelgn state, it cannot join 
international organizations, which alienates Kosovar Albanians. In this context, it 
is quite possible that the non-resolution of the political status of the province may 
generate internaI conflicts and provoke a return to regional instability. Testifying 
before Congress in May of 2005, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 
Nicholas Burns recognized that the status quo in Kosovo was "no longer 
sustainable or desirable". 69 
There is now a consensus among U.S. foreign policy experts that the 
United States will eventually recognize the independence of Kosovo.7o Returning 
to the regional stability model, one of its main assumptions is that the U.S. 
presidency chooses, on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, the option that carries the 
greatest expected regional stability. As time goes on, it appears that the option of 
independence for Kosovo is susceptible to bringing more stability than alternative 
policies. A former advisor to President Clinton on Kosovo points out: "1 think the 
United States will recognize Kosovo' s independence in the next two or three years 
for the same reasons it didn't before. Because we think that recognition will not 
create further fragmentation in the region and a failure to recognize would actually 
create a higher danger ofinstability".71 
68 Nicholas Wood, "Still Deeply Divided, Nervous Kosovo Goes to PoUs This Weekend", The New 
York Times, October 23,2004. 
69 Steven J. Woehrel and Julie Kim, op. cit., p. 20. 
70 See Interview with James O'Brien, Washington D.C., April 12, 2005. Phone interview with 
Daniel Hamilton, April 11, 2005. Moreover, in a 1999 interview, V.S. officiaIs declared that 
Kosovo would eventuaUy become independent. See R. Jeffrey Smith, "V.S. OfficiaIs Expect 
Kosovo Independence", The Washington Post, September 24,1999. 
71 Interview with a former V.S. official who asked to remain anonymous. Virginia, April 28, 2005. 
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To be consistent with my model, Kosovo would have to guarantee both its 
internaI and external stability to obtain U.S. recognition. Facts indicate that in the 
recent years, the V.S. and UNMIK have adopted policies that focused on this 
double dimension of stability. A document called "Standards for Kosovo" set out 
by the U.N. mission in Kosovo 2003, emphasized the importance of the mIe oflaw 
and of minority rights in the province. The document also pointed out that Kosovo 
will have to be "in stable and peaceful relationships with its regional neighbours" 
before any decision on its status could be made.72 Of course Kosovo's relation 
with Serbia remains tense, but the province has focused, in the last six years, on 
building democratic institutions, which strengthened its internaI stability. 
Moreover, the recent settlement of the Macedonian crisis through the Ohrid 
Agreement (see Chapter 5), which gave greater representation to the ethnic 
Albanian minority, increased stability in the region and reinsured V.S. policy 
makers who feared that the recognition of Kosovo could destabilize Macedonia. 
largue that if the V.S. eventually recognizes Kosovo, it will be because the 
province will have met UNMIK standards of stability. And that any further delay 
on the status will be motivated by the same kind of considerations. 
What About Albanian-Americans and Serbian-Americans' Roles? 
Interestingly enough, despite its rather small size, the Albanian-American 
lobby was more active and influential than the Serbian-Americans with respect to 
the Kosovo issue. The Albanian community, which inc1udes between 350,000 and 
72 The United Nations, Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, op. cit. 
197 
1 
The Nonrecognition o/Kosovo 
400,000 people clustered mainly in Boston, Chicago, Detroit and New York, 
managed to be heard in Congress and was successful at framing the debate in 
Washington. In the early 1990s, Albanian-Americans appeaied to State 
Department officiaIs, to members of Congress and to the media to heighten 
government awareness of the problem of human rights in Kosovo and to promote 
the idea of independence. The impact of this diaspora was tangible. From January 
to March of 1992, four resolutions were introduced by Senators and 
Representatives in favor of the recognition of Kosovo.73 For the period 1988-96, 
conservative estimations indicate that the Albanian-American diaspora spent more 
than Il million dollars on public relations, political contributions and lobbying in 
Washington.74 
When the Kosovo crisis reemerged in 1998, the Albanian community 
already had several allies in Congress, Senator Bob Dole being the most weIl 
known, who promptly argued for a NATO intervention against the FRY. During 
that year, the Albanian American Civic League and the National Albanian 
American Council (NAAC) were very active and influential. They collected over 
120,000 dollars for members of Congress who were sympathetic to the Kosovo 
cause.75 Moreover, the NAAC had regular access to the White House and to 
73 Alphonse D'Amato (R-New York), Bob Dole (R-Kansas), Larry PressIer (R-South Dakota), and 
Claibome Pell (D-Rhode Island), were the main supporters of Kosovo's independence in the 
Senate. William Broomfield (R-Michigan), Ben Gilman (R-New York), Tom Lantos (D-
Califomia), and Dick Swett (D-New Hampshire), were the strongest proponents of its 
independence in the House of Representatives. See Peter R. Prifti, Confrontation in Kosova: The 
Albanian-Serb Struggle, 1969-1999, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, pp. 206-207. 
74 Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism & the Balkan Wars, Ithaca: Comell 
University Press, 2003, p. 243. 
75 Danielle S. Sremac, War of Words: Washington Taekles the Yugoslav Confiiet, Westport: 
Praeger Editions, 1999, p. 217. 
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President Clinton's foreign policy team. During the year 1998, most Albanian-
Americans a change in their strategy by shifting their political and financial 
support from Rugova' s Democratic League of Kosovo to the KLA. Albanian-
Americans became strong supporters of the KLA and sent weapons to the 
organization.76 
Despite its active involvement in the Kosovo crisis, the Albanian-American 
lobby did not make any progress on the issue that mattered most to Kosovo 
Albanians, namely the independence and diplomatic recognition of the province. 
As Paul Hockenos points out: "Regarding national independence, the very essence 
of their struggle, the Kosovar Albanians were no closer to their ultimate goal. 
Despite their new legion of 'friends in Congress', V.S. policy had not budged on 
Kosovo's status".77 In fact, regardless of the number of supporters for Kosovo's 
independence in the V.S. Congress, the decision to recognize new states is the 
prerogative of the executive branch of government. And for reasons mentioned 
previously, the Clinton administration judged that the recognition of Kosovo 
would create greater instability in the region and, therefore, was opposed to this 
option. 
The Serbian-Americans 
Was the Serbian-American community, which includes around one million 
Americans, powerful enough to prevent three successive V.S. presidencies from 
76 See Stacy Sullivan, "From Brooklyn to Kosovo, with Love and AK-47's", The New York Times 
Magazine, November 22, 1998, p. 52. 
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recognizing Kosovo's independence? Facts indicate that the Serbian-American 
community was politically weak and badly organized throughout the 1990s. The 
anti-Milosevic bias, the fragmented nature of the Serbian-American community, 
and its lack of involvement in the public relations battle in Washington account for 
the failure of the Serbian-American lobby to have any impact on the formulation 
of the U.S. foreign policy towards Kosovo. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Serbs were quickly identified by the 
Bush administration as the aggressors during the Croatian and Bosnian wars. In 
the case of Kosovo, the U.S. was quick to condemn Belgrade for massive human 
rights violations in the province and, as early as in the faU of 1991, the U.S. 
government had a clear bias against the Milosevic regime, which made things 
difficult for any attempt by the Serbian-Americans to influence the U.S. on the 
Kosovo issue. In a discussion with Acting Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger in 1992, Congresswoman Helen Delich BentIey, a Serbian-American 
leading figure, was told: "If you want to help your people, dump Milosevic".78 
This shows how bad the State Department views were toward the Serbian regime. 
Representative BentIey was reaIly the only point of access that the Serbian-
American lobby had in Congress. Years later she recalled: "We wanted to lobby 
for the Serbian cause to let people know that Serbians aren't aIl bad guys. People 
were only getting one side of the story [in the United States]".79 And when Helen 
77 Paul Hockenos, op. cif., p. 243. 
78 Paul Hockenos, op. cif., p. 131. 
79 Ibid., p. 128. 
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Delich left Congress in 1994, the Serbian community lost most of its political 
strength on Capitol Hill. 
Moreover, despite its large size, the Serbian-American community had no 
strong tradition of political organization and was divided over whether or not to 
support the Milosevic regime. 80 This lack of cohesion, which remained throughout 
the 1990s, significantly weakened the Serbian lobby in Washington. The Bosnian 
tragedy also seriously damaged the credibility of the Serbian Americans in their 
attempt to influence the White House. Serbian American organizations that had 
supported Serbia before and during the Bosnian war were embarrassed and 
remained relatively quiet toward the Kosovo issue in the second half of the 
1990s.81 
Finally, while Albanian-Americans relied on public relations firms in 
Washington to promote the independence of Kosovo, Serbian-Americans were not 
significantly involved in the public relations battle. As Danielle Sremac points out: 
"The Serbs did not hire professional help and missed out on establishing contacts 
with V.S. policymakers and opinion makers in Washington".82 Overall, the impact 
of the Serbian-Americans was overshadowed by the actions undertaken by the 
other Yugoslav ethnic groups including the Albanian-Americans. As a result, the 
80 See Warren Zimmermann, "Yugoslavia: 1989-1996", in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, 
(eds.), U.S. and Russian Palicymaking with Respect ta the Use af Farce, Santa Monica: RAND 
Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, California, 1996, pp. 178-181. See also Brad K. Blitz, 
"Serbia's War Lobby: Diaspora Groups and Western Elites", in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. 
Mestrovic, (eds.), This Time We Knew: Western Respanses ta Genacide in Basnia, New York: New 
York University Press, 1996, p. 196. 
81 Interview with James O'Brien, Washington D.C., April 12, 2005. 
82 Danielle S. Sremac, ap. cit., p. 5. 
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U.S. view on the whole Yugoslav crisis quickly went in a direction that was 
against Serbian-American perceived interests. 
When the Kosovo cri sis became intemationalized in 1998, the Serbian 
Unit y Congress (SUC), one of the most influential and organized Serbian interest 
group in the United States, strongly opposed the NATO use of force against 
Serbia. The organization sent letters to the press, to Congress members, and to the 
Clinton administration. The SUC also sponsored a demonstration against the use 
of force before the State Department in October of 1998.83 These actions, 
however, did not prevent the Clinton administration from bombing Serbia. 
Thus, ethnic groups in Washington failed to influence the U.S. govemment 
on the issue of Kosovo' s secession. The White Rouse remained opposed to 
independence for reasons of stability, not to please Serbian-Americans. As for 
Albanian-Americans, their influence was strategically greater. They were 
effective, quite good in getting attention for their cause, and had strong advocates 
in Congress. At the end of the day, however, the support expressed by sorne 
Congress members in favor of independence was not materialized by the U.S. 
presidency. 
Moreover, State Department archives on Kosovo, which were recently 
unc1assified, do not refer to domestic ethnic politics issues. The role and impact of 
both diaspora groups are absent from analyses produced by the State Department 
83 Rachel Paul, "Serbian-American Mobilization and Lobbying: The Relevance of Jasenovac and 
Kosovo to Contemporary Grassroots Efforts in the United States", in Thomas Ambrosio, (ed.), 
Ethnie Identity Groups and u.s. Foreign Policy, Westport (CT) : Praeger, 2002, pp. 104-105. 
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apparatus.84 In addition, every former State Department officiaIs and former D.S. 
negotiators involved in the Kosovo crisis that were interviewed for this research 
point out that ethnic lobbies were insigniticant in the formulation of the U.S. 
response. As Daniel Hamilton indicates: "These ethnic groups were just too small 
and the stakes here were too big. They did not have any influence [on the issue of 
recognition]". 85 
Conclusion 
The argument according to which Kosovo was not recognized as an 
independent state because it was a province of Serbia does not explain why the 
D.S. remained opposed to its independence. Kosovo was not recognized for two 
main reasons: tirst, because the FRY succeeded in containing the crisis from 1991 
to 1998; second, because Kosovo clearly failed the test of internaI and external 
stability at the end of the 1990s when Belgrade became the main obstacle to the 
restoration of stability in the province. Thus, the case of Kosovo tends to validate 
the regional stability model. It highlights the crucial importance that regional 
stability played in the American response to the Kosovo crisis. As long as the 
effects of secessionism were contained within the host state's national borders, 
Kosovo remained an issue of secondary interest in Washington. When the crisis 
84 See Office of Information Programs and Services, U.S. Department of State, Case Control No. 
200502018. Documents unclassified in November and December 2005. 
85 Phone interview with Daniel Hamilton, April 11, 2005. This was also the opinion of, Morton 
Abramovitz, James O'Brien, and Morton Halperin. Morton Halperin was the Director of the policy 
Planning Staff in the State Department. He was also advising Secretary Albright on Kosovo. See 
interview with Morton Halperin, Washington D.C., April 21, 2005. 
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produced a large flow of international refugees, however, Kosovo became a 
central issue for the Clinton administration. 
This study also reveals that the regional stability model undermines how 
crucial was the resolution of the Kosovo conflict for the Clinton administration in 
1999. In Chapter 3, the model predicts that the simultaneous failure of the host 
state and of the secessionist state to keep stability will lead the U.S. to adopt a 
wait-and-see approach. The Kosovo war shows, instead, that the status quo was 
undesirable for the Clinton administration and that it harmed the U.S. stability 
interests in the region. Thus, the model did not predict that the American 
superpower could rely on military intervention to restore order when there is a 
stability impasse resulting from a secessionist crisis that goes against the vital 
interests of the United States. 
The next chapters will focus on the regional context of the Hom of Africa. 
By analyzing the case of Eritrea and Somaliland, these chapters will highlight the 
U.S. foreign policy variations in matter of diplomatie recognition in this particular 
region of the world. 
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7. 
Eritrea 's Independence and u.s. Regional Interests, 
1989-1993 
Introduction 
The independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993 is the only case of 
successful secession to happen in post-colonial Africa. It was the first time that a 
secessionist state achieved independence from a sovereign African state. While 
several African secessionist movements failed to break from their central state 
(e.g. Biafra, Cabinda, Casamance, Katanga, Southern Sudan, Western Sahara), 
Eritrea seceded and obtained diplomatie recognition after 30 years of war against 
Ethiopia, the longest secessionist struggle ever fought in Africa. 
Eritrea is a unique case to the extent that the Ethiopian govemment agreed 
to its secession in 1991 mainly because it no longer had the power and the 
authority to oppose it. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Eritrean secessionist army 
of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) had become more powerful than 
the troops of the rump Ethiopian govemment, which collapsed in May of 1991, 
and it had more military capacity than the transitional govemment that eventually 
took control of Ethiopia in July of 1991. This unusual situation, therefore, 
compelled Addis Ababa to negotiate the secession of Eritrea. The refusaI to allow 
Eritrea's independence would have led Eritrean secessionists to resume fighting 
and eventually to defeat the central govemment of Ethiopia. 
The case of Eritrea is highly relevant to this research because the fate of 
this secessionist state was partly linked to V.S. geo-strategic interests. From 1952 
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to 1991, American governments consistently opposed the secession of Eritrea 
because, as it will be shown later, it was perceived as going against their interest of 
maintaining stability in the Rom of Africa. Interestingly enough, the reversaI of 
this position in 1991 in favor of Eritrea's independence was made to pursue the 
same objective: regional stability in a changing political context. Moreover, the 
United States played a crucial role in the process leading to Eritrea's secession. In 
contrast to the Yugoslav cases studied previously in which other foreign powers 
were also involved (i.e. members of the European Union), the U.S. was the only 
foreign power engaged in the resolution of the Eritrean issue. Renee, regional and 
great powers did not act as a determining variable in the U.S. decision process as it 
was partly the case, for instance, with Germany toward Croatia and Slovenia or 
Greece in the case of Macedonia. 1 
Following a briefhistorical background of Eritrea's political evolution, this 
chapter will take a detailed look at the critical period that began in 1989 with the 
U.S. involvement in the Ethiopian civil war and ended in 1993 with the official 
recognition of the independence of Eritrea. This focus will allow us to evaluate 
whether the regional stability model explains the initial U.S. policy in favor of 
Ethiopia's unity as weIl as the shift in favor of Eritrea's secession which occurred 
in 1991. 
1 The position of the European Community toward the Eritrean issue was similar to the one of the 
United States, which was to support a federal or confederal arrangement between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. Following the U.S. policy shift in May of 1991, the EC aligned its position with the U.S. 
and supported Eritrea's right to secede. 
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Historical Background 
In contrast to almost all African states, Ethiopia does not have a colonial 
pasto It was a member of the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s and was 
only occupied by Italy from 1936 to 1941, until the allies liberated the Hom of 
Africa from Mussolini's imperialist ambitions.2 Eritrea, however, has a very 
different political history. It was an Italian colony from 1889 to 1941 and was 
administered by the British as a United Nations trust territory during the 1940s. 
This colonial legacy strengthened Eritrea's separate identity and certainly 
complicated its relations with Ethiopia after the Second World War.3 
In 1950, the political future of Eritrea was debated between the great 
powers but no consensus could be reached on its final status. The Soviet Union 
argued that Eritrea should become an independent state while the United States 
and the United Kingdom supported a federal union of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The 
British, who were still administering the territory by then, relegated the issue to a 
U.N. commission of investigation, which recommended the creation of a 
.., 
federation with Ethiopia. Despite the fact that a large segment of the Eritrean 
population wanted independence (mainly among the Eritrean Muslim 
populations), the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution creating the Ethio-
Eritrean federation which went into effect in 1952.4 This resolution made Eritrea 
2 During the Italian occupation, Ethiopia was merged with Eritrea and with parts of the current 
Somalia into what was called ltalian East Africa. 
3 John W. Harheson, "The Hom of Africa: From Chaos, Political Renewal?", Current History, Vol. 
90, No. 556, May 1991, p. 221. 
4 Most of the Eritrean Muslims favored the independence of Eritrea while a large segment of the 
Christian populations supported the integration of Eritrea within Ethiopia to create a greater 
Ethiopia. Some Muslims also supported irredentism and wanted to unite parts of Eritrea with 
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an autonomous unit under Ethiopia's sovereignty. A separate Eritrean constitution 
was established as well as an Eritrean Parliament in Asmara, the capital of 
Eritrea.5 Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, however, never fully accepted the idea 
of a federation.6 As Alexis Heraclides notes: "Federated Eritrea was, if nothing 
else, an anomaly within despotic Imperial Ethiopia".7 Haile Selassie's ultimate 
objective was to annex Eritrea under a greater Ethiopian Empire. To this respect, 
the autonomy of Eritrea was systematically violated by the Ethiopian authorities 
during the 1950s. The Eritrean flag was also abolished and the Eritrean 
constitution was suspended. The Ethio-Eritrean federation officially ended in 1962 
when Eritrea was annexed into Ethiopia and declared the fourteenth province of 
the Ethiopian empire. 8 
The erosion of Eritrea's autonomy prior to 1962 led to the emergence of 
secessionist organizations. The Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), which 
mainly consisted of Christians, and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), a Muslim 
dominated organization, rose up respectively in 1958 and 1960. The Ethiopian 
neighboring Sudan. See Paul Henze, The Question of Eritrea. http://www.african-
geopolitics.orgishow.aspx?Articleld=3063 (accessed June 2006). 
Eritrea represented 9 percent of Ethiopia's territory. With around 3 to 4 million inhabitants, Eritrea 
contributed 8 to 10 percent of Ethiopia's total population. See Alexis Heraclides, The Self-
Determination of Minorities in International Politics, London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 
1991,pp.179-180. 
5 Ibid., p. 178. 
6 As it will be seen in the next section, the Emperor consented to the federation to maintain a close 
relationship with the United States. 
7 Alexis Heraclides, op. cit., p. 181. 
8 The Ethiopian army surrounded the Eritrean administrative building in Asmara and compelled 
members of the Eritrean Assembly to vote in favor of the annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia. This is 
reminiscent of how the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic ended the autonomous status of 
Kosovo in 1989. See Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Strugglefor Independence: Domination, Resistance, 
Nationalism, 1941-1993, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 94. 
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authorities responded with violence to these secessionist insurgencies, but failed to 
resolve the Eritrean secessionist issue. This political stalemate was partly 
responsible for the creation of a military committee in Ethiopia known as the Derg 
(which means "council" in Amharic-an Ethiopian language). This Marxist 
military committee ultimately overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and 
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam became the head of the government of the 
People's Democratie Republic of Ethiopia (GPDRE). This was a major turning 
point in Ethiopia's history.9 
After a brief attempt to appease Eritrea's secessionist demands, Mengistu 
chose to pursue Haile Selassie's repressive policy against Eritrean secessionists. 
The brutal ruling of Mengistu and his will to crush secessionism by all means 
galvanized Eritrean nationalism and mobilized the population (Muslims as weIl as 
Christians) in favor of independence. Within a few years, the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front-formerly the ELF-, and the ELM successfully fought 
Ethiopia's troops and were able to take control of most of Eritrea's territory with 
the exception of Asmara and sorne major towns. 10 Moreover, the creation of the 
Marxist republic of Ethiopia favored the emergence in the province of Tigray of 
the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), a non-secessionist organization that 
9 The military coup of the Derg was also motivated by the fact that Emperor Selassie was an 
autocratie leader who favored Ethiopia's Christian community at the expense of the Muslims. 
10 The ELM and ELF (the future EPLF) fought against each other in the 1960s and 1970s for 
control of Eritrea. By the late 1970s, the EPLF led by Isaias Afwerki had become the most 
prominent front in Eritrea and led the final war of liberation against the govemment of Addis 
Ababa in the early 1990s. 
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fought to replace the repressive Marxist regime of Mengistu. Il The TPLF, which 
originally was a small rebellion group, was trained and armed by the EPLF. From 
1975 to 1991, in coordination with the EPLF, the TPLF achieved several military 
defeats over the GPDRE. This circumstantial alliance between the Eritrean 
secessionists and the Tigrean rebels ultimately led them to defeat the central 
government of Mengistu in May of 1991. 
Following the faH of the GPDRE, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
entered Asmara and established control over Eritrea's territory, which made the 
province a de facto independent state. Meanwhile, the Tigrean People's Liberation 
Front took control of Addis Ababa with the help of EPLF units and constituted an 
Ethiopian transitional government. This new government recognized Eritrea's 
right of self-determination and agreed to a referendum on Eritrea's independence. 
In April of 1993, when asked the question: "Do you want independence from 
Ethiopia?", 99.8 percent of the 98.5 percent of Eritreans who cast ballots voted in 
favor of secession in a referendum monitored by the United Nations. Following 
this result, Eritrean leaders officially dec1ared independence and the United States 
recognized the new state. 12 
Il Roy Pateman, "Eritrea Takes the World Stage", Current History, Vol. 93, No. 583, May 1994, 
p.228. 
12 Dan Connell, "Eritrea", Foreign Policy in Focus, International Relations Center, Vol. 2, No. 45, 
September 1997. http://www.irc-online.orgltpif7briefs/vo12/v2n45eri.html (accessed June 2006). 
See also David Pool, From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean People 's Liberation Front, 
Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2001, p. 162. 
210 
The Recognition of Eritrea 
Washington Supports Ethiopia's Sovereignty over Eritrea: 1952-1991 
The international dimension of the Ethiopian-Eritrean issue is crucial to 
understanding why Eritrea did not obtain independence in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, and why it finally became a sovereign state in 1993. As it will 
be demonstrated, the political evolution of both Ethiopia and Eritrea was 
intimately linked to American strategie interests in the region. 
As early as 1942, Eritrea became an important geostrategic position for the 
United States.13 After having taken control of the ltalian communications station 
(Radio Marina) in Asmara during the war, the U.S. employed it to relay military 
messages and to monitor Soviet radio communications. In 1948, Emperor Haile 
Selassie and U.S. Secretary of State John Marshall agreed that the U.S. would 
maintain its military presence at the Asmara station in exchange for its support of 
the integration of Eritrea into Ethiopia.14 
Following the recommendation of the U.N. commission of investigation, 
the United States (backed by England) managed in 1950 to make the Security 
Council vote on a resolution that created the federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea 
despite the reluctance of the Soviet Union. Following this resolution, the U.S. 
signed a mutual defense treaty with Ethiopia, and Radio Marina (renamed Kagnew 
Station) was converted into a 60 million dollar military complex. 15 Eritrea thus 
became an important link in the U.S. world-wide communication network. As 
13 Okbazghi Yohannes, Eritrea, A Pawn in World Polities, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 
1991, p. 211. 
14 Ibid., p. 91. 
15 In exchange, the United States designed most of Ethiopia's infrastructures following World War 
II and sent the largest share of its African economic aid to Ethiopia. See Dan Connell, op. cit., p. 1. 
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Yohannes points out: "The Ethiopian-Eritrean federation was installed by the 
Western powers under the leadership of the United States pure1y for geopolitical 
considerations. This UN-sanctioned federation in essence became a denial of 
Eritrea's right to national self-determination.,,16 When Ethiopia annexed Eritrea by 
force in 1962, the United States remained silent because this action served its 
interests. The annexation increased Addis Ababa's control over Eritrea's political 
life facilitating U.S. operation in the province. 
u.s. Interests in Ethiopia Decrease but Support for Unity Remains 
With the development of satellite technology in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
communication facilities of the Kagnew Station became obsolete and, as a result, 
the United States gradually lost its interest in Eritrea as a geostrategic position.17 
When the Ethiopian Emperor was overthrown by a Marxist military coup in 1974, 
the U.S. had already reduced its military personal and investment in the region. 
Moreover, the rise of Mengistu to power in the mid-1970s ended friendly U.S.-
Ethiopian relations. The new Marxist regime abrogated the mutual defense treaty 
with the U.S. and by the late 1970s, the influence of the U.S. govemment in 
16 Okbazghi Yohannes, op. cil., p. 258. Cited in Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly, 
Understanding Ethnie Corifliets: The International Dimension, New York: Longman Publishers, 
2002, p. 216. 
17 Moreover, the development of Diego Garcia-a British Island in the Indian Ocean-as an 
alternative U.S. emplacement in the region contributed to demote the Kagnew station. See Richard 
Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980, p. 143. 
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Ethiopia was barely existent as Mengistu broke his relations with the West and 
moved into the Soviet orbit. 18 
Despite its ideological setback, and regardless ofits aversion to Mengistu's 
Marxist regime, the United States maintained an anti-secessionist policy toward 
Eritrea. Washington expressed its desire for internaI negotiation between Addis 
Ababa and Asmara and wished that the conflict would be resolved within the 
Ethiopian political frame. 19 
Interestingly enough, the U.S. govemment did not redefine its policy in the 
Hom by supporting Eritrea's independence in order to weaken the Ethiopian 
regime and the Soviet influence in the region. Even if Ethiopia was using brutal 
military means to crush secessionism in Eritrea, including the bombing of major 
Eritrean cities, and that Ethiopia's repressive rule resulted in over 100,000 
casualties and caused a major famine, the United States categorically refused to 
support EPLF leaders because they advocated Eritrea's secession. Moreover, 
Washington's mistrust of Eritrea's long-time inclination to socialism, and the 
precedent that a D.S. support to secessionism would have engendered (Le. 
bolstering secessionist movements across Africa) led the U.S. to adopt a different 
strategy. Instead of violating the norm of states' territorial integrity cheri shed by 
18 Mengistu also announced that U.S. military facilities in Ethiopia (especially in the Eritrean 
province) would be closed down. Ibid., p. 144. Soon after the Derg declared Ethiopia a socialist 
state, the Soviet Union sent more than Il billion dollars in arms to Addis Ababa. With this support, 
Mengistu was able to temporary reoccupy most of Eritrea's major cities. However, by the end of 
the 1980s, the EPLF had regained most of the territory it had lost. See Dan ConneIl, op. cit., p. 1. 
19 At a Senate Subcommirtee hearing in 1976, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
William E. Schaufeke declared: "Our emphasis of the Eritrean question has been on the need for 
internai negotiations to resolve the status of Eritrea within Ethiopia ... The movement to establish 
an independent Eritrea is not something we either acknowledge or recognize". Ibid., p. 145. 
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the Organization of African Unit y (OAU), Washington applied the containment 
doctrine to prevent Marxist diffusion in the Hom. The strategy consisted of 
encircling Ethiopia by arming its neighbors: Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya and by 
investing in Somalia, which became the new client state?O As the U.S.-Ethiopian 
relations worsened after 1974, the United States increased its military and 
economic assistance to the Somali govemment and made its Embassy in 
Mogadishu (the capital of Somalia) one of the most important diplomatic missions 
in Africa.21 
Thus, despite the variation over time of U. S. strategic interests in Ethiopia, 
and despite the rather drastic change in the nature of its relations with the 
Ethiopian regime, the United States remained commirted to Ethiopia's territorial 
integrity. 
D.S. Involvement 
The reasons leading the United States to become involved in the Ethiopian-
Eritrean conflict in the late 1980s were far different from those behind 
Washington's involvement in the Yugoslav conflict. The Hom of Africa was not 
part of the U.S. main strategie interests, and with the end of the Cold War, the 
Hom of Afriea had lost much of its strategic value. If the Yugoslav war threatened 
20 Dan Connell, op. cU., p. 1. 
21 Within a few years, the u.S.-Somali relations replaced those that Washington had maintained 
with Ethiopia over the last 20 years. The Somali partnership allowed the U.S. to keep its influence 
in the region as well as to retain a certain control on the Red Sea. This will be seen in more details 
in Chapter 8. See Herman J. Cohen, "Somalia and the US long and troubled history", Race and 
History, January 21, 2002. http://www.raceandhistory.comlcgi-
biniforum/webbbs config.pl/noframes/read/l15 (accessed June 2006). 
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the security and stability of the European continent and the functioning of the 
European economy, the brutal conflict in Ethiopia did not affect the well being of 
the United States or that of any of its allies. Thus, the Ethiopian civil war was not a 
priority for the Bush administration and, prior to the 1990s, the U.S. had never 
seriously attempted to resolve this secessionist conflict (especially from 1952 to 
1974 when the U.S. had a great influence in Ethiopia)?2 So why is it that the U.S. 
intervened in the Ethiopian conflict if it no longer had influence or apparent 
interests in Ethiopia? 
The administration of George H.W. Bush got involved in the Ethiopian 
civil war for three main reasons. First, the Bush administration wanted to increase 
its cooperation with the Soviet Union on international issues. Back then, the Soviet 
Union wanted to "disengage from Ethiopia with dignity" as it went through an 
economic crisis and could no longer provide assistance to Ethiopia.23 For this 
reason, Moscow was in favor of a U.S. involvement in the cont1ict and 
Washington saw the issue as a good opportunity to strengthen ties with the 
govemment of Mikhail Gorbatchev.24 Hence, after 15 years of quasi-absence from 
Ethiopia (the U.S. no longer had an ambassador in Addis Ababa and was 
represented by a chargé d'affaires), the U.S. took up the challenge.25 
22 For an interesting distinction between V.S. primary and secondary interests toward ethnic 
conflicts, see David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars: Ameriean Power and Ethnie Conf/iet, New York: 
Hill and Wang Editions, 1997. 
23 Moscow had informed Mengistu that it would not renew its defense and cooperation agreement 
with Ethiopia. 
24 Herman J. Cohen, Intervening in Afriea: Super power Peaeemaking in a Troubled Continent, 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, p. 20. 
25 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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Second, in the late 1980s around 20,000 Jewish Ethiopians (the Falashas) 
wanted to immigrate to Israel to escape the intense civil war and the famine. They 
felt that their security was no longer assured in Ethiopia. This issue became a 
major concem in Washington and President Bush expressed personai interests for 
the fate of the Falashas. Members of U.S. Congress who represented Jewish 
constituents also raised their concem and pressed the Bush administration to take 
concrete actions to facilitate the departure of the Jewish Ethiopians. This was one 
more incentive for the U.S. to get involved in the war. 
Third, hunger in Ethiopia was another concem in Washington. Throughout 
the 1980s, the U.S. govemment had been one of the main providers of 
humanitarian aid to Ethiopia to counter the famine in the region. By the late 1980s, 
the Bush administration reached the conclusion that by intervening in the 
Ethiopian conflict it could help to end the civil war and the humanitarian crisis. As 
a result, the Jewish Ethiopians could more easily depart from Ethiopia. AIl ofthese 
factors were part of the equation and motivated the U.S.'s initial decision to 
intervene in the conflict. 26 
The issue of Eritrea's secession was not a factor that played in the United 
States' decision to be involved. In fact, it just happened that the Falashas and the 
hunger issues were intimately linked to the tough secessionist war in Eritrea. As 
the next section will show, however, the U.S. intervention turned out to have a 
more far-reaching effect than expected. Indeed, American officiaIs decided at 
26 Ibid. 
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sorne point to address the Eritrean secessionist question in order to strengthen 
regional stability in the Hom. 
Toward the Collapse of the Ethiopian Government: 1989-1991 
The reign of the Derg regime was marked by a progressive loss of political 
control over Ethiopia's territory. Throughout the 1980s, the regime of Mengistu 
fought on several fronts against the EPLF, which captured most of Eritrea's 
strategie locations. The Derg also fought against the TPLF, which occupied most 
of Northem Ethiopia. Toward the end of the 1980s, other liberation movements 
such as the Oromo Liberation Front also emerged in the South of the country.27 In 
early 1990, Mengistu acknowledged for the first time that the Ethiopian state was 
on the verge of dismemberment and that the national army had to fight with more 
determination against the multiple insurgent fronts to keep Ethiopia united. 
Externallnstability but InternaI Negotiations are Still Possible 
When the United States became involved in the conflict, the extemal 
stability of Ethiopia was no longer preserved. The Ethio-Eritrean war had created a 
major spillover effect and between 500,000 to 600,000 civilians had taken refuge 
mainly in Sudan, but also in Kenya and Djibouti. There were also a considerable 
number of emigres and exiles in Arab states (80,000-100,000).28 According to 
27 John W. Harbeson, op. cit., p. 222. 
28 David Pool, "Eritrean Independence: The Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of 
Reconstruction", African AfJairs, Vol. 92, No. 368, July 1993, p. 394. See also June Rock, "Relief 
and Rehabilitation in Eritrea: Lessons and Issues", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, 
p.133. 
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Robert Houdek, who was U.S. Chief of Mission to Ethiopia from 1988 to 1991, 
the refugee crisis was taken very seriously by the State Department and it was one 
more reason why Washington got involved in the conflict.29 
In terms of internaI negotiations, Mengistu had refused to negotiate with 
Eritrean secessionists until the Iate 1980s and he had used military means to bring 
Eritrea to heel. The rapid decline of Soviet aid and the severe famine, however, 
compelled the Ethiopian govemment to come up with a peace initiative that 
included negotiations with Eritrean secessionists.30 Following his first official 
meeting with V.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. 
Cohen, Mengistu expressed desire to end the war. He introduced market-oriented 
reforms and promised to facilitate the emigration of Jewish Ethiopians. At this 
point, there was external instability resulting from the conflict, but Mengistu was 
open for change and accepted third party mediation. Thus, as the regional stability 
theory predicts, this openness was good enough for the V.S. to maintain its support 
of Ethiopia's unity. 
In 1989, former V.S. President Jimmy Carter was chosen by Ethiopian and 
Eritrean leaders to conduct peace negotiations. These semi-official peace talks, 
however, did not pro duce any significant progress. Negotiations held in Atlanta 
and in Nairobi (Kenya) in the fall of 1989 failed because the Derg regime refused 
to allowa V.N. observer mission to assist negotiations, as requested by Eritrean 
secessionists. Addis Ababa argued that allowing a V.N. presence in Ethiopia 
29 Phone interview with Robert Houdek, May 25, 2005. 
30 Herman J. Cohen, op. cit., p. 24. 
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would further internationalize the conflict.31 Mengistu also refused to implement a 
cease-fire during peace negotiations; a proposition that had been put forward by 
the United States. Eritrean secessionist leaders were not more inclined to 
compromise since their military victory had started to alter the balance of force in 
their favor. 32 
FoUowing these negotiation attempts, the EPLF launched an attack against 
the Ethiopian army on the Red Sea coast and captured the port of Massawa-
Eritrea' s main port. This victory marked the beginning of the end for Mengistu as 
his troops located in Asmara were isolated and could no longer be supplied on the 
ground. The Tigrean People's Liberation Front also made significant progress 
against Mengistu's army and was able to move closer to Addis Ababa. 
In the light of a rapidly declining military situation, Mengistu appeared 
willing to resume peace talks with secessionists under the auspices of the U.S. and 
showed signs of flexibility. To demonstrate its good faith, the GPDRE aUowed 
international food relief to reach the Eritrean population, which until then had been 
forbidden.33 State Department officiaIs also hosted informaI talks in Washington 
D.C. between the Ethiopian govemment and Eritrean secessionists in the faU of 
1990. At this occasion, the representative of the Ethiopian govemment, Tesfaye 
31 Mengistu only accepted the proposaI ofa U.N. observer mission in 1991 when his regime was on 
the verge of collapsing. 
32 Other talks hosted by the Italian government in Rome at the end of 1989 between the Tigrean 
People's Liberation Front and the Ethiopian government ended in deadlock for similar reasons. See 
John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People 's Liberation Front, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 167. 
33 The Washington Post, "Ethiopia Said Willing to Seek Peace; Eritrea Is Urged to Reciprocate", 
November 15, 1990. 
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Dinka, introduced the draft of a new Ethiopian constitution that guaranteed special 
autonomy for Eritrea. Assistant Secretary Cohen declared: "1 believe the Ethiopian 
government has effectively shown great flexibility in recent weeks and 1 would ask 
the EPLF to reciprocate.,,34 EPLF leaders, however, kept requesting a referendum 
on independence, which was the centerpiece of their strategy, and categorically 
refused the idea of political autonomy within Ethiopia. 
Mengistu Acts in Bad Faith 
Although the Ethiopian central government seemed open to negotiations 
and ready to devolve constitutional power to Eritrea, it soon appeared that 
Mengistu was not acting in good faith and that the GPDRE was not really 
interested in achieving a negotiated peace settlement with the secessionists. The 
State Department realized that the Ethiopian host state was involved in peace 
negotiations to buy time in order to reestablish its military aUthority in Ethiopia 
and defeat the insurgent movement. To achieve this objective, the Ethiopian 
government made two tactical decÏsions. First, it supported the V.S. coalition 
against Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iraq (Ethiopia had a seat at the V.N. 
Security Council at the time of the GulfWar). Mengistu believed that cooperating 
with the V.S. on the Iraqi issue could be the tirst step toward a U.S.-Ethiopian 
alliance against Arab influences in the Hom of Africa. Through this alliance, 
Mengistu was hoping to defeat secessionist insurgents in Eritrea (even if 
34 Ibid. 
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secessionists were from both Muslim and Christian backgrounds) and to 
consolidate his regime. As Herman Cohen recalls: 
What [Mengistu] wanted was to find a substitute for Soviet military 
support in the form of a trilateral anti-Arab alliance grouping 
Ethiopia, the United States, and Israel. Until the very end in May 
1991, Mengistu's overriding aim was to win military victories in 
his unwinnable internaI wars?5 
Mengistu's second tactical decision was his "visas for arms" policy. To rebuild his 
military, the Ethiopian leader used the Falashas in an attempt to obtain weapons 
from Israel. Mengistu literally blackmailed the Israeli government by making it 
cIear that there would be no Falasha emigration without arms in exchange. Thus, 
in early 1991, the Bush administration came to the conclusion that the regime of 
Mengistu was an obstacle to the resolution of the civil war and that his policy of 
the open hand toward Eritrea was a bluff. 
In April of 1991, after several unsuccessful attempts at peaceful 
negotiations, the EPLF and TPLF launched their final offensive against the 
Mengistu regime. In Washington, the issue of the Falashas became central. Both 
the White House and members of Congress worried that Ethiopian Jews could be 
the victims of the intensification of the civil war. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak 
Shamir even appealed to President Bush for an intervention in favor of the 
Falashas. In response to this appeal and to pressure from Congress, President Bush 
named Rudy Boschwitz, a former Republican Senator who had the fate of the 
Falashas at heart, as his special envoy to Ethiopia. Boschwitz's first assignment 
35 Herman J. Cohen, op. cil., p. 20. 
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was to deliver a message asking the Ethiopian government to facilitate the 
departure of the J ews. 36 
The D.S. government also intensified its involvement in the conflict by 
sending high-Ievel officiaIs to Ethiopia. In addition to Rudy Boschwitz, NSC 
director for Africa Robert Frasure, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs Irving Hicks also traveled to Ethiopia to push for the departure of 
the Falashas and to find a peace agreement between the GPDRE, the EPLF and the 
TPLF.37 American officiaIs first met with Mengistu in Addis Ababa. During the 
meeting, Mengistu consented to a rapid departure of the Falashas if the United 
States agreed to coyer the costs of the airlift operation.38 The Ethiopian leader also 
asked the Bush administration to organize a new round of peace negotiations with 
the insurgent movement. The State Department agreed to resume peace talks but 
indicated that these negotiations would begin only once the emigration process of 
the Falashas was underway.39 The peace conference finally began in London on 
May 27 following the rapid and successful departure of most of the Falashas. 
36 John M. Goshko, "U.S. Plea for Ethiopian Jews Led to Mediator Role; Marxist Government, 
Rebel Groups Sought American Involvement in Attempt to End Strife", The Washington Post, 
May 30, 1991. 
37 Peter J. Schraeder, "U.S. Intervention in the Hom of Africa Amidst the End of the Cold War", 
Africa Today, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1993, p. 8. 
38 The United States provided $15 million in assistance for the airlift of 18,000 Falashas from 
Addis Ababa to Tel Aviv. For more on this issue see Stephen Spector, Operation Salomon: The 
Daring Rescue of the Ethiopian Jews, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
39 NSC Director for Africa Robert Frasure traveled 10 Sudan to meet with Issaias Afwerti the leader 
of the EPLF and with Meles Zenawi the head of the TPLF, and they both agreed to meet in London 
in May to begin peace negotiations with the Mengistu regime. On May 24-25, 1991 the Falashas 
were airlifted to Israel. The U.S. and Israel had to pay $35 million to the Ethiopian government in 
"exit fees" for the operation. 
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Ethiopia 's Central Government Disintegrates 
In the days preceding the London conference, the political context i!1 
Ethiopia substantially changed. The EPLF launched its final attack on Asmara 
forcing 200,000 Ethiopian troops to surrender.40 The Eritrean secessionists then 
established a Provisional Government in Eritrea (PGE), which was in control of 
the entire Eritrean territory. Meanwhile, the TPLF army was literally waiting at the 
do ors of Addis Ababa ready to enter the city. Facing his imminent defeat, 
Mengistu abandoned his government on May 21 st fleeing to Zimbabwe.41 Before 
leaving, he designated his Vice President Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan as the new 
President of Ethiopia. 
Soon after the V.S. delegation began negotiating with representatives ofthe 
different parties in London, the V.S. Chargé d'Affaire in Addis Ababa, Robert 
Houdek, informed Assistant Secretary Cohen that the Ethiopian government was 
no longer able to defend the capital against rebel factions. Since the central 
government of the Derg was in an advanced stage of disintegration, the V.S. 
government made an important decision. Assistant Secretary Cohen, who chaired 
the peace talks in London, agreed to let the TPLF enter Addis Ababa to maintain 
order. This was part of Herman Cohen's strategy of a "soft landing", that is to 
settle the conflict by minimizing turmoil and violence. The V.S. was really 
40 Paul B. Henze, Ethiopia: The FaU of the Derg and the Beginning of Recovery Under the EPRDF 
(March 1990-March 1992), Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995, p. 19. 
41 The U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Robert Houdek had convinced Mengistu of ''the hopelessness of his 
situation" and of the inevitable defeat of his army. Houdek's pressure apparently convinced 
Mengistu to leave Ethiopia. See Paul Henze, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Defeat of the Derg and the 
Establishment of New Governments", in David R. Smock, (ed.), Making War and Waging Peace: 
Foreign Intervention in Africa, Washington D.C.: United States Institute ofPeace, 1993, p. 63. 
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concemed that the collapse of the Mengistu regime could produce chaos that 
would aggravate the war. The State Department was still shaken by the collapse of 
lawand order that resulted from the overthrow of the Liberian govemment in 1990 
and of the govemment of Somalia in early 1991, and Cohen was determined to 
prevent a similar state of anarchy emerging in Ethiopia.42 
The U.S. de ci sion to support the TPLF entry into Addis, however, became 
highly controversial because it was made without the approval of Ethiopia's Prime 
Minister Tesfaye Dinka who attended the London conference.43 This decision 
drastically changed the dynamic of the talks in London. Representatives of the 
GPDRE, led by Tesfaye Dinka, refused to acknowledge the disintegration of their 
regime and chose to leave the conference to prote st against what they called the 
"Cohen's Coup". Several Ethiopians were also opposed to the TPLF's take over in 
Addis Ababa and saw it as the replacement of one dictatorial regime by another 
one. Many argued in Ethiopia that the V.S. had literally authorized a military coup. 
The V.S. Supports Eritrea's Right to Secede 
The second major V.S. decision in London was less expected than the first 
one. At a press conference, Secretary Cohen declared that he was in favor of a 
referendum on Eritrea' s independence while stating that he hoped that Eritreans 
42 Evelyn Farkas, Fractured States and Us. Foreign PoUcy: Iraq, Ethiopia, and Bosnia in the 
1990s, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p. 56. 
43 Acting Ethiopian President Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan had apparently informed Robert Houdek that 
he consented to let the TPLF enter the capital because it was the only way to enforce order in Addis 
Ababa. This lack of communication between the new Ethiopian president and the prime minister, 
who was in London attending the peace talks, shows that the Derg regime was in an advanced 
phase of disintegration. Ibid., p. 20. 
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would ehoose to remain in Ethiopia.44 This dec1aration had the effeet of a bomb 
having been dropped. For the first time since the Second World War, the Vnited 
States expressly supported the right of a secessionist state to conduct a referendum 
on independence. This goes without saying that this statement departed from the 
U.S. traditional policy of supporting Ethiopia's territorial integrity. It was the first 
time in almost 50 years that the V.S. recognized Eritrea's right to become a 
sovereign state. 
Cohen justified this decision by emphasizing that Eritrea' s situation, from a 
legal point of view, was different from the other African secessionist movements. 
The Assistant Secretary stressed the fact that Eritrea was never allowed to exercise 
its right of self-determination. Eritreans were indeed compelled to join the Ethio-
Eritrean federation in 1952 following a V.N. Security Council decision, and was 
illegally annexed by Ethiopia in 1962. Hence, supporting a referendum on 
Eritrea's independence was a way to repair an historical mistake. 
The unique character of Eritrea, however, is a constant rather than a 
variable. Eritrea's right of self-determination had been denied since 1952 and 
successive V.S. administrations from President Truman to Reagan had never 
attempted to rectify this injustice. Therefore, this argument cannot explain why the 
V.S. suddenly reversed its policy. Assistant Secretary Cohen even recognized 
years later, during an interview with the author, that this legal argument was an 
excuse to justify the V.S. support to self-determination. "We felt it helped us feel 
44 Hennan J. Cohen, op. cit., p. 54. This decision was badly received in Addis Ababa and riots 
emerged in the streets of the capital. Ethiopians protested against the U.S. support for a referendum 
on Eritrea's independence. See Peter J. Schraeder, op. cit, p. 8. 
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comfortable because we were always worried with the Organization of African 
Unit y (OAU). But the OAU reached the same conclusion as we did, which was 
that secession was inevitable and that we couldn't stop it".45 The emphasis put on 
this international legal argument had also as its aim the prevention of criticism of 
U.S. foreign policy inconsistency in matters of international recognition. It was a 
way to avoid creating a political precedent. 
Explaining the Us. PoUcy Shift 
The U.S. decision to support Eritrea's referendum on independence was 
surprising since the U.S. delegation went to the London conference with a policy 
of supporting Ethiopia's territorial integrity.46 So why this shift? The explanation 
must be found in the political rather than in the legal realm. 
The central govemment of Ethiopia was no longer viable when the parties 
met in London in May of 1991 and the disintegration of the regime had become a 
great source of instability. Moreover, the Mengistu govemment had failed to 
contain the secessionist crisis within its borders and had used peace negotiations to 
buy time against Eritrea' s secessionists. The central govemment of Ethiopia was, 
therefore, a major obstacle to stability. Facts indicate that the V.S. consented to a 
referendum on Eritrea's independence because this was the only option to end the 
war and to reestablish stability in the Hom. In other words, the independence of 
Eritrea, or at least the right to conduct a free referendum on the issue, was seen as 
45 Interview with Herman J. Cohen, Washington D.C., May 16,2005. 
46 Herman Cohen points out: "As far as Eritrea was concemed, we went to the London conference 
with a policy of not recognizing secession pursuant to the principles of the Organization of African 
Union". Correspondence with Herman J. Cohen, May 23,2005. 
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a tool to foster regional stability in both Eritrea and Ethiopia; the only way to stop 
civil war and the devastating famine. As Evelyn Farkas properly points out: "the 
U.S. defense of the territorial sanctity of Ethiopia was only abandoned when it 
became an obstacle to continued negotiations and peace. In short, the United States 
decided to support Ethiopia's partition because it became necessary in order to 
achieve peace and stability.,,47 
A denial of Eritrea's right to secede may have caused war to resume in 
Ethiopia. According to Farkas: "there was an implicit recognition that not 
accepting the fait accompli would lead to more fighting". 48 In addition, the fact 
that the EPLF had a more powerful military than the TPLF, which was then in 
control of Addis Ababa, contributed to the U.S. policy shift. Eritrea was a de facto 
independent state in May of 1991, and any attempt by the new Ethiopian 
transitional authority to reclaim Eritrea by force would have resulted in a failure. 
Thus, the changing nature of the domestic context in Ethiopia forced the U.S. to 
formulate a new pragmatic approach. Since Eritrea's independence was 
unstoppable and given that the Ethiopian host state was powerless toward it, the 
U.S. decided to use its power to grant recognition to facilitate the resolution of the 
conflict (as in the case of Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia) and to impose, as it 
will be shown later, conditions of recognition. This was the only way that the U.S. 
could keep a certain control over the pro cess leading to the inevitable 
independence of Eritrea. 
47 Evelyn Farkas, op. cit., p. 60. 
48 Ibid., p. 59. 
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Dealing with the DA U 
The U.S. delegation in London declared itself in favor of a referendum on 
Eritrea' s secession before consulting with the Organization of African Unit y on 
the subject, which was unprecedented. Before pushing further in that direction, 
however, the U.S. checked with the OAU to see whether it supported its new 
stand. The United States had always backed the OAU's principle of the 
maintenance of post-colonial international borders to contain potential secessionist 
aspirations.49 As Herman Cohen indicates: "We were keen supporters of the 
cardinal princip le of the Organization of African Unity-that colonial boundaries 
inherited by African states should be left intact to preclude demands for hundreds 
of ethnically based ministates".50 This time, however, the U.S. went ahead of the 
OAU by supporting Eritrea's right to self-determination, which left the 
organization with very little option but to back this policy. 
In this context, the OAU recognized that Eritrea had never had the chance 
to decide its own political future and that a referendum on secession was, 
therefore, a legitimate action. American officiaIs also sought the approval of 
surrounding states (i.e. Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya and Sudan), which aIl gave their 
49 See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical 
and the Juridical in Statehood", World PoUtics, 1982, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 18. 
50 Herman J. Cohen, op. cit., p. 22. At a Congressional hearing held in February 1990, Hermann 
Cohen declared: "Ethiopia will be able to achieve a durable peace only by means of a negotiated 
political solution. The oudines of that solution are not hard to see. Ethiopia must remain who le" . 
See Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for independence: Domination, resistance, nationalism, 
1941-1993, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 44. 
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consent to Eritrea's secession. This was a way for the U.S. to secure regional 
stability following Eritrea's independence.51 
Absence of a Consensus Within and Between V.S. Foreign Policy Agencies 
The consensus that existed between U.S. foreign policy agencies on the 
issue of Ethiopia was based on the need to collaborate w~th Gorbatchev, to change 
the Ethiopian regime, and to end the war. Prior to Herman Cohen's unilateral 
decision to support a referendum on Eritrea's independence, there were serious 
doubts among U.S. national security bureaucracies about the positive aspect of 
Eritrea's independence. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the National 
Security Agency (NSA) worried that an independent Eritrea could become a 
hotbed for Islamic extremism. Following the policy shift, the State Department 
argued that the new Eritrean government was in control of its borders and, 
therefore, that it was not susceptible to being manipulated by radicals or by 
regional powers hostile to U.S. interests.52 
The decision of Assistant Secretary Cohen to support Eritrea's right to 
secede was made without prior approval by the State Department or the National 
Security Council. To the question "Why did the U.S. change its policy toward 
Eritrea's right to secede?" Walter Kansteiner, who worked for the Policy Planning 
staff at the State Department before replacing Robert Frasure as NSC Director for 
Africa, declared: "The U.S. didn't [change its policy], Cohen just said it. That's 
51 Walter Kansteiner indicates: "If you want to mess with borders, you better get the five 
surrounding countries and the country that is splitting to aH agree". Interview with Walter 
Kansteiner, Washington D.C., May 18,2005. 
52 Peter J. Schraeder, op. cit, p. 10. 
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the wonderful thing about being the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, no one 
else cares".53 In this case, however, the Bush administration did care and the 
latitude of the Assistant Secretary created tensions and disagreement within the 
State Department. A few hours after his controversial statement, Cohen received a 
call from Secretary Baker. The Secretary expressed strong concem about the new 
and unexpected policy toward Eritrea. As Cohen himselfrecalls: 
Baker expressed concem about my endorsement of self-
determination in Eritrea [ ... ]. The German government, he 
explained, was exerting pressure on the United States to recognize 
the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The United States was 
resisting because we feared that unilateral dec1arations of 
independence in Yugoslavia could lead to violence. My support for 
a referendum in Eritrea could open the door to press accusations of 
policy inconsistency. If self-determination is good enough for 
Eritrea, why isn't it good enough for Croatia and Slovenia? l 
protested that consistency is not necessarily the best way to deal 
with specifie country problems, an argument he found naïve.54 
In an interview with the author, Herman Cohen added: "Baker didn't really 
disagree [with my decision]. l think that if l had asked his opinion before l did 
what l did, he would have said: well you should stay out of it. Let them make their 
own announcement".55 Baker was apprehensive and anticipated tough questions 
from the press such as why the U.S. opposed Croatia and Slovenia's 
independence, which both had held a winning referendum on independence, while 
it supported a referendum on Eritrea's secession? Fortunately for Baker (and for 
Cohen), the press did not emphasize the inconsistency. 
53 Interview with Walter Kansteiner, Washington D.C., May 18,2005. 
54 Herman J. Cohen, op. cit., p. 54. 
55 Interview with Herman J. Cohen, Washington D.C., May 16,2005. 
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This intra-agency debate could have been avoided if Cohen had obtained 
the approval of Secretary Baker before making such a substantial policy 
modification. This disagreement could also have been avoided if the representative 
of the NSC at the London peace conference, Robert Frasure, had made sure that 
this decision regarding Eritrea did not conflict with other U.S. positions. After aH, 
the role of the NSC is precisely to coordinate policies between foreign policy 
agencies. In a correspondence with the author, Herman Cohen points out: 
Frasure was kind of taken aback by this ruling on my part, but he 
did not object. 1 remember telling him at the hotel that 1 had taken a 
'battlefield decision'. He laughed and said ok. In retrospect, Frasure 
should have objected because he represented the NSC. At that level, 
he should have known that we were trying to stop the independence 
of Slovenia and Croatia. 1 certainly was unaware of it. 56 
If the American participation in the relief of the Jewish Ethiopians was an 
express decision from the White House, U.S. involvement in the resolution of the 
Eritrean secessionist conflict and in the partition of Ethiopia were initiated by one 
man: Assistant Secretary Herman J. Cohen. At no point in time did the White 
House instruct the U.S. diplomat to work on the Eritrean secessionist question and 
even less to preside over the splitting of Ethiopia. 57 
A Unilateral Declaration of Independence is Excluded 
To achieve their "soft landing" strategy, American officiaIs in London 
discouraged EPLF leaders from issuing a unilateral declaration of independence 
56 Correspondence with Herman J. Cohen, May 23,2005. 
57 Paul Henze, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Defeat of the Derg and the Establishment of New 
Governments", in David R. Smock, (ed.), Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in 
Africa, United States Institute ofPeace Press, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 62. 
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(UDI) in 1991 because they believed that it would further destabilize Ethiopia. 
Assistant Secretary Cohen also warned Isaias Afwerki, the leader of the EPLF, that 
the United States and Western European states would not recognize Eritrea if it 
unilaterally seceded from Ethiopia. Cohen went even further by indicating that the 
U.S. would withhold the recognition ofboth the new Ethiopian government and of 
the Eritrea secessionist state if Addis Ababa and Asmara concluded an immediate 
separation. Thus, Washington was ready to oppose the independence of Eritrea in 
1991 even if the new Ethiopian govemment would have supported it. This was a 
unique scenario. 
Cohen also stressed the importance that Eritrean secessionists withhold 
their declaration of independence for a period of two years and that they wait for a 
U.N. sponsored referendum before officially seceding from Ethiopia. This two-
year period was meant to allow for the new Ethiopian and Eritrean governments to 
consolidate their power, to facilitate economic negotiations, and to establish 
favorable conditions for a stable transition toward Eritrea's independence. 
In this context, secessionist leaders made the calculation that the costs of 
issuing a UDI would clearly exceed the benefits. For one thing, as mentioned 
above, Eritrea was already a de facto independent state. A unilateral secession 
would not have granted much additional power to Eritrea and, on the contrary, 
would have deprived Eritreans from Western recognition and from U.N. 
endorsement. Such a disruptive decision could also have stained cooperation with 
Addis Ababa and with Western capitals at a time when Eritrea needed economic 
emergency relief to recover from its civil war. Thus, a UDI would not have been a 
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rational decision.58 Commenting on the EPLF decision, Robert Houdek, who was 
the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Addis Ababa from 1988 to 1991 and who became the 
first U.S. Ambassador to Eritrea from 1993 to 1996, declared: "It was a very smart 
maneuver. If the EPLF had declared independence the day they walked into 
Asmara, a lot of African members [and the United States] would have been 
uncomfortable with that". 59 
The 1991-1993 Transitional Period 
At the end of the London peace conference, parties agreed to meet in Addis 
Ababa in July to decide on the transitional phase. By then, the Mengistu regime 
had disintegrated. From May to July, there was in fact no official government in 
Ethiopia and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front assumed the function of the 
transitional government. It is ironic that the TPLF, which was helped and trained 
by the Eritrean secessionist front in the 1970s and 1980s, came to power in 1991 
as the new government of the host state from which Eritreans attempted to secede. 
In July, three important decisions were made at the Addis Ababa 
conference: 1) The TPLF officially recognized the right of Eritreans to decide on 
their political future in a referendum supervised by the United Nations. Even if 
sorne members of the transitional government of Ethiopia were opposed to the 
independence of Eritrea, there was nothing that the transitional government could 
58 Ibid., p. 75. When the war ended in 1991, about 85 percent of Eritreans depended on 
international food relief. See The Christian Science Monitor, "Eritrea's Path to Independence After 
a 30-year war, residents of this Red Sea land struggle to rebuild and win recognition for their 
dreams ofsovereignty", January 15, 1992. 
59 Phone interview with Robert Houdek, May 25,2005. 
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have done to prevent it. 60 The EPLF had the strongest military and it was in 
Ethiopia's interest to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with Eritrea. 
Meles Zenawi, the TPLF leader, called the anticipated secession of Eritrea an 
"unfortunate" event but argued that the maintenance of good economic relations 
with Asmara would minimize the disruptive effect of the breakup. Zenawi also 
made c1ear to V.S. officials that Ethiopian nationalists would not go to war in the 
future to rec1aim Eritrea back.61 Ethiopia's consent on the secession of Eritrea 
facilitated the international community' s acceptance of the breakup. This avoided 
creating a political precedent in which a secessionist state would have unilaterally 
seceded without the approval of its central state. 2) The EPLF, which attended the 
Addis Ababa conference as an observer, announced that Eritrea would stay out of 
the new Ethiopian transitional govemment as they had already set up their own 
govemment In Eritrea. The EPLF also agreed to defer for two years the 
referendum on Eritrea's independence. And 3) the Ethiopian govemment 
negotiated a free access to the Eritrean port of Assab on the Red Sea.62 Assab 
became a free transit port for goods entering Ethiopia. 
60 ln the early 1990s, Ethiopia was facing five different rebellious movements (e.g. Afars, 
Eritreans, Oromo, Somali and Tigray) among which the Eritreans and Tigray where the most 
powerful. It is important to mention here that the Addis Ababa conference approved the right of the 
Ethiopian nationalities to self-determination, which included the right to secede. However, only 
Eritrea used that right and had the actual capacity and will to function independently. The Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF), for instance, was discouraged by the United States from holding a 
referendum on independence. In his memoir Cohen writes: "1 discouraged [OLF leaders] from 
pursuing this policy objective, arguing that it was a nonstarter with the international community 
and could be traumatic for Ethiopia. 1 advised [them] to aim for a federal system which would give 
a measure of self-determination to the Oromos". Herman Cohen, op. cit., p. 51. 
61 Ibid., p. 55. 
62 John Young, op. cif., p. 206. 
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From May of 1991 to the referendum on independence in 1993, Eritrea was 
an independent state in all but name. Neighboring states like Sudan, Egypt and 
Yemen even established an official diplomatic presence in the Eritrean capita1.63 
Eritrea, however, remained officially part of the Ethiopian state until it formally 
proc1aimed its independence in April 1993. 
Strengthening Eritrea 's InternaI and External Stability 
American representatives also fixed conditions for an eventual recognition 
of Eritrea's independence. In addition to compelling Eritrea to renounce 
unilaterally dec1aring secession and to agree to hold a democratic referendum, the 
U.S. expected Eritrean secessionists to create basic democratic institutions, to 
enact free market reforms, and to maintain peaceful relations with neighboring 
states. These facts tend to validate my mode!. The U.S. persuaded Eritrean leaders 
that they first needed to establish their legitimacy and show that they could 
maintain internal and external stability before being recognized. 
During these two years, relations between Ethiopians and Eritreans were 
constructive. The Transitional Govemment of Ethiopia (TGE) reaffirmed its 
decision to support Eritrea' s right to secede and indicated that it would recognize 
the result of the referendum.64 Addis Ababa and Asmara also worked together to 
implement democratic reforms and affirmed that regional stability and peace were 
63 The Christian Science Monitor, op. cit., Janua,ry 15, 1992. 
64 Addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations in the faH of 1991, Ethiopia's 
Ambassador to the UN declared that Ethiopia "respects the right of the Eritrean people to freely 
determine their future in an intemationally supervised referendum". See Roy Pateman, Eritrea: 
Even the Stones are Burning, Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1998, p. 238. 
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prerequisites for economic development in the Hom. The two states also signed 
trade and communication agreements, and established a mutual defense pact. 65 The 
Provisional Govemment of Eritrea also proceeded to major political reforms. It 
introduced, among other things, the rule of law and conducted a civic education 
pro gram. Meanwhile, Ethiopia's transitional govemment drafted a new 
constitution that proclaimed a new peaceful and democratic order.66 Then, in late 
1992, the OAU announced that it would send observers during the referendum 
process and the UN General Assembly passed resolution 47/114 establishing the 
United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea 
(UNOVER). In 1993, when the referendum was held, Eritrea had thus shown 
evidence of internaI and external stability.67 
The referendum was finally held on April 23-25, 1993. Observers from the 
United States, the UN, the OAU, the Arab League, the United Kingdom, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, Russia, Yemen, Sudan and Tunisia were present for a total of 536 foreign 
65 Ruth Iyob, op. cit., p. 137. See also The Washington Post, "Ethiopia Proposes Eritrea Vote ln 
Exchange for Port Access", July 4, 1991. 
66 Paul Henze, op. cit., 1995, p. 27. 
67 During this two-year delay, however, Eritrea did not have full access to international aid since it 
was not a sovereign state. Furthennore, the United States suspended its development aid to the 
Eritrean govemment because the PGE had refused to adopt drastic liberalization policies. See The 
Christian Science Monitor, "An Opening for Democracy in Eritrea", April 30, 1993. The U.S., 
however, remained one of the main economic contributors to Eritrea during the transitional period 
and partly funded the referendum on independence. 
In August 1992, the United States reopened its Consulate in Asmara and a World Bank mission to 
Eritrea, which gathered representatives from the United States, the European Community and 
members of the UN Development Program, promised a fund of $140 million for Eritrea's 
reconstruction after its independence. See The Christian Science Monitor, "Eritrea Gets Fast Start 
Rebuilding Economy After Decades of War, Broken Infrastructure is Addressed", February 3, 
1993. 
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observers.68 Following the vote, OAU representatives validated the result and 
Eritrea declared its independence on April 27. The United States immediately 
recognized the new state and the international community followed suit.69 Ethiopia 
granted formally recognition to Eritrea on May 3rd and the official celebration of 
independence was held on May 24, the day of the second anniversary of the 
liberation of Asmara by the EPLF troopS.70 Eritrea became a member of the United 
Nations in June of 1993, and its diplomatie recognition allowed it to joïn the IMF 
and the World Banle 71 
Does the Eritrean Case Validate the Regional Stability Model? 
The answer is yeso As long as the Mengistu regime was in power and 
showed willingness to resolve the Eritrean secessionist conflict, the U.S. remained 
committed to Ethiopia's unity despite the fact that external stability was no longer 
preserved (i.e. massive cross-national refugee flow). From the day of the U.S. 
involvement in 1989 to the collapse of the Ethiopian government in 1991, 
Assistant Secretary Cohen and the State Department remained patient and 
attempted on multiple occasions to bring the parties together. Thus, the case of 
68 Ruth Iyob, op. cit., p. 139. One quarter of the 1.2 million registered voters were living outside of 
Eritrea (in Sudanese refugee camps, in Ethiopia or in Western countries). 
69 Although sorne states had already given their support and granted de facto recognition to Eritrea 
(e.g. Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yernen), the United States was the fIfst state to recognize de 
jure the independence of Eritrea following its declaration of independence. See Kinfe Abraham, 
Ethiopia From Bullets to the Ballot Box, Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1994, p. 58. 
70 Faets On File, "Eritrea", World News Digest with Index, Vol. 53, No. 2735, April 29, 1993. See 
also U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Background note: Eritrea. 
http://www.state.gov/r/palei/bgnl2854.htrn (accessed August 2006). 
71 Peter Woodward, The Horn of Afriea: PoUties and International Relations, London: I.B. Tauris, 
2003, p. 107. 
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Eritrea does validate the first step of the regional stability model. At no point in 
time, prior to the collapse of the Mengistu regime, did the United States support 
Eritrea's secessionist aspirations. 
The model also explains the U.S. policy shift in favor of Eritrea's 
independence. As the theory predicted in Chapter 3, the U.S. will undertake "a 
significant political shift in favor of the secessionists if at least one external and 
one internal indicator simultaneously depict a breakdown in stability".72 This is 
precisely what happened in the case of Ethiopia. Not only did the secessionist war 
cause external instability but the central govemment was not seriously interested 
in negotiating, and was ultimately paralyzed and collapsed. Taken together, these 
indicators caused the U.S. policy shift. 
Assistant Secretary Herman Cohen, however, was the mam agent 
responsible for the U.S. change in policy. His decision to support Eritrea's right to 
hold a referendum on secession left Secretary Baker and the White House with a 
fait accompli. Cohen's decision in London does support the regional stability 
argument. It seems, however, that if Cohen had consulted with the Secretary of 
State before committing the U.S. to a new policy, the American govemment would 
have stayed out of the debate and would have let Ethiopia and Eritrea make their 
own announcement regarding the referendum. 
Moreover, one could wonder whether the internaI and external stability 
factors really justify the shift in U.S. policy. The fact that the Eritrean secessionist 
army was the predominant military force in Ethiopia in 1991 made Eritrea's 
secession unstoppable, and this could be enough to explain why the U.S. supported 
72 See Chapter 3, p. 57. 
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Eritrea's secessionist self-determination. To this we can answer that, from 1989 to 
1991, secessionist rebels were more powerful than the central government and 
won most of the fights against it. Yet, the United States maintained its support of 
Ethiopia's integrity. 1 argue that the fact that Mengistu became an obstacle to 
internaI negotiations, combined with the cross-national refugee problem, are what 
initiated the U.S. policy shift. As for the distribution of power which was 
increasingly favorable for the Eritrean secessionists, it contributed by accelerating 
this shift. 
The second step of the regional stability model also explains the U.S. 
management of the last phase of the conflict. Between 1991 and 1993, the U.S. 
negotiating team was focusing on the internaI and external stability of Eritrea. 
First, Cohen received the assurance that the Eritreans would pursue a cooperative 
foreign policy with Ethiopia as weIl as with neighboring states, which aIl accepted 
Eritrea's secession. External stability was thus quickly secured at the Addis Ababa 
conference in July 1991. As for internaI stability, the EPLF already had effective 
control of Eritrea's territory when it took over Asmara in May of 1991 and 
secessionist leaders rapidly established a well-functioning government. During the 
two-year transition period, the Eritrean government implemented democratic and 
liberal reforms, followed by a democratic referendum on independence. As Evelyn 
Farkas indicates: "the [U.S.] decision to allow partition was made to advance the 
prospects for stability and security on the Hom. The means by which it was 
implemented demonstrates most clearly the U.S. concern about stability".73 In 
73 Evelyn Farkas, op. cit., p. 58. 
239 
The Recognition of Eritrea 
April of 1993, Eritrea fulfilled the U.S. criteria of stability and was ready to be 
recognized. OveraIl, the regional stability argument performs weIl. 
Competing Arguments 
To what extent do ethnic politics and private business interests explain the 
fluctuation of the U.S. position toward Eritrea? As far as ethnic lobbies are 
concemed, there was a consensus among Ethiopian and Eritrean Americans on the 
need to overthrow the Mengistu regime. This consensus reflected the cooperation 
between the TPLF, the EPLF, and the other rebel factions that were fighting 
against the Derg regime. Until 1991, Ethiopian and Eritrean American lobbies 
spoke with the same voice in favor of a regime change in Addis Ababa. Both 
diasporic communities, however, which consisted ofaround 100,000 U.S. citizens, 
were ethnically divided and could only agree on the overthrow of Mengistu. There 
was no consensus on who should rule in Addis Ababa following the downfall of 
the Derg and most Ethiopian Americans were opposed to Eritrea's independence. 
When the U.S. govemment made the decision to support a referendum on 
Eritrea' s secession, the cooperation between Ethiopian and Eritrean Americans 
abruptly ended. The Ethiopian American community mobilized and demonstrated 
against the U.S. policy shift. One leader of the Ethiopian community dec1ared that: 
"If it [the U.S. govemment] lets Eritrea secede, there is no way the govemment 
can deny it to any other group, which is the dismemberment of Ethiopia".74 
74 Cited in Evelyn Farkas, op. cil., p. 65. 
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Eritreans in the United States were less numerous than the Ethiopian 
Americans but they were unified behind the EPLF. The large majority of them 
were in favor of Eritrea's independence when the Mengistu regime fell apart, and 
they all pushed in the same direction even if they were not organized into one 
main ethnic association. Moreover, Eritrean Americans were successful at 
lobbying members of Congress and convinced sorne of them of the importance of 
Eritrea's secession. They gained support especially among the Subcommittee on 
African Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.75 
However, despite the fact that Eritrean Americans were vocal on Capitol 
Hill, and that they pressured Congress members, facts indicate that they failed to 
impact the Bush administration. As one policy-maker points out: "The 
demonstrations in the streets of Washington really didn't matter. What mattered 
were the conversations we had with Meles Zenawi [the TPLF leader and with 
Isaias Afwerki ofthe EPLF] in London".76 Moreover, as mentioned previously, the 
U.S. decision to support Eritrea's right to secede was made by Assistant Secretary 
Cohen and the decision was taken in London, far from Washington's political 
scene. No evidence indicates that the Eritrean American community impacted 
Herman Cohen's perception of the issue in the weeks prior to the London 
conference. 
Generally speaking, ethnic lobbies are influential to the extent that they can 
impact the election or reelection of politicians. This is why elected representatives 
75 Ibid., p. 67. 
76 Interview with Walter Kansteiner, Washington D.C., May 18,2005. Robert Houdek agrees with 
this point ofview. Phone interview with Robert Houdek, May 25,2005. 
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usually pay attention to the opinion of ethnic communities especially when they 
are concentrated in important states or ridings. In the case of Eritrea, the D.S. 
decision to support self-determination was not made by the President or by his 
political entourage, but by a non-elected high-Ievel public servant, who had not 
consuIted the White House before making the decision. The phone conversation 
that Assistant Secretary Cohen had with Secretary Baker, hours after his 
controversial declaration, shows that the State Department and the White House 
had not planned this policy shift. It is therefore very unlikely that the Eritrean 
American diaspora played a role in the redefinition of the policy. In fact, Baker 
and Cohen were both focusing on international factors. Secretary Baker was trying 
to preserve Yugoslavia's unit y and was worried about policy inconsistency, while 
Assistant Secretary Cohen's main objective was the end of the Ethiopian war and 
the stabilization of the Hom of Africa. Thus, the ethnic politics argument falls 
short in explaining the policy variation. 
Facts also indicate that the business interest argument does not explain the 
situations under investigation. In the aftermath of the Second World War, 
American corporations did have economic interests in Ethiopia. Pan-American 
airlines obtained landing rights from the Ethiopian govemment for its long-
distance trip to Asia. The New York based Sinclair Oil Company explored 
petroleum on the Ethiopian territory. And Shell operated an oil reserve in 
Massawa (Eritrea) for the use of the D.S. navy.77 In the mid-1970s, however, 
colonel Mengistu nationalized D.S. properties without providing any 
77 Okbazghi Yohannes, op. cit., pp. 67-68,210. 
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compensation in retum and, as a result, American business interests in Ethiopia 
became non-existent.78 By the time the Bush administration came to power, D.S. 
corporations had received compensations from Mengistu but Ethiopia was no 
longer seen as a safe place to invest. 79 Ethiopia was still officially a communist 
state and the 30-year civil war had destroyed infrastructures and produced high 
instability. During the rule of the Derg, the only substantial D.S. investment in 
Ethiopia was made by the Kalamazoo Spice Company from Michigan. 
The D.S. chargé d'affaires in Addis Ababa, Robert Houdek, does not recall 
that D.S. corporations ever pressured the Bush administration for or against 
Eritrea's secession. He points out: "the only kind of business interests that 1 was 
pushing for was with Ethiopian airlines. 1 wanted to make sure that they continue 
to buy Boeings. And they bought Boeings with Pratt and Wittney's engines on".80 
Boeings had helped the Ethiopian government to create Ethiopian airlines 
following the Second World War and this D.S. corporation wanted to maintain this 
long standing tradition following the downfall of Mengistu. Assistant Secretary 
Cohen concurs with Houdek. He has never been aware of any D.S. private firms 
that could have pressured the Bush administration in one way or the other toward 
the issue of Eritrea. 81 
The D.S. decision to support Eritrea's independence, therefore, can hardly 
be explained by D.S. business interests in the region. The central question that 
78 Ibid., p. 228. 
79 Interview with Herman 1. Cohen, Washington D.C., May 16,2005. 
80 Phone interview with Robert Houdek, May 25, 2005. 
81 Interview with Herman J. Cohen, Washington D.C., May 16,2005. 
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should be asked is how can the political outcome of the Eritrean issue (i.e. 
independence or integration) affect the interests of U.S. corporations if there was 
effectively no U.S. investment in Ethiopia and in Eritrea? In this context, it is hard 
to see how an independent Eritrea could have bolstered or damaged U.S. business 
interests. It could be argued, however, that the liberalization of Eritrea's economy 
and the overthrowing of the communist regime in both Eritrea and Ethiopia during 
the transition period did faH under U.S. medium and long-term economic interests 
as it created private investment opportunities. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the external instability of the Ethiopian host 
state was not sufficient in itself to compel the United States to move to the second 
step of the regional stability model. Indeed, from 1961 to 1991, hundreds of 
thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians fled Ethiopia to neighboring states to escape 
the war. Yet, the U.S. only shifted its policy in favor of Eritrea's independence 
once it became clear that the central govemment of Addis Ababa was no longer 
able and willing to resolve its internaI secessionist crisis. At this point, the idea of 
secession emerged as a tool to restore order, and this is consistent with the regional 
stability model developed in Chapter 3. 
The events of the 1991-93 transitionaI period aIso tend to validate my 
model. The U.S. persuaded Eritrean leaders that a unilateral declaration of 
independence would isolate Eritrea. Secessionist leaders were rather encouraged to 
establish a functioning and democratic govemment. Then, they strengthened their 
ties with the new Ethiopian govemment, and proceeded with a referendum on 
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independence supervised by the United Nations to validate the legitimacy of the 
breakup. It is only once Eritrea fulfilled these criteria that the United States 
extended recognition. 
The next chapter will focus on the nonrecognition of· a secessionist 
movement in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland, which is near Eritrea, was never 
recognized by the United States or by the larger international community. Once 
more, the regional stability model will be applied to this case to evaluate whether 
it is accountable for the U.S. position. 
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The Nonrecognition of Somali/and 
8. 
Somaliland: A Nonrecognized Independent State, 
1991-2005 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand why Somaliland, the northwest 
region of Somalia that seceded in 1991, is still unrecognized as an independent 
state despite its relative level of stability in comparison to the rest of Somalia. 
More specifically, this chapter will attempt to explain why the United States, 
whose role was important in the independence of Eritrea (the neighboring state), 
has been opposed to Somaliland's secession for over 15 years. 
Based on the regional stability theory, this chapter argues that until 1997, 
the United States did not seriously raise the issue of Somaliland's recognition 
because, like Somalia, it was unstable. Since 1997, however, Somaliland has 
experienced a period of uninterrupted stability and democratization. !ts 
government has developed a dynamic economy, created functional democratic 
institutions, and Somaliland now has most of the attributes of statehood. It has its 
own passport, national currency, flag, and license plates. Meanwhile, Somalia has 
undergone war and chaos and has been without effective government since 1991. 
Yet, despite Somaliland's achievements, which have been made without any 
foreign assistance, it is worth noting, the United States remains opposed to its 
independence. If we follow the assumptions of the regional stability model, the 
United States should now recognize Somaliland in order to promote stability in 
this turmoiled region of Africa but it does not do so. Why? 
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This chapter argues that Somaliland is an exceptional case. The failure of 
the V.S. assault mission in Mogadishu in October 1993, during which 18 U.S. 
Army Rangers were killed, partly explains why Washington has still not granted 
recognition to Somaliland, despite its fulfillment of most of the stability indicators 
introduced in Chapter 3. Since the failed military operation of 1993, a "Somalia 
aversion" has affected the conduct of the V.S. policy toward Somalia and 
Somaliland. The American government has refrained from being involved in the 
Somalian quagmire, and the State Department does not see how it could be 
beneficial to be involved one way or another in Somalia/Somaliland. This chapter, 
therefore, maintains that the casualties in Mogadishu is causally relevant in the 
explanation of the V.S. attitude toward Somaliland and that it partially undermines 
the predictive nature of the regional stability mode!. 
As in the case of Kosovo, studied previously, 1 must delimit the timeframe 
of this chapter since the Somaliland secessionist issue is still underway. The scope 
of the analysis is limited to the 1991-2005 period and does not include recent 
developments such as the overthrow of the Transitional Government of Somalia 
by Islamic extremists in 2006. Before beginning the analysis of this case, a brief 
historical synopsis of Somaliland will be introduced to pro vide a better outlook of 
the issue. 
Historical Background 
After more than 60 years as a British colony (1897-1960), British 
Somaliland declared its independence from England on June 26, 1960 and was 
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recognized by 35 states including the United States. l British Somaliland joined 
with Italian Somaliland five days later to form the Republic of Somalia to pursue 
the dream of uniting all the Somali people within one state.2 Despite the fact that 
the two Somalilands had different colonial pasts, their union was looked upon as a 
great prospect for political stability since the new Republic of Somalia was the 
only state in Africa that was ethnically, linguistically, and religiously 
homogeneous.3 
Despite their several common attributes, the two former colonies failed to 
develop a sense of nationhood. They had very different economies, unique 
colonial experiencès, and different institutions.4 Moreover, political parties were 
based on clan loyalties, which emphasized regional interests and divided the north 
and the south. These discrepancies led British and Italian Somaliland to disagree 
on the terms of the Act of Union and the new President of Somalia, Aden Abdilla 
Osman, decided to unilaterally authorize the unification through a political decree 
that established a unitary state.5 The Act of Union thus never obtained the consent 
1 Henry Srebmik, "Can clans form nations? Somaliland in the making", in Tozun Bahcheli, Barry 
Bartmann, and Henry Srebmik, (eds.), De Facto States: The quest for sovereignty, London: 
Routledge, 2004, p. 225. 
2 The territory populated by the Somali people was divided by the colonial powers in the late 19th 
century. The British occupied the Northem region (British Somaliland) and the North of present-
day Kenya. The French took French Somaliland (now Djibouti), the Italians occupied the South 
(Italian Somalia), and the Ethiopian Empire took up the Ogaden region. See Rakiya Omaar, 
"Somaliland: One Thom Bush at a Time", Current History, Vol. 93, No. 583, May 1994, p. 232. 
3 One could have expected Somalia to be in a better position to keep stability and peace than 
Ethiopia, for instance, which brought several ethnie and linguistic groups together with large 
Christian and Muslim populations. But recent history has proven the opposite. 
4 Somaliland and Somalia traded less than one percent oftheir production to each other. SomaIiland 
was mainly doing business with neighboring Arabie states, while Somalia was trading with Italy. 
See Henry Srebmik, op. cU., p. 212. 
5 Several Somalilanders favored a federation, while people from the south wanted a unitary state. 
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of politicians from former British Somaliland and no official international treaty 
on the union was ever signed between the two states.6 
Furthermore, Somalilanders opposed the adoption of Somalia' s constitution 
because the document was seen as reflective of southern thinking and Italian 
values.7 Nevertheless, the constitution was adopted because the large majority of 
the population in former ltalian Somalia (which represented two-thirds of the total 
population of Somalia) voted in favor of it. The Somalia experiment, therefore, 
started off on the wrong foot and suffered from a deficit oflegitimacy.8 
A military coup, orchestrated by Somalia's chief of the armed forces, Siad 
Barre, in 1969 drastically transformed Somalia' s political landscape. The 
constitution and the assembly of the Republic were suspended, private industries 
were nationalized, and the new military regime established a socialist state with 
the support of the Soviet Union.9 In the second half of the 1970s, Siad Barre 
pursued an aggressive foreign policy that aimed to unite aIl of the Somali people 
Ibid. 
6 Peter Woodward, The Horn of Afriea: PoUties and International Relations, London: LB. Tauris, 
2003, p. 65. 
7 Henry Srebrnik, op. cil., p. 212. Most Somalilanders chose to boycott the unification referendum 
and more than 50 percent of those who exercised their right to vote were opposed to the 
constitution. 
8 Also, the main govemment positions and the majority of the seats in the Mogadishu Parliament 
were held by Southern Somalians. Throughout the 1960s, Somaliland felt politically and 
economically marginalized. See Ismail 1 Ahmed and Reginald Herbold Green, "The Heritage of 
War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions 
and Reconstruction", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. l, 1999, p. 116. 
9 A treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed with the USSR in 1974. Rakiya Omaar, 
"Somalia: At War with Itself', Current History, Vol. 91, No. 565, May 1992, p. 230. 
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living in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya into a Greater Somalia.10 The tirst action 
undertaken by Barre was to invade Ethiopia's Ogaden region in 1977, which 
caused his regime to lose the support of the Soviet Vnion in favor of Ethiopia.11 
This event eventually compelled Barre to withdraw his troops from Ethiopia and to 
carry out a major political realignment. 12 In 1978, following the war with Ethiopia, 
Somalia requested V.S. economic and military assistance, and soon the Americans 
became the most important provider of foreign aid to Somalia. 13 In exchange, the 
V.S. obtained the right to use naval and military facilities in the port of Berbera 
located in the North (i.e. in Somaliland), which had previously been used by the 
Soviets. 14 
The V.S. support of Somalia was purely pragmatic and must be viewed 
through the lens of Cold War politics. As former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Africa, Herman Cohen, indicates: "Because of Somalia's strategie position, VS 
10 There were about 350,000 ethnie Somalis in surrounding states. See Herman J. Cohen, 
Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent, New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 2000, p. 198. 
11 Terrenee Lyons and Ahrned 1. Samatar, Somalia: Slate Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and 
Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Washington D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 1995, pp. 14-
15. Siad Barre exploited Ethiopia's vulnerability following the military eoup against Ethiopian 
Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 (see Chapter 7) to launeh its war. Following Moseow's decision to 
support Ethiopia in the war, Somalia ended its friendship agreement with the Soviet Union. 
12 This retreat eaused more than 650,000 ethnie Somali to flee Ethiopia to Somalia for fear ofbeing 
perseeuted by the Mengistu regime for eomplicity with Somalia. Peter Woodward, op. cit., p. 70. 
13 Between 1980 and 1990, 75 percent of aIl Somalia's military equipment was coming from the 
United States. Matthew Bryden, "Somalia: The Wages of Failure", Current History, Vol. 94, 
No. 591, April 1995, p. 146. 
14 In 1979, the United States took over the former Soviet faeilities in the port of Berbera and 
upgraded the station by investing $35 million. The U.S. used this strategie location to keep an eye 
on the Persian Gulf against any potential Soviet invasion. See Herman J. Cohen, "Somalia and the 
US Long and Troubled History", Race and History, January 2002. 
http://www.raceandhistory.comlcgi-bin/forum/webbbsconfig.pllnoframes/read/ 115 (aecessed June 
2006). 
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diplomacy felt obliged to cultivate close and cordial relations with one of the 
world's most vicious despots, Mohammed Siad Barre". 15 
The Emergence of the SNM 
In the early 1980s, a group of exiled Somalilanders in London created the 
Somali National Movement (SNM). This movement assembled businessmen, 
religious leaders, intellectuals and former army officers from the Isaak clan-the 
largest family clan in Somaliland-and its main objective was to overthrow 
Barre's regime. 16 Military operations conducted by the SNM were based in 
Ethiopia with Addis Ababa's supportY It is worth noting that the SNM, which 
eventually declared the independence of Somaliland, was initially not a 
secessionist movement. In fact, in the 1980s most of its members saw Somalia's 
unity as being inviolable and fought for the establishment of a federal state. 18 
The SNM's war against the central government reached its peak in 1988 
when the SNM made significant progress by defeating the troops of Siad Barre in 
Hargeisa (the capital of Somaliland) and in Burao. The response of the central 
15 Herman J. Cohen, op. cit., 2000, p. 197. 
16 The Isaak clan dominates the northwest of Somalia. Around 70 percent of Somalilanders are 
Isaaks. See Asteris Hulianas, "The Viability of SomaIiIand: InternaI Constraints and Regional 
Geopolitics", Journal ofContemporary African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2002, p. 157. 
17 Ironically enough, Ethiopia and Somalia supported each others' rebellious movements. Addis 
Ababa supported the SNM to weaken the regime of Barre in SomaIia, while Mogadishu was 
supporting the EPLF and TPLF which were fighting against the regime of Mengistu in Ethiopia. 
This logic turned out to be counter-productive since it increased the vulnerability and weakness of 
both states'regimes. 
18 As Matthew Bryden notes: "Federalism was widely touted as the most Iikely post-Barre model of 
govemment". See Matthew Bryden, "Somaliland and Peace in the Horn of Africa: A Situation 
Report and Analysis", UN Emergencies Unitfor Ethiopia, November 13, 1995. 
http://www.h-net.orgl-africa/sources/somalirpt.html (accessed June 2006). 
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government was brutal. Barre ordered aeriai bombardments on Somali1and's cities. 
The effects of this counter measure were atrocious.19 By 1990, at Ieast 50,000 
Somalilanders had died in the fighting between the SNM and the national army, 
and these events strengthened popular support for secession. 
The SNM was not the only rebellious movement in Somalia. During the 
1980s, two other organizations from the South aiso fought for the overthrow of 
Barre's authoritarian regime: the United Somali Congress (USC), and the Somali 
Patriotic Front (SPF). In concert with the SNM, these movements coordinated 
their military efforts and accelerated the faH of Barre. In May of 1990, wariords 
from different clans and rebellious movements controHed large parts of Somalia 
and the government of Mogadishu could no longer carry out its normal 
administrative functions. In January 1991, the state of Somalia disintegrated when 
the troops of the United Somali Congress, under the authority of General Aidid, 
entered Mogadishu and forced Siad Barre to flee.2o 
Pro-Secessionist Sentiment Rises 
In the months following the exile of Siad Barre, SNM leaders who were by 
then in control of Somaliland were highly dissatisfied with the way the post-Barre 
19 As Asteris Huliaras indicates: "Schools were razed, water and electricity were made inaccessible, 
and at least 40,000 people died and half a million fled into Ethiopia". See Asteris Huliaras, op. cit., 
p.159. 
20 As Bradbwy, Abokor, and Yusuf point out: "AIl state legislative and judicial institutions 
disintegrated, along with the army, banks and government-run welfare services". See Mark 
Bradbwy, Adan Yusuf Abokor, and Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, "Somaliland: Choosing Politics over 
Violence", Review of African Political Economy, No. 97, 2003, p. 456. 
Siad Barre fled to the Kenyan border. One year after his overthrow, Barre had still not been offered 
sanctuary by any foreign countries. See U.S. Department of State, January 1992. Unclassified 
Document E30, case 200502026. Unclassified on January 27, 2006. Barre eventually died in exile 
in Nigeria. 
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transition was going. There was a lack of consultation between the three rebellious 
movements and the national conference on transition that had been planned prior 
to the collapse of the Barre regime never convened. Furthermore, a faction of the 
USC decided unilaterally to form a government in Mogadishu and named its 
leader, Ali Mahdi, as interim president without any prior consultation with the 
SNM. This decision not only alienated Somalilanders but initiated a war between 
the two dominant figures of the United Somali Congress: Ali Mahli and General 
Aidid. This war was the main cause of starvation and suffering in Somalia during 
the 1990s. 
In the face of these developments, SNM leaders declared the independence 
of the Republic of Somaliland in Burco on May 18, 1991 and repealed the Act of 
Union of 1960.21 The Burco proclamation stated that Somaliland would keep the 
borders of the former colony of British Somaliland, and the leader of the SNM, 
Abd-er-Rahman, also known as "Tur", was named president of the new Republic. 
Secessionist leaders also argued that since Somaliland had been a distinct 
geopolitical entity prior to 1960 and that it had declared independence and 
obtained international recognition in June 1960, the Burco declaration was not an 
act of secession but a "voluntary dissolution between sovereign states"?2 
21 Somalilander leaders argued that in addition of having suffered from Barre's repression in the 
1980s, and having been deprived from economic development since the 1960s, Somaliland had 
been betrayed by its southem allies. Rakiya Omaar, op. cit., 1992, p. 233. Omaar indicates that 
Somalilanders "crossed the Rubicon of secession in May 1988." He addes that "the sca1e and 
ferocity of the war in the north had nurtured a visceral hatred not on1y of the regime but of 
everything it represented". Ibid., pp. 233-234. 
22 Quoted in Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor, and Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, op. cil., p. 457. 
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However, since there was no longer a central government in Mogadishu to consent 
(or not) to the dissolution, the declaration was one of secession stricto sensu. 
The American Reaction 
The regional stability theory is applied here to the post-May 1991 era, that 
is to say, after Somaliland declared independence. Prior to this, there was no 
secessionist cri sis in Somalia and the Bureau of African Affairs of the State 
Department was only focusing on the resolution of the civil war?3 In the days 
following Somaliland's unilateral declaration of independence, the State 
Department made its position clear: the D.S. government would not recognize any 
new entity in Somalia. In a cable sent to American embassies in Africa, Secretary 
of State James Baker writes: 
The Somali National Movement (SNM) recently announced 
northem Somalia's secession under the name 'Somaliland 
Republic', with boundaries apparently the same as the old British 
Somaliland protectorate. The import of this move is not entirely 
clear. It may not be fully accepted even within the SNM and may 
also be designed as a bargaining chip for SNM use with the self-
proclaimed provisional government in Mogadishu. The D.S. of 
course does not recognize any new entity in Somalia. As we have 
23 Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. supported Siad Barre for strategie reasons. As Cohen recalls: 
"Despite Somalia's severe internaI instability, CENTCOM continued to view the naval/air facility 
at Berbera as important to the defense of the Gulf. In Tampa, Florida, in late 1989, CENTCOM 
Commander in Chief General Norman Schwarzkopf pressed me on the need to maintain access to 
Berbera". Herman J. Cohen, op. cif., p. 202. Therefore, even if the government ofSiad Barre failed 
to keep external stability in the 1980s and used brutal repression against the population of 
Somaliland, the U.S. chose to tum a blind eye on these atrocities. 
The Gulf war had a major impact on Somalia's geo-strategic value. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 
August of 1990 opened the way for U.S. military deployment in the Middle East (e.g. in Saudi 
Arabia), and as a result the port of Berbera was downgraded to a U.S. "backup contingency 
facility". As U.S. strategie interests in Somalia vanished at the dawn of the 1990s, the eagerness 
with which the American government supported Siad Barre diminished. This does not mean, 
however, that the administration of George H. W. Bush was indifferent to the fate of Somalia. The 
United States supported the central govemment and hoped that a peace agreement would be 
reached to preserve the integrity of the state. 
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made clear elsewhere, we do not think declaratory acts hold the key 
to solving Somalia's or the hom's problems. Only negotiations can 
do that. SNM' s unilateral declaration of independence could also 
serve to complicate a possible initiative by African states or the 
OAU on the political front by introducing new juridical problems. 
In our actions and statements with respect to Somalia, we wish to 
calI as little attention as possible to the SNM's UDI.24 
The U.S. position of nonrecognition was shaped by different factors which, when 
taken together, led the Bush administration to conclude that the partition of 
Somalia would lead to the emergence of another unstable state in the Hom of 
Africa. First of all, there was a chaotic situation in Mogadishu and the Bush 
administration wanted to avoid any hast y decision that could have worsened the 
situation in Somalia. 
Secondly, in the absence of a central govemment in Mogadishu, the U.S. 
did not trust any rebellious groups or clans that pretended to speak in the name of 
the Somali people. As Assistant Secretary Cohen points out: "We did not 
recognize the new entity [Somaliland], because we had no confidence in any 
declarations in Somalia". 25 
Thirdly, the U.S. govemment had difficulties in gathering reliable 
information on the political course of events in Somalia. This was mainly due to 
the fact that the U.S. no longer had an embassy in Mogadishu-violence in the 
capital had forced the U.S. govemment to evacuate and close its embassy in 
24 U.S. Department of State, May 1991. Unclassified Document E6, case 200502026. Unclassified 
on January 20, 2006. Moreover, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) reaffmned the founding 
principles of the organization (i.e. sovereignty, territorial integrity, intangible territorial integrity) 
and categorically opposed the secession of Somaliland. See U.S. Department of State, June 1991. 
Unclassified Document E9, case 200502026. Unclassified on January 20,2006. 
25 Herman J. Cohen, op. Git., pp. 204-205. 
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January 1991. In addition, as unclassified cables show, U.S. embassies in Djibouti 
and Kenya were unable to communicate valuable information on what was 
happening on the ground: "We have received no reliable information on what is 
actually happening in the north,,?6 In this context, the U.S. was not in a position to 
make a sound and enlightened decision on the issue of Somali1and. 
Fourthly, unlike Eritrea, which ultimately seceded with the consent of 
Ethiopia, Somaliland never received the approval of Somalia to leave since there 
was no constitutive government in Somalia in the aftermath of Siad Barre's 
departure. The United States was clearly aware of this fact and raised it as an 
objection against secession because it feared that recognition in such a context 
would create a precedent. 27 
Fifthly, the Organization of African Unit y (OAU) was opposed to 
Somaliland's secession and the United States was not interested in violating the 
sacred principle of state integrity cheri shed by the OAU.28 The OAU's approach to 
Somaliland was far different from its approach toward Eritrea for the reason 
mentioned in point four. 
26 The cable sent to the State Department pointed out: "It appears to us that the limited hard 
evidence on hand permits several different speculations about what was going on up there. One 
possibility is out-and-out independence. Another is an attempt by the SNM to face the Mogadishu 
provisional authorities on a footing of equality, as a 'government' rather than a movement. This 
would leave open the possibility of later re-negotiating the 1960 Act of Union with the south, 
which some Isaaks have expressed interests in doing. A third possibility is that the declaration of 
independence is an attempt by one faction or group of factions to force the secession issue by 
announcing it publicly". See U.S. Department ofState, May 1991. Unclassified Document E4, case 
200502026. Unclassified on January 20, 2006. 
27 U.S. Department of State, November 1991. Unclassified Document E28, case 200502026. 
Unclassified on January 27,2006. 
28 Phone interview with Robert Houdek, Washington D.C., May 25,2005. 
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Thus, at this point, there was no benefit for the U.S. in supporting 
Somaliland' s independence and the costs of making such a decision would have 
been considerable since they may have worsened the political environment in the 
Hom. 
Awaiting for the Formation of a Somalian Government 
In this context, the United States focused its attention on the global 
settlement of the Somalian crisis and, in the words of Secretary Baker, called "as 
little attention as possible to the SNM's UDI".29 The Bush administration, 
however, was not as directly involved in the resolution of the Somalian conflict as 
it was in Ethiopia, for instance, during the same period. At that time, the Bureau of 
African Affairs was already involved in the resolution of several other African 
conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, and Sudan, and thus, suffered 
from 'bureaucratie fatigue'. As Herman Cohen points out: "with US forces weIl 
accommodated directly in the Gulf, and with our embassy closed, we more or less 
dropped Somalia from our radar screens".30 
In the weeks following the collapse of Somalia, the Bush administration 
expressed support for the restoration of a central Somalian govemment and 
encouraged Djibouti in its initiative to host reconciliation talks in June and July of 
1991. The U.S. saw the restoration of peace and order in Somalia as essentiai to 
29 See quotation pp. 255-256. 
30 Herman J. Cohen, op. cit., p. 203. In fact, the State Department adopted a wishful thinking 
approach toward Somalia by assuming that the different Somali clans would eventually find a way 
to live together and to bring order back in the state. This was far from being a realist assessment of 
the situation on the ground. 
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setting the stage for an international relief effort and it remained confident that 
Somalia could establish a functioning govemment. 31 
The peace negotiations held in Djibouti in the summer of 1991 failed, 
however, because sorne warlords did not attend the talks and because SNM 
representatives refused to participate in the negotiations claiming that their party 
was not one political faction among others but the representative of the Republic 
of Somaliland. Ironically, these talks, which aimed to reunite Somalia, accelerated 
its collapse. 
While Somalian political parties attempted to secure a peace agreement, 
Somalilanders were on a different trajectory. In the fall of 1991, SNM leaders 
traveled to Western countries to seek international recognition and humanitarian 
assistance.32 ln Washington, SNM representatives delivered the following message 
to State Department officiaIs: 1) The Isaaks and the other clans in Somaliland 
support secession; 2) Law and order prevail on the ground; 3) Somaliland is 
committed to liberal democracy; 4) A referendum on Somaliland' s constitution 
will be held within two years (the referendum was actually held in 2001); and 5) 
Somalilanders favor a market oriented economy.33 Despite this charm offensive 
carried out by the secessionists, the State Department adopted a 'wait-and-see' 
approach and expressed its preference for a global peace solution to end the 
Somalian crisis. 
31 U.S. Department ofState, July 1991. Unclassified Document E22, case 200502026. Unclassified 
on January 26,2006. 
32 Secessionists visited European capitals, the U.N. headquarters, Canada and the United States. 
33 U.S. Department of State, November 1991. Unclassified Document E28, case 200502026. 
Unclassified on January 27,2006. 
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Somaliland Devolves into Chaos (1992-1996) 
The peaceful state of affairs in Somaliland that was depicted by SNM 
representatives in Washington did not last. Clan conflicts erupted in March of 
1992 when Somaliland's government attempted to take control of the Red Sea port 
of Berbera against the will of the local clans and warIords. This conflict was the 
result of the government's failure to establish demobilization programs for veteran 
fighters. Sub-clan conflicts also caused Somaliland's emerging economy to 
crumble after a few months of sustained economic activities. The absence of 
international recognition also worked against the economy of Somaliland since it 
could not acquire loans from international institutions.34 
In less than a year after its UDI, Somaliland was internally unstable. This is 
without mentioning that all the political and military factions in Somalia were 
opposed to its secession, which indicates that Somaliland was evolving in a semi-
hostile international environment. These events confirmed the assessment of the 
State Department that the whole region was unstable and that a global solution had 
to be found, starting with the establishment of a central government in Mogadishu. 
The EIders at the Center ofSomaliland's Conjlict Resolution Pro cess 
In late 1992, eIders from the different sub-clans in Somaliland gathered in a 
"shir" (assembly) to find a solution to the crisis in what became the first national 
34 Ismail Ahmed, "Understanding Conflict in Somalia and Somaliland", in Adebayo Adedeji, (ed.), 
Comprehending and Mastering African Conjlicts, New York: Zed Books, 1999, p. 244. 
Furthermore, the four non-Isaak tribes, which represented around 30 percent of Somaliland's 
population, refused to join the Isaak-clan ruling majority in the new constituted govemment. The 
non-Isaak clans are: the Dulbahante, the Gadabursi, the Warsengeli, and the Isse. See Rakiya 
Omaar, op. cit., 1994, p. 234. 
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reconciliation conference. A political settlement, which among other things 
allocated a greater share of parliamentary seats to minority clans, was reached in 
the spring of 1993. This unique way ofsolving political problems was part of the 
Somaliland traditional conflict resolution structure.35 This traditional mechanism 
will prove its effectiveness throughout the 1990s and explains, in large part, why 
Somaliland will eventually become a stable political entity in comparison to the 
rest of Somalia. 
Following the reconciliation conference, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (who 
had been prime minister of Somalia in the late 1960s) was selected as the president 
ofSomaliland and "Tur" (who had been the first president ofSomaliland in 1991) 
was chosen as vice-president. Egal made significant progress towards political 
stability. He demobilized the militias that were created in the 1980s to fight against 
Siad Barre, and he re-established a secure environment for economic activity. The 
new president was unable, however, to extend administrative control over aIl of 
Somaliland's territory and met the resistance of sorne Isaak sub-clans over the 
issue of power sharing. Moreover, rebellious groups loyal to the unit y of Somalia 
(called the federalists) and allied with Somalian General Aidid, opposed Egal' s 
government. The fight between the secessionists and the federalists caused 
Somaliland to fall into a second civil war in late 1994, during which Hargeisa and 
Burco were seriously damage d, and 180,000 people were displaced throughout 
Somaliland.36 
35 Rakiya Omaar, op. cil., May 1994, p. 234. 
36 Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor, and Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, op. cit., p. 461. 
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This second war validated, once again, the American assessment of the 
situation in Somaliland and kept the issue of recognition off the U.S. foreign 
poHcy agenda. 
Somaliland: From Internai Strife to Growing Stability (1997-2005) 
Somaliland's internaI war ended with the gathering of a second national 
reconciliation conference, held in Hargeisa from October 1996 to February 1997. 
Retrospectively, this conference marked the beginning of Somaliland's 
institutionalization and democratization process. Isaak sub-clans, which had been 
fighting each other sporadically over the control of resources, decided to put an 
end to their division and to work together for the edification of viable political 
institutions.37 This state of mind had a 'snowball effect'. It improved the minority 
clans' trust of the Isaaks, and favored their involvement in the institutionalization 
process of Somaliland. 
Representatives at the conference also established a parliament with a two-
chamber assembly inspired by the Westminster model of govemment. The Lower 
Rouse serves as an elected assembly, and the Upper Rouse serves as the Senate of 
the Clans also called the Rouse of Eiders. 38 
Although Somaliland President Egal failed to achieve international 
recognition for Somaliland, he succeeded in establishing a democratic and stable 
govemment, and he was able to resume economic activities. In 1997, for instance, 
37 Gerard Prunier, "Somaliland Goes It Alone", Current History, Vol. 97, No. 619, May 1998, 
p.228. 
38 Steve Kibble, "Somaliland: Surviving Without Recognition; Somalia: Recognised but Failing?", 
International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 5, p. 14. 
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the port of Berbera became a central import-export location on the Red Sea and 
overshadowed the port of Djibouti in terms of goods traded.39 In the late 1990s, 
exchanges through the port were double what they were before the 1988 war 
against Siad Barre.4o A vibrant private sector also emerged. Airline companies as 
weIl as electricity and telephone companies were created in order to help rebuild 
Somaliland's infrastructures. At the dawn of the 21 st century, the economy of 
Somaliland was getting stronger and was in a much better position than Somalia' s 
economy, which was even assisted by international organizations. 
On the political front, President Egal carried out a political transition 
toward a multiparty democracy, which added value to Somaliland's democratic 
process.41 Ris govemment also signed the Universal Declaration of Ruman Rights 
and drafted a constitution that guaranteed univers al suffrage. Moreover, in May of 
2001, a new constitution was validated by 97 percent of Somaliland's voters in a 
referendum supervised by international observers. The resuIt of the referendum 
was a clear majority in support of Somaliland's independence as the first 
paragraph of the constitution stipulated that Somaliland was an independent 
state.42 
39 Ken Menkhaus, "Somalia: Political Order in a Stateless Society", Current History, Vol. 97, No. 
619, May 1998, p. 221. 
40 Ismail 1 Ahmed and Reginald Herbold Green, op. cit., p. 161. 
41 Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor, and Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, op. cit., p. 463. 
42 Steve Kibble, op. cit., p. 16. The international community was impressed by the referendum 
process but did not attach any legal value to it because there was no census in Somaliland and, 
therefore, it was impossible to know the proportion of Somalilanders who favored independence. 
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The death of President Egal in 2002 was the first serious democratic test 
for Somaliland since his death necessitated a political transition. The test was 
successfully passed and the transfer of power to new President Dahir Riyale Kahin 
was performed according to the constitution. This showed the viability and 
stability of the political system.43 Finally, in September 2005, the first multiparty 
parliamentary elections were held. This was seen as a major step in the 
democratization process and as proof that Somaliland is now becoming a stable 
multiparty democracy.44 
Today, Somaliland has functioning democratic institutions including a 
judicial system and a free press, and it no longer generates refugees, which greatly 
contributes to its external stability. Somalilanders aIso have a légitimate 
constitution, an army, and police forces. As indicated in the introduction, it also 
has the main attributes of statehood including a flag and its own currency, 
pas sports and license plates.45 Somalilanders also obtained quasi-recognition from 
several states: Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti exchanged quasi-ambassadorial 
envoys with Hargeisa. 
After numerous threats to its existence in the first half of the 1990s, 
Somaliland managed to survive as a de facto independent state on the path to 
prosperity. Since 1997, Somaliland has experience a period of uninterrupted 
stability. 
43 The following year, president Kahin was confrrmed in his functions during a presidential 
election. 
44 Stefan Simanowitz, "Democracy cornes of age in Sornaliland", Contemporary Review, December 
2005, Vol. 287, No. 1679, pp. 335-339. 
45 Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor, and Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, op. cit., p. 458. 
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Somaliland 's Externat Stability 
Despite the fact that Somaliland no longer pro duces refugees, the external 
dimension of its stability is not as strong as its internaI counterpart. In the late 
1990s, Somaliland's territorial integrity was disputed by Puntland, a non-
secessionist autonomous state established in 1998 on the northeastern side of 
Somalia, which claimed Somaliland's regions of Sanaag and Soo1.46 The dispute 
emerged when members of minority clans in Somaliland (the Dulbahante and the 
Warsangeli) who lived near the Puntland border felt divided in their affiliation and 
wanted to associate with Puntland. Somaliland argued that the two regions were 
part of former British Somaliland, while Puntland authorities maintained that the 
representatives of Sanaag and Sool expressed their desire to join Puntland and 
should have the right to do SO.47 Tensions arose in 1999 when the government of 
Puntland attempted to establish control over parts of Sanaag and Sool, an action 
that led to a political crisis. Until recently, Somaliland's integrity remained 
threatened by Puntland.48 
It seems, however, that the SomalilandiPuntland border dispute has not 
been a major factor influencing the U.S. nomecognition policy. None of the U.S. 
govemment officiais interviewed for this chapter raised the Puntland issue as an 
obstacle to Somaliland's recognition, and the literature on Somaliland, written 
from a U.S. perspective, does not raise this subject either. 
46 Asteris Huliaras, op. cit., p. 169. 
47 Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor, and Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, op. cit., p. 457. 
48 Asteris Huliaras, op. cit., p. 166. 
264 
The Nonrecognition ofSomaliland 
The U.S. Poliey Remained Constant 
In the second half of the 1990s and in the early twenty-first century, the 
United States continued to focus on the establishment of a central government in 
Mogadishu. The objective was straightforward: to prevent Somalia from becoming 
a hot bed for Islamic fundamentalism.49 During these years, the U.S. has remained 
categorically opposed to Somaliland's independence. 
In 1999, Somaliland President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal visited the 
United States and raised the issue of recognition with State Department officiais. 
The U.S. policy remained unchanged, however, and the State Department 
indicated, as it had in 1991, that a global solution must be found in order to resolve 
the Somalian crisis. This time, the U.S. govemment agreed to supply more aid to 
Hargeisa.5o The U.S. govemment sent a delegation of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) to the secessionist state in 2000. The 
delegation, headed by the U.S. Ambassador in Djibouti, met with President Egal 
and such a visit to an African secessionist state was unprecedented. 51 As former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman J. Cohen points out: "while 
awaiting for sorne eventual Somalian govemment, we are doing what we could 
have done if we would have recognized Somaliland. We are giving aid. So the 
situation on the ground is not so different".52 
49 Asteris Huliaras, op. cit., p. 171. 
50 Henry Srebmik, op. cit., p. 219. 
51 Ibid., p. 172. 
52 Interview with Herman J. Cohen, Washington D.C., May 16,2005. 
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In 2001, the D.S. supported the Arta peace pro cess that established the 
Transitional National Government of Somalia (TNG).53 This was the twelfth peace 
negotiation attempt since the collapse of Somalia. Since its creation, the TNG has 
not been able, however, to establish its authority over Somalia and the whole 
region remains an administrative 'black hole'. 
Why does the V.S. Refuse to Recognize Somaliland? 
If the SomalilandlPuntland border dispute does not bother D.S. decision-
makers, why is it then that the U.S. still refuses to recognize this secessionist state, 
which meets most of the U.S. traditional requirements for recognition? Why is it 
that the American government persists in supporting the formation of a Somalian 
government after more than a decade of negotiation failures between the different 
family clans, while Somaliland is stable, peaceful, democratic, and has sought 
recognition for over 15 years? In such a case, the regional stability argument 
predicts that the D.S. should quickly move on with recognition in order to bolster 
stability in the region. 
This chapter argues that the key to understanding this puzzle lies in what 
can be referred to as the "Somalia aversion", which is unique to this case. To 
understand the impact of this intervening factor in the U.S. regional stability 
calculation, we must go back to the year 1993. 
53 Steve Kibble, op. cit., p. 13. Arta is a city in Djibouti where negotiations occurred. 
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The 'Somalia Aversion' Factor 
Following the collapse ofSomalia in 1991, Mogadishu became the scene of 
inter-clan fighting for the control of food and other resources. In early 1992, the 
humanitarian crisis in Somalia hit the news in the United States and CNN provided 
extensive coverage of the issue. Somalia soon became a buming issue in U.S. 
politics. As Herman Cohen recalls: CNN, which "showed starving Somali mothers 
and babies on American television daily had a strong impact. Congress was 
inundated with mail calling for Washington to do something to stop the 
suffering".54 With a U.S. Presidential election coming in November, President 
Bush estimated that it was worthwhile to tackle the Somalian issue. After being 
abandoned by the Americans in January 1991, Somalia became a top U.S. foreign 
policy issue less than a year later. In August, the White House announced that the 
Department of Defense (DoD) would launch an emergency food airlift to Somalia 
called "Operation Provide Relief,.55 The U.S. operation, however, encountered the 
resistance of warlords in Mogadishu who blocked the distribution of food. 
In the weeks following his presidential defeat, President Bush remained 
steadfast to resolve the hunger problem in Somalia. In December of 1992, 28,000 
U.S. troops were dispatched as part of the United Nations Unified Task Force-
UNITAF. The objective of the mission was to take control of the ports of 
Mogadishu in order to assure the distribution of relief supplies. 56 Throughout 
54 Hennan J. Cohen, "Somalia and the US Long and Troubled History", op. cit., p. 3. 
55 The operation was baptized "Operation Restore Hope" by the Department of Defense. A few 
weeks later, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 794 establishing a safe environment for 
humanitarian aid in Somalia. Peter Woodward, op. cit., p. 76. 
56 The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) eventually replaced UNITAF. Ibid., p. 77. 
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1993, U.N. peacekeepers were being repeatedly attacked by guerilla groups led by 
General Mohammed Aidid. These groups wanted the U.N. to withdraw from 
Somalia in order to maintain their power. In reaction to this, President Clinton, 
who inherited the case from his predecessor, authorized U.S. troops to use force 
against General Aidid with the consent of the U.N. The operation, however, tumed 
into a chaotic battle in the streets of Mogadishu. Two U.S. 'Black Hawk' 
helicopters were shot down by Aidid' s rebels and 18 American soldiers were 
killed during the operation. 
This marked the end of the U.S. operation in Somalia and brought into 
question the very reason ofthis involvement. Many have considered the 'Battle of 
Mogadishu' unjustifiable since U.S. national interests were not at stake in Somalia. 
This event has created an aversion among the U.S. foreign policy community that 
has kept the American govemment away from Somalia and Somaliland. Somalia 
remained out of Washington's radar in the second half of the 1990s,57 and only 
received attention again following the terrorist attacks perpetrated against the 
United States on September 11 th. When asked why the U.S. government was not 
directly involved in the resolution of the Somalian conflict and why it does not 
recognize the independence of Somaliland, a high-ranking former U.S. official 
who was posted in the Hom of Africa in the 1990s answered: "Frankly there is a 
Somalia fatigue. What's really in it for us? Why get involved and open an embassy 
57 See Walter Kansteiner, Somalia: U.S. PoUcy Options, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 107th Congress, 
February 6, 2002. 
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ifit's going to get bombed the next week? Once upon a time we had 28,000 troops 
there and we walked out with our tail between our legs". 58 
Despite the fact that Somaliland now lives in a different political reality 
than Somalia, in that it has been stable for almost ten years, the American 
government refrains itself from making any bold decision on the issue because it 
feels that it has nothing to gain from it. This is consistent with the realist paradigm. 
The Somalia aversion argument, of course, is not part of the official 
justification for nonrecognition. The two factors that are most often brought up 
are: 1) that Somaliland never got the approval of Somalia to secede, and 2) that the 
OAD rejects the secession of Somaliland. Yet, chapters 4 and 5 show that the 
Dnited States did recognize secessionist states that went through 'non-consensual 
divorce'. Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia were indeed recognized by the D.S. 
even if they unilaterally seceded from Yugoslavia. It is true that Yugoslavia had 
ceased to exist when the Americans granted recognition to these Yugoslav 
republics, but Somalia has also ceased to exist as a coherent political entity. If the 
fear of creating a political precedent is what precludes the D.S. government from 
recognizing Somaliland, it would seem that that precedent has already been 
created. Furthermore, the case of Eritrea in Chapter 7 shows that the OAD did not 
stop the D.S. delegation in London from supporting Eritrea's right of self-
determination in 1991. So, is the unilateral character of Somaliland' s secession 
and the OAD opposition enough to explain the D.S. nonrecognition policy? l 
doubt it. 
58 Phone interview with a former State Department official who asked to remain anonymous, 
May 25, 2005. 
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In fact, if the United States was convinced that the recognition of 
Somaliland would bring more stability to the region, it would certainly push for it. 
The U.S. would also have some solid arguments to justify its preference for 
recognition. First of aIl, Somaliland was a sovereign state recognized by the 
United States before it joined Somalia in 1960, a status that Eritrea did not have 
before being integrated into Ethiopia in 1952. Second, Somalilanders never fully 
consented to the terms of the Act of Union signed in 1960, which gives greater 
legitimacy to the secession. Together, these arguments are a solid justification for 
secessionist self-determination and constitute a fence against the spread of 
secessionist movements in Africa since Somaliland is a unique case. As for the 
moral aspect of the issue, the U.S. could emphasize the fact that Somalilanders 
experienced political and economic discrimination as weIl as military repression 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
Despite these strong arguments for recognition, the American government 
IS far from being convinced that recognition would bring more stability. 
Washington still views the whole region as unpredictable, and this assessment is 
'path dependent' on the military defeat in Mogadishu, which was a defining stage 
in the temporal sequence of events that shaped the U.S. policy toward Somaliland. 
The CUITent dominant view in the National Security Council and in the State 
Department is that as long as there is no central government in Mogadishu, 
nothing can be done to restore order. Some even argue in the foreign policy 
establishment that Somaliland did weIl and is relatively stable precisely because it 
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was not recognized.59 This would suggest that the hope of obtaining recognition 
forced Somalilanders to behave and to adopt a democratic system. This argument 
maintains that since Somaliland is already stable, international recognition would 
not bring much more stability to it. Therefore, there is no rush to issue diplomatie 
recognition, and the American govemment should continue to foeus on a global 
peace initiative that will bring order to Somalia as a whole. 
Another approach, which obtains increasing support from the academic 
community, argues that the U.S. recognition of Somaliland would in faet improve 
regional stability by sending the message to the rest of Somalia that if Somalians 
would come together and implement demoeratization, as did Somalilanders, the 
United States would be more supportive and helpful.6o For now, however, this 
view has not been endorsed by U.S. foreign policy officiaIs. 
Within the V.S. Executive 'Black Box' 
The Somaliland issue has never produced any significant disagreement 
between U.S. foreign policy agencies. In the early 1990s, the question of 
Somaliland' s recognition was not even on the agenda. The secession of 
Somaliland was treated as an epiphenomenon of Somalia state collapse and as one 
source of trouble among many. In early 2000, however, the issue of Somaliland's 
recognition was seriously studied by the African bureau of the State Department. 61 
59 Interview with aState Department official, Washington D.C., May 4,2005. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Interview with Walter Kansteiner, Washington DC, May 18,2005. 
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Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner came to the 
conclusion, however, that recognition would pro duce very little benefits with 
significant costs. Former Assistant Secretary of State Cohen reached a similar 
conclusion: "The OAD cooperates with us in anti-terrorism and in aH sorts of 
economic issues. If you weigh aH that against getting them upset about 
Somaliland, on balance it' s not worth it. ,,62 
The Ethnie Polities Argument Performs Poorly 
There has been no major variation in the D.S. policy toward Somaliland 
slllce 1991, which makes it difficult to analyze the impact that Somalian and 
Somalilander Americans had on the D.S. position. There is no policy shift that can 
be isolated to evaluate the influence of these diasporic groups. 
Evidence indicates, however, that Somalian Americans, which form a 
community of over 100,000 people in the Dnited States, have not been politically 
organized in Washington D.C., unlike Ethiopian Americans, for instance. The 
Somalian diaspora is divided by clans, it has been ineffective at raising its voice, 
and has failed to come up with a coherent position regarding the future of 
Somalia.63 l came across no evidence indicating that the D.S. position on the 
matter eould have been influeneed by this ethnie group. 
As for Somalilander Amerieans, they did organize demonstrations in 
Washington in favor of Somaliland's independenee but they were not well 
62 He added: "But logically, philosophically, and morally it's probably right to recognize them". 
Interview with Herman J. Cohen, Washington D.C., May 16,2005. 
63 Interview with Herman Cohen, Washington D.C. May 16,2005. See also Interview with Walter 
Kansteiner, Washington De, May 18,2005. 
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organized either, partly because they constitute a very small community in the 
United States; most of Somaliland's diaspora is located in England.64 As the U.S. 
position toward Somaliland has remained unchanged since 1991, we must 
conclude that Somalilander Americans have had very little or no influence at aIl on 
the U.S. position. 
Business Interests 
Oil corporations such as Exxon Mobil, Total, Amoco, and Chevron held 
exploration concessions in the north of Somalia in the late 1980s. When Somalia 
collapsed in 1991, these companies declaredforce majeure, which exempted them 
from their legal obligations toward the government of Somalia because of 
conditions beyond their control. 65 Parts of the concessions that were held by these 
oil corporations in the late 1980s are now located within the Republic of 
Somaliland. But since the United States does not recognize the secessionist state, 
these companies have been left with a complex legal situation and hope that one 
day their oil concessions will be honored if a central government is reestablished 
in Somalia.66 
In 1991, Conoco and Phillips (now merged into ConocOPhillips), one of the 
large st energy companies in the United States, discovered oil fields in the North-
East of Somalia close to the Somaliland border, and sorne of that oil lay under 
64 Interview with aState Department official, Washington D.C., May 4, 2005. 
65 Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections, "Somalia welcomes oil interest", Vol. 10, No. 17, 
September 15, 2005. http://www.gasandoil.comlgoc/news/nta53713.htm (accessed in May 2006). 
66 Ibid. 
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Somaliland's soil. The sites were expected to produce up to 300,000 barrels of oïl 
per day.67 Following Somaliland's secession, Conoco and Phillips worried about 
the juridical situation in Somaliland and consulted with U.S. government officials 
to evaluate whether it was safe to start oil exploration in the north.68 The problem 
was that international law did not apply to the self-declared republic and, 
therefore, Conoco and Phillips and the other corporations that chose to do business 
in Somaliland had no juridical appeal. 
That being said, 1 came across no evidence indicating that one or several of 
these oil firms have influenced, in one way or the other, the U.S policy toward 
Somalia and Somaliland. 1 found no information indicating that there might be a 
connection between U.S. executive officiaIs and the interests of oil corporations 
that were operating in Somalia and Somaliland. The literature on the Somalian 
crisis does not address this issue, and unclassified documents from the State 
Department do not mention or imply that politicians from the White Rouse 
elaborated a policy toward Somaliland that was in the interest of oil corporations 
with which they share ties. Finally, interviews conducted with current and former 
NSC and State Department officiaIs did not shed any light on this issue. 
Logically, we could have expected American oil companies to pressure the 
U.S. government to recognize the independence of Somaliland so that they could 
pump oil in the secessionist state without any legal uncertainty or political void. 
As mentioned above, however, 1 came across no evidence that validates this 
67 u.s. Department ofState, June 1991. Unclassified Document E15, case 200502026. Unclassified 
on January 26, 2006. 
68 U.S. Department ofState, June 1991. Unclassified Document E28, case 200502026. Unclassified 
on January 27,2006. 
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assertion. Furthermore, as we have seen, the V.S. has been constantly opposed to 
Somaliland's independence since 1991, which suggests that if indeed private 
corporations did try to pressure the White House, they failed in their attempt. 
1 am not arguing that the business interest argument falls short III 
explaining the U.S. foreign policy toward Somaliland, although previous chapters 
have demonstrated that this model is unconvincing. 1 am simply indicating that 
very little information is available on this issue and, therefore, that no conclusion 
can be reached at this stage on the ability of this argument to explain the puzzle 
under investigation. 
Conclusion 
The performance of the regional stability argument here is not as strong as 
it is in the other cases previously studied. In fact, the argument performs better in 
the period of 1991-97 when Somaliland was facing internaI wars. Somaliland was 
perceived as one zone of conflict among manY in Somalia, and the diplomatic 
recognition of this secessionist state was, therefore, not even on the U.S. agenda. 
The 1997-2005 period is a different story, however. Somaliland went through a 
sustained process of democratization and institutionalization. Yet, while the 
indicators of the regional stability model, taken together, predict the V.S. 
recognition of Somaliland, the American govemment holds fast to its policy of 
nonrecognition. 
This chapter has argued that the case of Somaliland is an exception to the 
extent that an ad hoc factor explains the current V.S. policy. The failed combat 
operation conducted in Mogadishu in 1993 has kept the American govemment 
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away from Somalia and Somaliland. There are not many instances ofU.S. military 
defeats in recent history. The Viet-Nam war and the 'Battle of Mogadishu' are 
probably the only two instances and their effects on the conduct of U.S. foreign 
policy should not be understated. The defeat in Mogadishu has tainted the U.S. 
government' s assessment of the evolution of Somaliland. Regardless of the 
considerable progress that Somalilanders made over the years to build a stable and 
liberal democracy, Washington is apparently unable to extricate Somaliland from 
the whole Somalian picture. For this reason, this case do es not perfectly fit the 
model due to its very unique character. 
The regional stability argument assumes that diplomatic recognition is a 
tool to foster regional order as long as the secessionist state can guarantee its 
sustainability by maintaining its internaI and external order. In the case of 
Somaliland, however, it is possible that the United States reached the opposite 
conclusion: that the recognition of Somaliland would not really contribute to 
bolster stability since the secessionist state does not generate instability. In that 
context, the identified cost of recognition (Le. fear of creating a precedent, and 
going against the OAU) may now appear higher because the benefits of 
recognition seem marginal. 
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9. 
Conclusion 
While the United States had been consistent in its approach toward 
secessionism during the cold war by systematically supporting host states, l its 
response to secessionist ambitions in the post-cold war was more confusing 
because it varied from case-to-case. Until now, no theoretical model has addressed 
this variation in the U.S. response to secessionist movements and explained the 
apparent inconsistency of its policy. The present dissertation remedies this 
research problem by showing that the regional stability theory perforrns weIl and 
explains the research puzzle under investigation. The model consistently offers 
better explanations and predictions than the ethnic politics and business interest 
arguments and challenges liberal daims that domestic politics define foreign 
policy. 
Moreover, by comparing intra-cases (i.e. the variations within each case), 
by looking at different secessionist movements taken from a same regional 
environment, and by contrasting the U.S. reaction to secessionism in the Balkans 
and in the Horn of Africa, this research has maximized the points of measurement 
of the theory and increased its extemal validity. Table 9.1 and 9.2 on the next 
pages highlight the "score" of the argument. 
1 The case of Bangladesh being the exception that proves the mIe. See Chapter 2, footnote 24. 
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Typology of the U.S. Regional Stability Model: 
First Step of the Argument 
External Stability Internal Negotiations V.S. Reaction 
Cross-National Violation of Conflict Central Govt. Military Central State U.S. U.S. 
Refugees Contiguous Escalation Negotiates with Repression Paralyzed or Expected Actual 
States' Secessionists Against Collapses Response Response 
Host State Sovereignty Secessionists 
Yugoslavia Yes No No Yes/then No Yes Yes End Support End Support 
to Yugoslavia's to Yugoslavia's 
Integrity Integrity 
FRY (Serbia- Yes No No Yes/then No Yes No End Support End Support 
Montenegro) toFRY's toFRY's 
Integrity Integrity 
Ethiopia Yes No No Yes/then No Yes Yes End Support End Support 
to Ethiopia's to Ethiopia's 
Integrity Integrity 
Somalia Yes No No No Yes Yes End Support Support 
to Somalia's to Somalia 's 
Integrity Integrity 
Cases in bold are successful predictions. Those in italics are incorrect predictions, which necessitate an ad hoc explanation. 
TABLE 9.2 
Typology of the V.S. Regional Stability Model: 
Second Step of the Argument 
External Stability Internai Stability D.S. Reaction 
Defined Respect of At Peace with Effective Respect of Democratic U.S. US. 
Territory International Neighbors Control of InternaI Referendum / Expected Actual 
Secessionist Borders Territory Borders Respect for Response Response 
State Minorities 
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Recognition Recognition 
(1991-92) of Secession of Secession 
Croatia Yes Yes No/then Yes No No Yes/No Nonrecognition Recognition 
(1991-92) of Secession of Secession 
Macedonia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes /Yes Recognition Recognition of 
(1991-04) But Tension of Secession Secession (delayed) 
with Greece 
Kosovo No Yes No No Yes No/No Nonrecognition Nonrecognition 
(1991-05) of Secession of Secession 
Eritrea Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Recognition Recognition 
(1989-93) Sponsored of Secession of Secession 
by u.N. 
Somaliland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Recognition Nonrecognition 
(1991-05) But Tension of Secession of Secession 
with Puntland 
Cases in bold are successful predictions. Those in italics are incorrect predictions, which necessitate an ad hoc explanation. 
Conclusion 
The Performance of the Model 
The first step of the argument is correct in explaining the U.S. reaction in 
three of the four host states studied (Le. Yugoslavia, FRY, and Ethiopia). The 
Dnited States supported these states as long as they were open to negotiation, and 
able or willing to negotiate. It is only once these central authorities failed to offer 
prospects for stabilization that the D.S. government considered the recognition of 
secessionist states as an alternative. As for the case of Somalia, an ad hoc 
explanation was necessary to understand why the D.S. keeps supporting a unified 
Somalian state, while the regional stability indicators anticipate the opposite 
decision. As explained in Chapter 8, this case is an exception to the extent that it 
is linked (even ifindirectly) to the D.S. military defeat in Mogadishu. 
The second step of the modeI aiso performs weil. Out of the six cases of 
secession examined, the argument is successful in explaining four of them. 
Eritrea, Macedonia and Slovenia were recognized by the D.S. because they 
fulfilled criteria of internal and external stability, while Kosovo was not 
recognized for the opposite reasons. Croatia and Somaliland represent deviant 
cases because they did not conform to the model. l consider the case of Croatia a 
minor deviance since broader stability considerations were at play in this case. 
The recognition of Croatia was part of a D.S. strategy to contain Serbia's 
aggressive behavior. This consideration explains why Croatians obtained 
recognition despite the fact that they did not meet aIl the stability conditions 
defined in Chapter 3. The D.S. strategy was more focused at that time on the 
transformation of Croatian republican boundaries into international borders than 
on Croatia's internai stability. The D.S. policy toward Croatia was, therefore, 
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driven by regional stability, but the means to aehieve it were different than those 
defined in the model. Hence, the theoretical assumption of the theory still holds in 
this case. 
Somaliland represents another challenge to the theory. In contrast to 
Croatia, the model expected this secessionist state to be recognized by the V.S. 
since Somalilanders have established a quite remarkably stable state. Yet, the 
American government still refuses to grant recognition to Hargeisa. As explained 
previously, this case is an exception. 
Domestic Arguments Perform Poorly 
The ethnie politics and business interest arguments do not perform well. In 
fact, they failed to explain the V.S. reaction to almost all the cases. Information 
eolleeted indicates that these domestic sources of foreign policy were secondary 
factors and often marginal ones at that. 
Ethnie Polities 
In only one brief instance was an ethnic group able to impact the conduct 
of V.S. policy toward a secessionist state. As shown in Chapter 5, the Clinton 
administration reversed its decision to exchange diplomatie relations with 
FYROM in 1994 beeause of the pressure exercised by the Greek-American lobby. 
The impact of this ethnie group remained limited, however, as it did not lead the 
V.S. to reverse its recognition of the republic. In all the other cases and intra-cases 
studied from the Balkans to the Hom of Africa, domestic ethnic politics in the 
Vnited States were always a secondary thought that could not seriously compete 
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with issues ofwar and peace in Ethiopia, FRY (Serbia-Montenegro), Somalia and 
Yugoslavia. 
Business Interests 
In contrast to the assessment of the ethnic politics argument, a categoricaI 
answer cannot be formulated toward the business interest argument since the 
available information to measure this argument was sometimes scarce. For 
instance, I had to renounce analyzing this proposition in the chapter on Kosovo 
because I was unable to collect sufficient facts. In sorne other cases, however, like 
Croatia and Slovenia, which were arguably the most important cases in terms of 
U.S. business interests because of their geographic location, I was able to show 
quite clearly that business interests were not an important factor in the foreign 
policy decision making. In light of collected evidence, this argument does not 
seem to be a significant factor. At no point in time was this model able to make a 
connection between the business interests of members of the U.S. executive 
branch of government and the recognition or nonrecognition of secessionist states. 
The Role of Regional and Great Powers 
The impact of these powers on the position of the United States toward 
secessionist conflicts was inconsistent. Germany did, to a certain extent, have an 
impact on the conduet of U.S. poliey toward Croatia and Slovenia, and Greece 
had a similar impact on the American government in the case of Macedonia. To a 
lesser extent, the European Union aIso influenced the U.S. perception of the issue 
of Kosovo's independence. However, the Balkan cases studied previously show 
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that these regional powers never diverted the U.S. government from pursuing its 
main interest: regional stability. The Bush administration categorically opposed 
Helmut Kohl's decision to recognize Zagreb and Ljubljana in December 1991 and 
waited for a cease-fire to occur between Croatia and Serbia as well as for the 
deployment of a large U.N. contingent of peacekeepers in Croatia and Bosnia 
before granting recognition. In the case of Macedonia, the strong Greek reaction 
against its potential recognition as 'Macedonia' created significant tensions 
between Athens and Skopje, which inhibited the U.S. government from moving 
on with its initial decision to recognize the republic. This factor, even ifit delayed 
recognition, did not prevent the Clinton administration from finding alternative 
ways to promote regional stability by deploying, for instance, U.S. troops at the 
Serbian-Macedonian border to contain a potential Serbian aggression. And 
ultimately, the American government recognized Macedonia despite Greece's 
objection, which tends to show that the impact of regional powers is limited. In 
the case of Kosovo, the European Union may have influenced the American 
perception of the issue in the 1990s but the lack of internaI and external stability 
of the Kosovo state is really what explains the Clinton administration's decision 
to oppose recognition in 1998-99. 
Moreover, in the case of Eritrea and Somaliland, the opinion of regional 
and great powers had a very marginal impact, if no impact at all, on the 
formulation of the U.S. response. The United States initially became involved in 
Ethiopia because the Soviet Union could no longer play a role in the region. 
When the Ethiopian crisis intensified in 1991, the U.S. government was really the 
only power involved in the resolution of the conflict. As a former colonial power, 
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Italy had attempted a few years before to help resolving the war but had been 
unsuccessful and did not influence Washington in favor or against the 
independence of Eritrea. As for Somaliland, Djibouti and Kenya have been 
particularly involved in the numerous attempts to resolve the Somalian civil war 
but their opposition to Somaliland independence does not explain the position of 
the U.S. 
In sum, we can conclude with reasonable confidence that regional and 
great powers had a secondary impact on the conduct of American foreign policy 
toward secessionism. 
A Coherent V.S. Policy Toward Secessionism? 
This research has shown that the United States does not have a written 
policy toward secessionist crises. The American government has never developed 
a grand strategy toward secessionist aspirations that would explicitly promote, for 
instance, the status quo or, conversely, the aspirations of secessionist movements. 
The only document that cornes close to such a policy is the guidelines for 
recognition that was elaborated by the State Department in 1991 (see Chapter 4) 
when the Bush administration was facing the emergence of secessionist states in 
the Balkans. 
With the multiplication of ethnic and secessionist conflicts since the end 
of the co Id war, political analysts, like David Callahan and Patricia Carley, have 
attempted to craft a coherent U.S. foreign policy to deal with these issues by 
tackling a fundamental dilemma of "weighing the risks to international stability of 
a policy that tends to favor the status quo as against a policy that indulges 
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nationalist aspirations".l This dissertation argues that this is a false debate. 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that the main issue is not whether or not the 
D.S. should support the status quo or secessionist changes as a principle, but 
rather how it should maximize regional stability when secessionist crises occur. 
As a defensive positional state, the D.S. focused on this fundamental interest, and 
empirical evidence indicates that the se arch for stability was consistent throughout 
aIl of the cases studied. In a word, regional stability is what guided the D.S. 
response; not principles, not domestic considerations, and certainly not a 
standardized policy on the matter. It is illusive to look for a one-size-fits-all 
foreign policy that could address the myriad of secessionist crises. What really 
matters is to identify the preferences that will guide the D.S. response, and this is 
precisely what the regional stability theory has done. 
From the Balkans to the Hom of Africa, the American govemment chose 
the option that provided the most stable outcome depending on the profile and on 
the evolution of each secessionist crisis. This is why the D.S. did recognize sorne 
secessionist states, while it remained opposed to the independence of other ones. 
This apparent inconsistency is, therefore, an illusion or an inconsistency "de 
façade" to the extent that it is the result of a coherent set of interests that produced 
different results for different crises. If we only focus on results, the D.S. approach 
1 David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict, New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1997, pp. 26-27. See also Patricia Carley, U.S. Responses to Self-Determination 
Movements: Strategies for Nonviolent Outcomes and Alternatives to Secession, Report frOID a 
Roundtable held in Conjunction with the Policy Planning Staff of the D.S. Department of State, 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute ofPeace, July 1997. 
http://www.usip.orglpubs/peaceworks/pwks 16.pdf (accessed July 2006). 
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seems inconsistent, but if we pay attention to process-tracing, or to the causal 
mechanisms leading to these outcomes, the D.S. has been consistent through time. 
Spheres of Interest 
This study also shows that the D.S. did not react with the same intensity 
and diligence toward secessionist movements in the Hom of Africa and in the 
Balkans. Indeed, the American govemment reacted more promptly to 
secessionism in Yugoslavia, than it did toward Ethiopia and Somalia. Although 
this dissertation demonstrates that regional stability was what mattered in both 
regional settings, evidence indicates that the American govemment was more 
concemed, for instance, by the refugees coming out of the Yugoslav secessionist 
wars than it was by similar problems in Ethiopia and Somalia. The reason for this 
is simple. The D.S. has more economic and political interests in Europe. The 
secessionist crises in the Balkans threatened to destabilize European economic 
partners and NATO allies. In the case of the Hom of Africa, secessionism did not 
significantly disrupt D.S. economic interests or the stability of allies. What it did, 
however, was destabilize the region and this is why the Dnited States became 
concemed with these issues. 
The differing D.S. reaction toward the Balkans and the Hom underlines 
the idea that stability drives American foreign policy as Washington focuses on 
stability where it matters most. This is another implication of the regional stability 
argument. 
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Theoretical Contributions 
The U.S. foreign policy toward secessionist conflicts abroad conforms to 
the defensive realist paradigm as clarified by Joseph Grieco's defensive 
po sitionali sm. The regional stability model shows in every case studied that the 
U.S. attempted to maintain regional status quo and had an anti-secessionist bias. 
Secessionist ambitions were perceived as sources of instability and, therefore, as 
going against American interests. Thus, this research not only refutes liberal 
arguments but it also disproves offensive realism. 
However, this dissertation demonstrates that status quo and stability do not 
have the same meaning and imply different things. If, on the one hand, the United 
States is the predominant power and greatly values international status quo, on the 
other hand, the American govemment had never supported as many secessionist 
states as it has since the end of the cold war, which seems to go against the 
previous assertion. 
What this research shows is that the status quo (i.e. the established order) 
do es not always play in favor of the stability of the regional sub-systems and, 
therefore, in the interests of the United States. As previous chapters have 
demonstrated, in certain situations, the U.S. will choose to break with the status 
quo because it generates instability and offers no real solution to end secessionist 
crises. The recognition of secessionist states, which represents a violation of the 
status quo and an alteration of the established order, can thus be a credible tool to 
reestablish regional stability. 
In the light of collected evidence, we can conclude that, everything being 
equal, the U.S. favors the maintenance of the status quo and has an anti-
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secessionist bias but only as long as an established regional order serves its 
interests. When it no longer does so, the American government will not hesitate to 
alter the status quo. In other words, stability rather than status quo defines U.S. 
security. This leads us to assert that the United States is not always a status quo 
power but that it is consistently a stability-seeking state. This distinction, which 
has an ontological dimension, refines the defensive positional approach of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
Moreover, this foreign policy theory is not so much about the United 
States as about the behavior of a predominant power. 1 argue that the basic 
assumptions and the logic of the regional stability argument could apply to other 
prevalent powers at any given time. Process-tracing is, however, one aspect of the 
model that would have to be adjusted if applied to a different state, since the 
governmental and institutional nature of each state is unique. Moreover, the way 
internaI stability is defined may also vary depending on the nature of the political 
regime of the predominant state in question. 
Validating a Common Assumption 
It is always interesting, from an academic point of view, to challenge a 
conventional wisdom and to prove it wrong. Such an endeavor makes our work 
original and potentially significant as far as future paths of research are 
concerned. The regional stability theory, however, do es not challenge common 
wisdoms but decodes, operationalizes, and validates a common intuition of U.S. 
foreign policy. In other words, it recognizes and explains the obvious. The model 
articulates the broad and abstract notion of stability, which is often intuitively 
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used to explain the American reaction to secessionist quarrels, and shows how it 
plays on the formulation offoreign policy. 
Thus, the contribution and originality of the the ory is not so much the fact 
that it argues that stability matters but rather that it depicts the mechanisms that 
connect the U.S. stability interest and the observable outcomes. It is at this level 
that the theoretical model makes a contribution to the literature and debates about 
U.S. foreign policy toward ethnie and secessionist strives. 
Contribution to the Debate in International Relations 
The theory developed contributes to the debates surrounding third states 
involvement in secessionist crises by showing that the international environment 
impacts the formulation of foreign policy. This assertion goes against the claims 
of recent theories on third state intervention, which argue that domestic incentives 
explain third state involvement in secessionist and ethnie conflicts (see 
Chapter 2). It has to be kept in mind, however, that the proposed theory is one of 
foreign policy and, therefore, that its contribution to international relation theory 
remains limited in scope by its nature. 
Future Paths of Research 
This dissertation does not pretend to be the definitive answer to this area 
of research. More case studies should be studied to increase the external validity 
of the theory and/or to refine it. A close look, for instance, at a third regional 
environment such as South East Asia would allow to compare cases like East 
Timor and Bougainvillea and assess whether regional stability explains why the 
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V.S. recognized the independence of the East Timorese in 2001 but refused to 
recognize Bougainvilleans who are still part of Papua New-Guinea. 
It would also be relevant to focus on cases that target the robustness of the 
first step of the model. For instance, future research could concentrate on the case 
of Abkhazia in Georgia or on the Pattani region in Thailand, to assess whether the 
V.S. has consistently supported these central states because they were able to 
maintain external stability, even if they refused to negotiate with secessionists. 
Another path of research could be to evaluate whether the logic of the 
argument applies to other V.S. foreign policy issues such as non-secessionist 
intrastate conflicts or the approach toward power sharing in instable multinational 
states. An interesting area of research, for instance, could measure whether the 
V.S. supports decentralization and minority representations in shaky multinational 
states for regional stability considerations or if, on the contrary, it supports 
centralization for similar reasons. Then, we could see whether the logic of the 
regional stability model explains the findings. 
In sum, more research is needed to get a better understanding of the 
motives shaping V.S. foreign policy toward issues related to nationalism and state 
fragmentation; however, the regional stability model gives us a strong base from 
which to work. 
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